

11

Name and Object

Our task in this chapter is to interpret the *TLP* terminology of 'name' (Name) and 'object' (Gegenstand, Ding).¹ This will determine our approach to the *TLP* semantics for sub-sentential expressions, which will occupy us throughout the remainder of this book. It will also be crucial for our understanding of the metaphysics of *TLP*, to be discussed in the sequel *MT*.

11.1 PRELIMINARIES

Our present concern is to judge between two quite different traditions of interpretation. One of these – which I shall refer to as 'the wide interpretation' – takes *TLP* names to cover not only proper names but also predicates and relational expressions.² Correspondingly, it takes the objects of *TLP* to include not only individuals but also properties and relations (universals). The other – narrow – interpretation takes names to cover only proper names and objects to include only individuals.³ I shall be arguing that we ought to adopt the narrow reading.⁴

On this topic, as elsewhere, one important consideration is Charity. As will emerge in the sections which follow, the wide interpretation forces us to regard a number of Wittgenstein's remarks as seriously confused, and others as trivial. On the narrow interpretation, on the other hand, there is no appearance of confusion, and the doctrines which would otherwise be trivial become substantive and interesting. But the most important argument from Charity depends upon our assessment of the Picture Theory. As we shall see from our discussion in chapters 14 and 15, on a wide reading of 'name' the Picture Theory contains nothing of any deep philosophical significance. In effect it will merely record a contingent fact about many natural languages. On the narrow interpret-

ation, however, it may be seen to mark a decisive step forward over the semantic theories invented by Frege. So the position argued for in this chapter can only be tentative: much will depend upon the arguments of later chapters, and the overall plausibility of the resulting reading of *TLP*.

Another general consideration against a wide reading of 'object' is that it is almost inconceivable that anyone who thought as highly of Frege as Wittgenstein did should simply have slurred over the distinction between concept and object. It is *a priori* most implausible to suppose that the writer who had acknowledged the 'great works of Frege' in *TLP*'s preface should have employed without any sort of apology an expression which simply equivocates between 'concept' and 'object'. For Frege had repeatedly insisted upon the fundamental importance of the distinction. It gets picked out as one of the three main methodological constraints in the introduction to *FA*, parallel in importance to the need to distinguish the logical from the psychological, and never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation – both of which, it should be noted, are not only echoed in *TLP* (4.1121, 3.3), but become absorbed into Wittgenstein's general approach. (See the discussion of chapters 3 and 8, and *MT*, chapter 2.) Moreover Frege had devoted three major papers to the subject: 'Function and Concept', 'Concept and Object' and 'What is a function?'. It is just incredible that Wittgenstein might have passed all of this over as being unworthy of any explicit comment, even if, as some have argued, he believed Frege to have overestimated its importance.⁵

11.2 UNDERSTANDING THE METAPHORS

The *TLP* exposition of the Picture Theory and of the nature of elementary states of affairs abounds with metaphors of a broadly spatial character.⁶ Thus a state of affairs is said to consist in a 'combination' of objects (2.01); it is said to be the changing 'configuration' of objects which produces states of affairs (2.0271–2.0272); we are told that the essence of a proposition can be seen clearly if we think of one which is expressed by a spatial arrangement of tables and chairs (3.1431); and we are told that the arrangement of names in a sentence presents a state of affairs in the manner of a *tableau vivant* (4.0311).

