Georges Rey
AOS: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Linguistics
Office: 1109 Skinner Bldg.

Georges Rey (PhD Harvard University) is Professor of Philosophy. He works primarily in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and has written numerous articles on problems surrounding (ir)rationality, concepts, linguistic competence, qualitative experience and consciousness, as well as a book,Contemporary Philosophy of Mind(Blackwell, 1997), where he defends a computational/representational theory of mind as a strategy for dealing with them.

Rey has been a visiting professor at MIT, Stanford, the University of Split in Zadar (as a Fulbright fellow); the Australian National University in Canberra; The School of Advanced Study, University of London; The Center for the Study of Mind in Nature at the Univ of Oslo; and at CREA in the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris, where he was also a visiting lecturer at the Ecole Normale Superieure. He was a co-editor with Barry Loewer of Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics(Blackwell 1991), and was the section editor for the Philosophy of Psychology entries in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

For details of his research, as well as pdf copies of most of his papers, please consult his professional website:


Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: a Contentiously Classical Approach, Oxford: Blackwell 1997.

Some Representative Recent articles:

Learning, Expressive Power and Mad Dog Nativism: The Poverty of Stimuli (and Analogies), Yet Again,(under review)

The Possibility of a Naturalistic Cartesianism Regarding Intuitions and Introspection, in volume on Philosophical Methods, ed. by M. Haug, London: Routledge (expected 2013)

We Arent All Self-Blind: a Defense of a Modest Introspectionism, Mind and Language (expected Spring 2013)

Externalism and Inexistence in Early Content, in R. Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning,New York: deGruyter (expected Spring 2012)

"Concepts, Defaults, and Internal Asymmetric Dependencies: Distillations of Fodor and Horwich" in The A Priori and Its Role in Philosophy, ed. by N. Kompa, C. Nimtz, and C. Suhm; Paderborn: Mentis (2009), pp185-204

"(Even High-Order) Intentionality Without Consciousness," Revue Internationale de Philosophie (2008), pp51-78

"Phenomenal Content and the Richness and Determinacy of Color Experience," Journal of Consciousness Studies,vol 14 (9-10) (2007), pp112-31

Resisting Normativism in Psychology, Blackwell Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. by J. Cohen andB. McLaughlin, Oxford: Blackwell (2007), pp69-84

Does Anyone Really Believe in God, Experience of Philosophy, 6th ed., ed. by D. Kolak and R. Martin,Oxford University Press (2006), pp. 335-353

Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence: an Overview of My Work, Croatian Journal of Philosophy,V(15), pp 389-415 (2005)