Paul M. Pietroski
AOS: Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Linguistics
Office: 1417B Marie Mount Hall

Paul Pietroski (PhD, MIT) is Professor of Philosophy and Linguistics. His main research interests lie at the intersection of these fields. Recently, his work has focused on how grammatical structure is related to logical form, how meaning is related to truth, and how human concepts are related to linguistic understanding.

Events and Semantic Architecture. Oxford University Press (2005, pbk 2006).

Causing Actions. Oxford University Press (2000, pbk 2002).

Framing Event Variables. To appear in Erkenntnis.

Poverty of Stimulus Revisited (with R. Berwick, B. Yankama, and N. Chomsky).Cognitive Science 35: 1207-42 (2011).

The Meaning of 'Most': Semantics, Numerosity and Psychology (with J. Lidz, T. Hunter, and J. Halberda).Mind and Language 24:554-585 (2009).

Minimalist Meaning, Internalist Interpretation. Biolinguistics 4: 317-41 (2008).

Meaning Before Truth, in Contextualism in Philosophy (Preyer and Peters, eds), Oxford University Press, 2005.

Nature, Nurture, and Universal Grammar (with Stephen Crain). Linguistics and Philosophy 24:139-86 (2001).

The Undeflated Domain of Semantics. Sats: The Nordic Journal of Philosophy 1:161-76 (2000). Reprinted, in part, in Reading Philosophy of Language (Hornsby and Longworth, eds.), Blackwell, 2005.

Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency. Mind 107: 73-111 (1998).

Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory.Ethics103: 489-515 (1993).