All this is entirely inappropriate if 'object' is intended to cover properties and relations as well as individuals, and if 'name' is to cover predicative expressions as well as proper names. For to speak of the relationship between an individual and a universal under which it falls as analogous to a spatial configuration would embody a fundamental confusion between a formal relation (which this is), and a relation proper (such as a spatial relation between two physical objects).⁷ And to suggest that it is the spatial arrangement of proper names and predicative expressions in a sentence which expresses its sense, precisely conflicts with what is claimed to be the main point of the Picture Theory, on the wide interpretation: that the real sign for a relation (say) is not the relational expression itself, but rather a relation in which that expression figures (see chapter 14). Consequently those who take the wide interpretation are constrained to say that in these passages Wittgenstein is seriously confused.⁸

It might be claimed in defence of the wide reading that Wittgenstein's use of the language of spatial relations is just another of those places where he tries to say what can, on his own principles, only be shown. Yet it is hard to see even what he might be *trying* to get at in saying that a red chair is a 'configuration' of the chair and redness (2.0272) or in saying that the chair and redness 'stand in a determinate relation to one another' (2.031). On the other hand, if 'object' only covers individuals, then it is easy to see what he is trying to get across; namely, that a state of affairs will consist of individuals standing in some material relation to one another. (Although this, too, is something which cannot strictly be said, since anyone who understands an elementary proposition would already know that it describes a relation between objects.)

Some have argued that since states of affairs are said to be combinations of objects, we cannot take this to mean a genuine relation between individuals.⁹ For where a state of affairs consists of a single individual possessing a property it would be nonsense to talk of the property 'combining' that object into a state of affairs. One possible line of reply would be to claim that in Wittgenstein's view there *would not be* any elementary states of affairs containing only one individual. Rather, all would consist of *relations between* individuals. Thus consider 2.0231–2.0232, where he writes as follows:

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented – only by the configuration of objects that they are produced. In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless.

On the narrow reading this might naturally be taken to mean that the substance of the world – that is, the necessarily existing simple individuals¹⁰ – does not by itself determine any fact about the world, because the only material properties possessed by such individuals consist in the relations in which they stand to other individuals. Thus individuals are, in a manner of speaking, 'colourless' in that they possess no properties except relational ones. (The corresponding semantic thesis would be that all elementary propositions consist of proper names standing in some significant relationship to one another.) These are of course of substantive and interesting claims.¹¹

If we adopt this line of reply we immediately face the question of why Wittgenstein should have believed that the only properties which simple individuals possess consist of their relations to other individuals. The only possible answer is that he must have had at least the outline of a programme of analysis already in mind. Now in *MT* chapter 14 I shall put forward a model for the elementary propositions of *TLP* which enables them to meet many of the constraints which Wittgenstein lays down (notably logical independence). Since all elementary propositions on this model are relational ones, it may be that he already had it (or something like it) before his mind when writing the metaphysical remarks of *TLP*. Alternatively, since he clearly believed that even the simplest of ordinary language predicates, particularly those of colour, would turn out under analysis to contain significant logical structure (6.3751), he may have felt that there would be no need for monadic predicates to make their appearance once again at the terminal level.

However, there also exists quite another line of reply to the objection, defended by Sellars in his (1962a), which avoids having to attribute to *TLP* a doctrine of bare (propertyless) particulars. This is that Wittgenstein may have been happy to speak of monadic combinations of objects, just as Russell had been happy to speak of properties as monadic relations. So when Wittgenstein

says at 2.14 that in a picture the elements (names) are related to one another in a determinate way, this would be taken to cover, as a limiting case, pictures which contain just a single name, where some property of the name itself (e.g. the style of its script) would serve to ascribe a monadic property to the individual referred to.

This is certainly a possible interpretation, though it produces a reading of the text which is far from natural. (For example, 2.03 has to be taken to cover states of affairs which contain just a single chain-link.) But it matters little for our purposes whether it is this, or rather the previous interpretation of objects as bare particulars, which is the correct one. For in fact most of the substantive doctrines of *TLP* which I shall discuss (both here and in the sequel) are consistent with either reading. Since this is so, and since the bare-particular interpretation is the more textually natural of the two, I propose to adopt it as my preferred version of the narrow reading of the *TLP* terminology of 'name' and 'object'.

