What are people investigating when they study moral judgment? From a psychological or cognitive science perspective, it would appear to be obvious that “moral judgment” is ambiguous between (1) a process of some kind and (2) a product of some process. From a philosophical perspective, we might distinguish judgment-qua-mental-action from judgment-qua-mental-state from judgment-qua-mental-attitude. All that said, empirical moral psychologists fail to attend to the basic ambiguity and rarely, if ever, attempt to connect their work to philosophical views about the nature of judgment. Philosophers are also to be faulted either for assuming that moral judgment is sui generis or for failing to investigate more closely the origins of moral judgments. While the course is motivated by my continuing interest in the nature of moral judgment, a great deal of the seminar will be devoted to thinking quite directly about judgment and judgments simplicter. You can expect to be reading (a little) Russell and Wittgenstein, Peacocke, G. Strawson, O’Shaughnessy, as well as a variety of recent work on moral judgment specifically.