Department of Philosophy: People: Core Faculty: Patricia Greenspan

Patricia Greenspan (PhD, Harvard) is Professor of Philosophy. Her main areas of research are ethics and philosophy of mind. She is the author of two books on the role of emotions in rational and moral motivation and several articles on emotions, rationality, metaethics, and free will. She has held research fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities (1983-84), the National Humanities Center (1990-91), and Australian National University (Summer 1995). In 1991 she was elected to membership in the International Society for Research on Emotions. She has also served on the Executive Council of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Her current work concerns issues of metaethics, practical reasoning, and responsibility.

E-mail: pg@umd.edu

Personal Home Page: http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/

Representative Publications

Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1988).

"Practical Reasoning and Emotion," in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, ed. by A. Mele and P. Rawling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

"The Problem with Manipulation," American Philosophical Quarterly, 40 (2003), 155-64.

"Genes, Electrotransmitters, and Free Will," in D. Wasserman and R. Wachbroit (eds.), Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Methods, Meanings, and Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

"Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body": Royal Institute for Philosophy Conference on Emotions, 2001

"Emotional Strategies and Rationality," Ethics, 110 (2000), 469-87

"Subjective Guilt and Responsibility," Mind, 101 (1992), 287-303. Reprinted in R. J. Wallace (ed.), Reason, Emotion, and Will, International Research Library of Philosophy (Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999).

"Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-Based Externalist Ethics," Journal of Philosophical Ethics (1998).

"Guilt and Virtue," Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 57-70.

"Free Will and the Genome Project," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), 31-43.

"Behavior Control and Freedom of Action," Philosophical Review, 87 (1978), 225-40; reprinted in J. M. Fischer (ed.), Moral Responsibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 191-204.

"A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion," in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 191-204.

"Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives," Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 259-76.