Undoubtedly the most awkward metaphor to interpret, from the standpoint of the narrow reading, is 2.03. This says that the objects in a state of affairs fit into one another like the links of a chain. Given the well-known Fregean metaphor of the 'completion' of a concept by an object, it would be natural to take 2.03 as describing the (formal) relation which obtains between the objects *a* and *b* and the relation *R* in the state of affairs depicted by '*aRb*'.¹² It would be saying that the elements in that state of affairs are related to one another immediately, that they fit together 'of themselves'. Nevertheless, we do have a powerful motive for finding an alternative interpretation of 2.03 if we can. For it is followed at 2.031 by the remark that in a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another. This would have to be read as saying that the objects *a*, *b* and the relation *R* are determinately related, which is an entirely unhappy way of putting the matter if they are supposed to fit together 'of themselves'.

In fact an alternative interpretation of 2.03 is readily to hand: we can see it as a model for the material relations between the individuals in a state of affairs, designed to render intelligible the doctrine that elementary propositions are logically independent of one another. (Note that this doctrine is about to be re-introduced, at 2.061–2.062.)¹³ For there is no way of making sense of it, if it is viewed through the medium of the spatial metaphors which dominate the *TLP* talk about states of affairs. Thus suppose – to take a

crude example – that elementary propositions took the form 'Object *a* is lying on top of *b*'. Then the truth of this proposition would be incompatible with indefinitely many others of the same form, for instance 'Object *a* is lying on top of *c*'. For one object cannot be in two places at once. A similar point could be made in connection with any system describing spatial relations between physical objects which employs names of those objects.¹⁴

I suggest then that 2.03 is presenting an alternative model for states of affairs, to set alongside the spatial model of 2.031, which is to render the logical independence of states of affairs intelligible. For the image of interlocking chain-links can at least capture the idea that no elementary proposition is inconsistent with another.¹⁵ Thus suppose that the simple names are names of chain-links, an elementary proposition '*abc*' saying that *a* is linked to *b* which is linked to *c*. Then the truth of this proposition is compatible with the truth of any other such proposition – with '*acb*', with '*ade*' and so on – although in any real case, with links of determinate size and thickness, there will be physical limitations on the modes of combination available.

Note that even Wittgenstein's comment on Ogden's original translation of 2.03, which has been cited by some in support of a wide reading of 'object', is in fact ambiguous between the two.¹⁶ Wittgenstein writes:

Here instead of 'Hang one on another' it should be 'hang one in another' as the links of a chain *do*! The meaning is *that there isn't anything third* that connects the links but that the links *themselves* make connection with one another. So if 'in' in this place is English please put it there. If one would hang *on* the other they might also be glued together. [Emphasis in original.]¹⁷

The sentence 'There isn't anything third that connects the links' could mean 'A formal relation is not a relation' (wide reading), or it could mean 'A material relation is not a thing' (narrow reading). In my view the reason why 'hang one on another' would be wrong is because it suggests that the relation obtaining between two individuals might be the same sort of thing as those individuals themselves, in the way that both a lump of glue and a chain-link are the same sort of thing. (However it does not follow that the *point* of the metaphor is to illustrate that this is *not* so.)

11.3 FORMS AND VARIABLES

Throughout the presentation of the Picture Theory early in *TLP*, Wittgenstein speaks of there being two very different aspects of pictures and the states of affairs pictured. There are the individual elements (the names) of the picture, corresponding to the objects in the state of affairs. And there is the form, realized in the determinate structure of the picture, which is common to both picture and state of affairs. (See 2.1–2.22.) Now there is a natural use of the term ‘form’ in which the form of the sentence ‘aRb’ is of a relational expression completed by two proper names. This is ‘form’ in the sense of ‘logical form’, on a fairly restricted (Fregean) understanding of ‘logical’. On this account the sentence ‘aRb’ might consist of the elements (names) ‘a’, ‘R’ and ‘b’, and the form $\alpha\alpha\beta$. And this would, of course, count in favour of a wide reading of ‘name’.¹⁸

