Fall 2004 (Talks begin at 4:00 pm in 1115 Skinner)

October 20, 2004
Speaker: Andrew Kania, University of Maryland
Title: "All Play and No Work: The Ontology of Jazz"

Abstract:There are various disagreements about the value of jazz among casual audiences and in the critical and philosophical literature. In this paper I argue that these debates are often confused by various questionable, usually implicit, ontological assumptions. I consider several current contenders for an ontology of jazz, rejecting all of them in favor of a new view: that there are no works of art in jazz, only performances. It is a mistake to think there must be works of art in every artistic tradition, or that works of art are necessarily more valuable than other art entities such as performances.

Abstract: I look at two interpretive movements in philosophy of science, instrumentalism and constructivism. Since the 1960s, the former has been largely discredited. The latter grew up in the 1960s and is a lively and controversial movement that many would like to see discredited. My purpose is to explore each of these just enough to display their attractions, and to show why they should not be discredited -- at least not in favor of other, similar programs. But I also hope to display them in such a way as to raise the question of whether we should be receptive to any such program for understanding science.

Abstract: Can the fact that potential beneficiaries are indeterminate make a moral difference? Are there circumstances, in other words, in which one's reason to rescue a determinate individual is more stringent than one's reason to increase by one the number of individuals who are rescued? I argue that the answer is 'yes.' Determinacy can make a moral difference. If this is right, then we should resist assimilating the wrongness of refusing to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts (HREs) with the wrongness of refusing to rescue a (determinate) imperiled individual. This result has the added virtue of explaining a modest principle of humanitarianism, according to which it would be wrong for a potential donor never to contribute to HREs, even if on many discrete occasions it would not be wrong for her to refuse to contribute.

Abstract: Epistemic contextualists assert that the truth conditions for attributions using "knows" can vary with the context of attribution. Invariantists deny this. The contextual variation is not supposed to be obvious. Its defense consists in its purported explanatory utility. Contextualism is supposed to explain the paradoxical character of skepticism. But this defense fails. Broadly characterized versions of contextualism with some plausibility are of no use. Versions that are of some potential explanatory use require supplementation. When supplemented, the resulting explanations are worse than invariantist accounts.

Abstract: Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument (1982, 1986) establishes the existence of phenomenal concepts, distinct from any physical concepts ('conceptual dualism'). On its own, however, the Knowledge Argument fails to prove that there are phenomenal properties, distinct from any physical properties. A further premise is needed to move from conceptual dualism to ontological dualism. Some philosophers think that such a premise is available, in the form of a 'transparency thesis'. (So we can schematize the argumentative set-up like this: (A) Conceptual Dualism (from the Knowledge Argument) + Transparency Thesis a Ontological Dualism.) I am one of the many contemporary philosophers who think that, while conceptual dualism is clearly true, the transparency thesis is false, and so that there is no sound route to ontological dualism.

When Jackson originally put forward the Knowledge Argument, he intended it to take us all the way to ontological dualism. More recently, however, he has come to have doubts. Given that he now wants to evade ontological dualism, his natural move would seem to be to reject the transparency thesis. Curiously, however, he has gone the other way. He has kept the transparency thesis, and chucked out conceptual dualism. Indeed Jackson is one of the most enthusiastic contemporary advocates of the transparency thesis. This means that his only way of avoiding ontological dualism is to disown his own Knowledge Argument as a proof of conceptual dualism. To my mind, Jackson has kept the bad premise and thrown out the good one. True, he now ends up with the right conclusion, the rejection of ontological dualism. But I view this as a kind of self-correcting mistake. Jackson gets to the right conclusion only by combining his mistaken insistence on the transparency thesis with his unnecessary recantation of his impeccable argument for conceptual dualism.

November 22, 2004
Speaker: Anna Ribeiro, University of Maryland
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December 1, 2004
Speaker: Bradley Rives, University of Maryland
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December 6, 2004
Speaker: José Idler-Acosta, University of Maryland
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December 8, 2004
Speaker: Erich Deise, University of Maryland
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