Fall 2003 (Talks begin at 3:30 pm in 1115 Skinner)

Sept. 17, 2003
Speaker: Ted Sider, Rutgers Unversity.
Title: "Vague, so Untrue"

Abstract: Vagueness must be eliminated before semantic notions - truth, implication, and so on - may be applied. Thus, nearly everything we say or think is neither true nor false. This nihilistic view is defensible when coupled with a theory of how vagueness is typically and properly ignored.

Oct. 1, 2003
Speaker: Barry Loewer, Rutgers University
Title: "Time and Law"

Oct. 15, 2003
Speaker: Rachel Cohon, SUNY Albany
Title: TBA

Oct. 29, 2003
Speaker: John Cooper, Princeton University
Title: "The Emotional Life of the Wise"

Nov. 12, 2003
Speaker: John Doris, UC Santa Cruz
Title: "Facing the Facts: Three Case Studies in Empirically Informed Ethics"

Nov. 19, 2003
Speaker: Jessica Pfeiffer, UM Baltimore County
Title: "The Real Problem with the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness"

Abstract: The propensity account of fitness has recently faced criticism from its previous defenders due to Gillespie's (1974 & 1977) findings that variance can affect selection and Finsen's and Beatty's (1989) similar finding with respect to skew. Some believe that these results merely require a revision of the mathematical formulation of fitness (Beatty & Finsen 1989; Brandon 1990). Sober(2002), however, argues that these revisions actually have profound implications for the metaphysics of fitness attributions. Given that the revised definition requires reference to population size, Sober argues that "an organism's fitness is not a propensity that it has," since populations size is extrinsic to the organism (2002, 320). In the first part of this paper, I argue that Sober's concerns are misplaced and that even the mathematical revisions may not be necessary. There is, however, a fundamental problem with the propensity account of fitness, which is the focus of the second part of the paper: its inability to deal adequately with the reference class problem. Brandon (1990) attempts to resolve this problem. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful. The problem results from the fact that the factors that are relevant for natural selection are only a subset of the factors that are causally relevant to the number of offspring produced. Therefore, when attributing fitness values to individuals or types, some features of the environment that are causally relevant for reproductive success, but not relevant for natural selection, are ignored. The question is whether ignoring causally relevant features makes sense on a propensity account of probabilities. If we only specify the selectively relevant features, there seems to be no fact of the matter about how probable each outcome is. Therefore, the probabilities associated with fitness would have no objective basis in the world.

Dec. 10, 2003
Speaker: David Lefkowitz, UM College Park
Title: TBA

Previous Colloquiua:Spring 2003