In order to see the possibility of a different way of taking the name/form contrast we should turn to *NB* 98–9 – though with trepidation, since this is from the 1913 ‘Notes on Logic’. There Wittgenstein distinguishes, within the class of indefinable symbols, between names and forms. Here the names in ‘aRb’ are ‘a’ and ‘b’, and the form is the ‘general indefinable’ ‘xRy’. So when in *TLP* Wittgenstein distinguishes between the elements and pictorial form of a picture, he may have in mind the distinction between the proper names and predicative expression in a sentence.¹⁹ The pictorial form of an elementary proposition would then be the conventions governing which combinations of names are possible (make sense) and providing for the comparison of any possible combination of names with reality. (We shall consider such an interpretation in chapter 15.) And to say that the pictorial form is held in common between the picture and the pictured fact would be to say that both names and objects must have the same ‘degrees of freedom’; i.e. that to every combination of names which makes sense corresponds a possible combination of objects, and vice versa. This would be ‘logical form’ in the extended sense in which one might say that although, on the Fregean approach, ‘Seven is heavier than five’ is well-formed (it combines two proper names with a relational expression), it is, in reality, *ill*-formed.²⁰

When it comes to expressing the (Fregean) logical forms of propositions by means of variables, Wittgenstein proceeds in a way which strongly supports the narrow interpretation. Thus at 4.1272

we are told that the variable name ‘x’ is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object, and 4.24 implies that it is names (simple symbols) which may be substituted for the variables ‘x’, ‘y’ and ‘z’. Yet at 5.5261 he is careful to provide a distinct style of variable – namely ‘ \emptyset ’ – to range over properties. There he says that a fully generalized proposition would have the form ‘ $(\exists x)(\exists \emptyset)\emptyset x$ ’. Yet if he really understood names to include predicates as well as proper names, and hence took the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ to range over properties and relations as well as individuals, then it is hard to see why he should not simply have written the form of the fully generalized proposition as: ‘ $(\exists x)(\exists y)xy$ ’.

4.24 goes on to say that elementary propositions, being functions of names, may be written in the form ‘fx’, ‘ $\emptyset(x,y)$ ’, etc. Now since an elementary proposition is said to consist only of names, it might be thought to follow immediately from this that predicates and relational expressions are names.²¹ But this would be to fail to distinguish between the expressions which an elementary proposition actually contains, and the ways in which one might *represent* its form. Thus suppose that elementary propositions describe the linking together of chain-links, the sentence ‘abc’ saying that a is linked to b which is linked to c. The only *words* which such a sentence would contain would be the proper names ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’. But of course there is absolutely nothing to prevent us from representing it as having the form ‘Fx’, or ‘Gxy’, or even ‘Hxyz’. And indeed, we shall need to treat the sentence as having these forms in order to explain the validity of different patterns of argument involving generality.²²

11.4 FURTHER *TLP* EVIDENCE

The fact that Wittgenstein is clearly prepared to quantify over properties and relations, as he does at 5.5261, might suggest that he recognizes them within his basic ontology. And then they could hardly avoid mention in elementary propositions, given the general reductive programme of *TLP*. This would give us reason to assume that elementary propositions, consisting only of names, must include names of properties and relations.²³ But in fact the system of quantification employed in *TLP* is quasi-substitutional (5.501, 5.52). So which ontology our quantifications commit us to will depend

upon the way in which the substitutions are explained. And as we shall see in chapter 16, this can be done in such a way as to legitimize second-order quantification without commitment to the existence of universals. We shall also see in chapters 15 and 16 that there is a case for saying that *TLP* embraces a form of Conceptual Nominalism, which can be defended powerfully against its Realist rivals.

At 4.123, in the course of discussing the distinction between internal and external properties and relations, Wittgenstein writes as follows:

(This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation of lighter to darker. It is unthinkable that *these* two objects should not stand in this relation.) [Emphasis in the original.]

This certainly seems to suggest that shades of blue (i.e. properties) are being counted as objects. But in fact Wittgenstein immediately goes on to write the following:

(Here the shifting use of the word 'object' corresponds to the shifting use of the words 'property' and 'relation'.)²⁴

Given the narrow reading of the *TLP* use of 'object', this can be interpreted to mean that when he speaks in the previous remark of 'two objects standing in this relation' he is talking non-standardsly, having in mind two properties standing in an internal relation to one another – the shift in the use of 'relation' from external to internal being accompanied by a shift in the use of 'object' from individual to property.²⁵ So 4.123 need raise no problem for the narrow reading. Given the wide reading, on the other hand, it is not at all obvious how Wittgenstein's qualifying statement should be understood. For when we shift from speaking of two 'objects' (e.g. an individual and a universal) standing in some external relation to one another, to speaking of two 'objects' (e.g. two universals) standing in an internal relation, it is far from clear why there should be a corresponding shift in the sense of 'object'.

One further set of remarks speaking strongly in favour of the narrow interpretation is 3.323–3.324, which runs as follows:

(In the proposition 'Green is green' – where the first word is a proper name of a person and the last an adjective – these words do not merely have different *Bedeutungen*: they are *different symbols*.) In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them). [Emphasis in original.]

By 'different symbols' here – and throughout 3.321–3.325, as we saw in chapter 4 – it is clear that Wittgenstein means not just 'signs having different senses', but rather 'signs having different *kinds* of sense, different *kinds* of use'. It would then be simply extraordinary that he should, on the one hand, believe that the most fundamental confusions can be produced by slurring over the different kinds of use that proper names and predicates have, and yet that he should, on the other hand, use the term 'name' in such a way as to do precisely that.²⁶

A final remark supporting the narrow reading is 5.535, where Wittgenstein says that what Russell's axiom of infinity tried to say would express itself in language though the use of infinitely many names with different *Bedeutungen*. For Russell's axiom had concerned the existence of infinitely many distinct *individuals*.²⁷ So if 'name' here were taken widely, then what Wittgenstein says would be straightforwardly false. For a language containing infinitely many predicates would, on such an account, contain infinitely many names. Yet it would not even begin to show the truth of the axiom of infinity. So once again we have the choice of either taking 'name' to be ambiguous, or taking Wittgenstein to be foolish, or adopting the narrow reading throughout.

The only place in *TLP* where Wittgenstein unequivocally uses 'name' in the wide sense is 5.02, where he gives as an example of an affix to a name, Russell's use of 'c' as an affix to the sign '+'; thus implying that '+' is itself a name.²⁸ But I can see no reason why we should take this to be anything other than a non-literal illustration of what he is basically getting at, namely the essential compositeness of sentences. For it is clear that the whole point of the passage is to distinguish between signs which are, and signs which are not, essentially composite – '-p' belonging to the first category (contra Frege's doctrine that sentences are names) whereas both 'Julius Caesar' and '+_c' belong to the second. Moreover, when speaking directly about the simple sign which could replace '+_c', Wittgenstein is careful to describe it only as a sign (*Zeichen*) rather than a name.

11.5 EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF *TLP*

The evidence of *NB* is equivocal, though in general it supports the narrow reading. In particular, it is one of the earliest themes of the

pre-*TLP* writings that it would be a complete mistake to think of proper names and predicative expressions as functioning in anything like the same way. (See *NB* 10, 98–9, 104–5, 111, 121.) It is this early concern which finally culminates in the Picture Theory, on my interpretation of it. (See chapter 15.) Moreover there are many passages where Wittgenstein uses ‘object’ and ‘name’ in such a way as to contrast with ‘property’ and ‘predicate’. See for example *NB* 65, where he talks of the ideas of thing, relation and property in the plural. See also *NB* 115, where he talks of ‘the name of a property (to speak loosely)’.

On the other hand there are two (but only two) places in the early writings where ‘object’ is definitely used in such a way as to cover properties and relations. The first is at *NB* 61, which reads as follows:

What seems to be given us *a priori* is the concept: *This*. – Identical with the concept of the *object*. Relations and properties, etc. are *objects* too.²⁹ [Emphasis in original.]

These remarks occur in a particularly exploratory – and often poorly expressed – sequence of passages: on analysis, on the extent to which ordinary objects can be regarded as simple, on whether there really do have to be simple objects, and so on. I can therefore see no reason why they should not be read as a conditional, embodying a criticism of Russell. That is to say: if the concept ‘object’ is given to us as ‘whatever can be picked out by means of a demonstrative’ (as Russell thinks), then properties and relations would be objects too (which Russell did not think). We might then be expected to contrapose, and say that since properties and relations are obviously not objects, the concept ‘object’ cannot be given to us in this way. Certainly Wittgenstein never makes anything further of the fundamental role of demonstratives, presupposed by an unconditional reading of the above remarks. (And in the very next passage on p. 61 he is to be found speaking of propositions containing names *and* relations.)

The second place is at *NB* 69, where Wittgenstein says that in the inference from ‘All men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a man’ to ‘Socrates is mortal’, both Socrates and the property of mortality are functioning as simple objects. But I can see no reason why this need be taken at face value either. For it is clear from the context that what is interesting him here is the fact that one can apply the

principles of logic to the ordinary – unanalysed – propositions of natural language. So in this context, to treat something as a simple object is merely to behave as if it had, itself, no logical structure. All he is saying, in effect, is that for some purposes we can treat ‘Socrates is mortal’ as if it were an elementary proposition.

Finally, there is a certain amount of post-*TLP* evidence – mostly anecdotal – that years later Wittgenstein himself adopted the wide reading of the terminology of ‘name’ and ‘object’ in *TLP*.³⁰ But in accordance with the general principles of interpretation argued for in chapter 1, I propose to accord this no independent weight.

SUMMARY

There are many arguments supporting the narrow reading, and there is no insuperable textual evidence against it. But in the end the question comes down to a matter of judgement: does the narrow reading, or does it not, make *TLP* more plausible and interesting than the alternative? In this chapter I have set out part (but only part) of the case for thinking that it does. This issue will remain with us for the remainder of this book.

act exactly as if I had completed it. The point here is related to the one made in note 2 above – it is the aptness of the incomplete thought-token to give rise to complete thinkings with a particular content which constitutes it as a conscious expression of that content.

- 22 Here I consciously echo Wittgenstein's remarks in his 1919 letter to Russell, to emphasize the point that they do not commit him to any version of the code-breaking conception of language. (See Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 72.)
- 23 The two are isomorphic not just in that both employ structured arrangements of sign-tokens, but in that anything thinkable will be sayable and vice versa. For someone who entertains privately the thought [that P] need only select some public markers to play the same roles as the ones which exercise the capacities involved in their thinking. And conversely, someone who asserts publicly that P need only find some markers in consciousness to play the roles of their public words, in order to be able to entertain that thought privately.
- 24 It is worth indicating how the position outlined in this chapter differs from the theory of mental representation defended by Fodor (1981). There is agreement that thoughts are relations to sentences. But Fodor denies that these sentences will belong to a natural language, whereas I maintain that they very likely will be. Given that public thinking takes place in natural language, parsimony supports the suggestion that private thinkings will similarly employ natural language sentences. Moreover Fodor believes that all propositional attitudes are relational, whether they be conscious or non-conscious, personal or sub-personal; whereas I am inclined to believe that only conscious propositional attitudes are relations to sentences; a conscious attitude being one which is apt to emerge in a conscious thinking (an event employing an arrangement of signs) with the same content. I hope to develop these ideas elsewhere.

CHAPTER 11 NAME AND OBJECT

- 1 Some have sought to find a distinction between objects (Gegenstanden) and things (Dingen) – see for example Finch (1971). I myself can see no significant difference between the two. Indeed the way in which the terms are introduced at 2.01 strongly suggests that they are to be understood equivalently. There Wittgenstein tells us that a state of affairs is a combination of objects (or things).
- 2 Those who adopt the wide interpretation include Stenius (1960), Allaire (1963), Mounce (1981) and Hintikka and Hintikka (1986).
- 3 Those who adopt the narrow interpretation include Copi (1958b), Anscombe (1959), Sellars (1962a), Griffin (1964) and Fogelin (1982).
- 4 Pears (1987, pp. 137–9) has suggested that Wittgenstein does not

commit himself to either these two doctrines in particular, arguing that what is of value in the Picture Theory is consistent with either of them. I think this suggestion is intrinsically implausible, for reasons which will emerge shortly. But in any case, since he concedes that what he finds important in the Picture Theory is consistent with the narrow reading, a demonstration that there is additional significance to be found in that theory if the narrow reading is adopted will provide a reason for embracing it. This is what I shall argue.

Ishiguro (1969, pp. 48–9) also suggests a third alternative, arguing that the Simples referred to by the names of *TLP* are instantiations of simple properties (immanent universals). Although this reading does have some advantages, it is hard to see how, in that case, Simples could have necessary existence. (See *MT* ch. 8.) For there is no reason to think that the set of universals which are immanent in a world should be the same across all possible worlds. Moreover, on this account it is hard to see what the Picture Theory, as it applies at the level of elementary propositions (which would consist only of 'names' of immanent universals), could usefully show us about the semantics of ordinary sentences: though Ishiguro herself defends an interpretation of the Picture Theory similar to my own (see ch. 15 of this work) in her (1979).

- 5 See Allaire (1963), who argues that objects and properties (and names and predicates) are much more nearly alike, in Wittgenstein's view, than Frege thinks. On the interpretation to be defended in ch. 15, on the other hand, Wittgenstein not only accepts Frege's distinction between names and predicates but widens it still further, claiming that predicates and relational expressions do not have reference. His view is that their *Bedeutungen* are not items in reality, as are the *Bedeutungen* of names.

Note that the central importance of the concept/object distinction in Frege counts also against Pears' suggestion, mentioned in note 4 above, that Wittgenstein leaves the categorial status of objects unresolved.

- 6 Though strictly speaking, whether they are metaphors at all is a matter of interpretation. I think they clearly have to be, since if states of affairs were literally spatial configurations of physical particles then there could be no question of them being logically independent of one another. See the discussion which follows.
- 7 See Long (1982) for an account of the distinction.
- 8 See for example Stenius (1960), p. 132.
- 9 See Stenius (1960), p. 62.
- 10 I am aware that it is to a degree controversial to take the objects of *TLP* to have necessary existence. I shall return to the matter in *MT* ch. 8.
- 11 Notice that on the wide reading the claims in 2.0231–2.0232 become utterly banal. They would merely deny that any individual, or property, or relation can constitute a state of affairs by itself. Rather it is only 'combinations' of objects with properties, or objects with re-

- lations, which can constitute a state of affairs. And the corresponding semantic claim would merely be that no proper name or predicative expression can constitute a sentence by itself.
- 12 Indeed it has been claimed that since all the links in the chain serve equally to hold it together, Wittgenstein is here expressing the view that Simples are neither individuals nor universals, but some unique category of entity containing elements of both. (Peter Long put this view to me in correspondence.) The trouble with this suggestion is that it is impossible to see what would motivate the resulting doctrine.
- 13 It had been briefly mentioned at 1.21.
- 14 This is why Wittgenstein's talk of states of affairs being configurations of objects must be metaphorical – see note 6 above.
- 15 Yet it still leaves us with entailment-relations between elementary propositions. Thus 'abc' will imply 'cba', and 'abc & cde' will entail 'bcd'. I owe this point to Tim Williamson.
- 16 See Stenius (1975).
- 17 See Wittgenstein (1973), p. 23.
- 18 Anscombe in her (1959), ch. 7, combines a narrow reading of 'name' with the thesis that the forms of elementary propositions are logical ones. She can do this because she thinks that amongst the names within an elementary proposition will be names of property and relation tokens. But such an interpretation faces overwhelming difficulties, most notably over the supposed necessary existence of Simples (see *MT* ch.8) and the possibility of falsehood (see ch. 15 of this work).
- 19 Griffin endorses such an interpretation. See his (1964), p. 13ff. and p. 89ff.
- A plausible account of the genesis of the terminology would be as follows. In the 'Notes on Logic' Wittgenstein speaks of predicates and relational expressions as 'forms' because there is a sense in which they carry with them the form of a sentence, in a way that proper names do not. (This had been one of the strands in Frege's metaphor of the 'incompleteness' of predicates – see my 1983b.) He also thinks that properties and relations are all 'copulae' – i.e. that there are no logical forms of the sort Russell believed in (see *NB* 120–1). Then in *TLP*, when he moves to the view that elementary propositions consist only of proper names, the 'form' of a sentence has become the possibility of combining names in a given way, with different such modes of combination signifying different relations between objects.
- 20 C.f. *NB* 70: 'The watch is sitting on the table is nonsense!' (The German says 'sinnlos', usually translated as 'senseless'. But Wittgenstein obviously does not mean that 'The watch is sitting on the table' is either a tautology or a contradiction!) Frege had notoriously believed that in a properly constructed language predicates and relational expressions would be defined over all objects, so that truth-conditions would have to be fixed for 'Seven is heavier than five' – see his (1984), p. 148 and *BLA* 56. Wittgenstein on the other hand feels that

- these examples show that the idea of a Begriffsschrift has not been carried far enough. He thinks that in a properly constructed, fully analysed, language its very syntactic structures would prevent us from formulating sentences such as these.
- 21 See Stenius (1960), p. 126.
- 22 For example, the inference: $\forall x(abx \rightarrow edx)$, $abc \vdash edc$, treats the sentence 'abc' as having the form 'Fc'.
- Notice that we can respond as we have done in this paragraph to an argument based upon 4.1211, which says that the proposition 'fb' shows that the object b occurs in its Sinn. It does not follow from this that there are any elementary propositions consisting only of a name and a predicate.
- 23 This argument is made much of by Hintikka and Hintikka. See their (1986), pp. 35–7.
- 24 Notice that this qualifying remark was added late to *TLP*, not occurring after the otherwise similar passage in *PTLP* (4.1022331).
- 25 Note that Wittgenstein's preparedness to talk here about internal relations between properties need not commit him to the existence of universals, but only to the existence of concepts (senses) and property-tokens. See ch. 15 for my account of the *TLP* semantic ontology as including only individuals and property- and relation-tokens.
- 26 Note that even if 'Bedeutung' in this passage means 'reference' it still does not commit Wittgenstein to the view that predicates have reference. Rather, it could be read as saying that to attempt to characterize the difference between proper names and predicates by saying that they have different kinds of referent (as Frege does) is to make the distinction between them too slight.
- 27 See Sainsbury (1979), pp. 305–7.
- 28 Again this passage is strongly emphasized by Hintikka and Hintikka (1986), pp. 32–3.
- 29 Virtually every commentator who adopts the wide reading mentions this passage.
- 30 See for example the evidence assembled by Hintikka and Hintikka in their (1986), ch. 2.

CHAPTER 12 NAMES, KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY

- 1 This is the view to which Baker and Hacker are committed, since they see *TLP* as endorsing what they call 'The Augustinian Picture of Language'. See their (1980), pp. 36–41 and 57–9, and my critique in my (1984a).
- 2 Note that this combination of views enables us to rebut the criticisms made by the later Wittgenstein at *PI* 40, which many have taken to be directed against the *TLP* view of names. To say that the distinctive semantic content of any given name is exhausted by its reference is not