

stein was fascinated by questions of semantics and metaphysics for their own sakes. All the same, there was, no doubt, an intended connection between the showing/saying doctrine as it applies to propositions of metaphysics and logic on the one hand (see *TS 6*) and the supposed inexpressibility of genuine value on the other. But my view is that there is, in truth, little more than an *analogy* between the two doctrines – though I do not propose to defend this here.

7 See Walt Disney's film *Bambi*. The advice is delivered to Thumper by his mother.

8 For more detailed exposition and defence of these principles, see *TS 1*.

9 Indeed, I once thought of calling this book *In Defence of a Dinosaur*. This was in deference to a remark of White's in his (1974), that the system of thought of the *Tractatus*, like the metaphysical systems of Leibniz and Spinoza, has to be regarded, in the end, as belonging amongst the prehistoric monsters of philosophy.

10 See von Wright's 'Historical Introduction' to *PTLP*. McGuinness conjectures (on the basis of rather slim evidence) that *PTLP* may have been written in the Autumn of 1917. See his (1988), p. 265.

11 These letters are collected together in Wittgenstein (1974).

12 For the conversations with Waismann, see Waismann (1979); for accounts of Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures, see Ambrose (1979), Diamond (1976) and Lee (1980).

13 See the Editor's Preface to Wittgenstein (1973), pp. 12 and 15, and Wittgenstein (1974), pp. 114–18.

14 It is impossible to believe that the text of *TLP* is only the opaque, if highly polished, tip of an iceberg of explicitly articulated thoughts and arguments, most of which Wittgenstein chose to suppress for aesthetic or pedagogic effect – especially when we consider the equally opaque writing of *NB*, which was written purely for his own use. The truth is that he had difficulty expressing himself at all, and that his mode of thinking and arguing was always highly intuitive and inexplicit.

15 See *TS 1*, where this restriction is defended more fully.

16 See Blackwell (1981), p. 8.

17 Compare 4.116.

1 Semantic background

1 For further discussion of the directedness of *Sinn*, see *TS 3*.

2 For more detailed discussion of the textual evidence supporting the views presented here, see *TS 3*.

3 In *TS 4 I* note a number of ambiguities in the *TLP* use of both 'symbol' and 'proposition'. But I conclude that in general the terms are used to express the quasi-Fregean notions sketched in the text.

4 See *TS 4* for a full defence of this interpretation of *TLP*.

5 Of course Russell held that all thought must concern entities with which we are immediately acquainted; in particular: sense-data and universals abstractable

Notes

Preface

1 Baker and Hacker (1980) and Malcolm (1986) are particularly glaring examples of this tendency.

2 Consider the variety of interpretations offered in the five major studies recently published, namely Wright (1980), Kripke (1982), McGinn (1984), Baker & Hacker (1985) and Pears (1988).

3 This is most obviously true in the cases of Baker & Hacker and of Pears; but I believe it may also be true, at a rather deeper level, in the case of Kripke and McGinn. See the notes to Chs. 15 and 16 below.

4 Fogelin shows in his (1976) how Wittgenstein's account of the quantifiers is expressively inadequate, since there is no way in which the N-operator can be used to construct propositions of mixed multiple generality, such as '∃xVyFxy'. (However, Geach in his (1981) shows how this defect could easily have been remedied.) Fogelin also argues convincingly that Wittgenstein's doctrines concerning the N-operator commit him to the existence of a decision procedure for predicate logic, whereas there is demonstrably no such thing.

5 Briefly, the problem was this. You cannot give a normal explicit definition of the negation-sign, for example, without first having introduced the quantifiers, since the negation-sign may take a quantifier within its scope. But then on the other hand you cannot give such a definition of a quantifier, either, without first having introduced the negation-sign. For a quantifier may be attached to propositional functions containing that sign. So it looks as if our only recourse, if we are not to employ just a single logical operator, will be piecemeal definition: we shall first have to define the logical connectives as they apply to elementary propositions and propositional functions, and then, on that basis, redefine them for contexts where they take other logical connectives within their scope. See 5.451, 5.46, 5.47.

6 See McGuinness (1988), pp. 245ff. Indeed, shortly after the completion of *TLP* Wittgenstein claimed in a letter to Ficker that the main point of the book was an ethical one – see Engelmann (1967), p. 143. But this was certainly an exaggeration, understandable in a letter to a prospective publisher. No one should be able to read *TLP* or the earlier *NB* without realising that Wittgen-

from sense-data. See *TS 2* for a brief account of Russell's views on semantics. As will emerge both from *TS* and from the present work, my view is that the extent of Russell's influence on *TLP* has been greatly exaggerated by most commentators.

- 6 Sameness of sense is sameness of cognitive content – two sentences possess the same cognitive content within a particular idiolect only if a speaker cannot take differing cognitive attitudes towards them; if a speaker believes the one they must believe the other, and if they doubt the one they must doubt the other. For a more detailed presentation of Frege's theory of sense, see *TS 2*.
- 7 In fact 5.141 actually says that all logically equivalent sentences express the same proposition. But see *TS 4*, where I argue that this is best understood elliptically, as saying that all such sentences, while expressing different propositions (having different senses), are *essentially* the same proposition, in that for the purposes of communication they are equivalent, in that they say the same thing.
- 8 In *TS 5* I show how the *TLP* account of semantic content reflects the essential purpose of factual communication, namely to acquire rationally grounded beliefs from the assertions of other people. It is our need to share the same conception of a rational ground which requires the identity-conditions for semantic content to be expressed in conceptual rather than metaphysical terms.
- 9 See *TS 5* for full development and defence of the ideas sketched here.
- 10 This is over-simple, since many philosophical terms, such as 'complex', may figure in contingent sentences by virtue of applying to things which exist only contingently. But they will make no contribution to the semantic content of such sentences over and above what is already contributed by the terms with which they are combined. See *TS 6*.
- 11 See *TS 6*, where this interpretation is expounded and defended in more detail.
- 12 For example, I argue in *TS 7* that the condition for understanding the content of a command is mutual knowledge of causal equivalence – that exactly the same events would be necessary to bring about obedience to the command, on either interpretation of it.
- 13 See *TS 7* for a full defence of a purpose-relative concept of semantic content, and of its consistency with the remaining doctrines of *TLP*.
- 14 See *TS 11* for a full assessment of the evidence.
- 15 See *TS 11* and 12, where this is shown in some detail.
- 16 See, for example, Stenius (1960), where such an interpretation is defended at length.
- 17 An alternative suggestion, made by Sellars in his (1962a), would be that Wittgenstein might have been happy to speak of monadic combinations of objects, just as Russell had been happy to speak of properties as monadic relations. See *TS 11*, where this interpretation is (tentatively) rejected.
- 18 For more extensive defence of this interpretation, see *TS 4* and 12.
- 19 These views are defended more fully in *TS 13*.
- 20 See *TS 12* for extensive discussion of the problems of interpretation and understanding which will be sketched briefly here.

21 This is especially plausible in connection with artefacts. Could a particular table ever have existed, for example, if the parts of which it is in fact made had never been brought together?

22 I also suggest that Wittgenstein employed a non-standard conception of knowledge, under which knowledge requires, not conscious belief, but merely the ability to deduce it *a priori* from what one does consciously believe. See *TS 12*.

23 See *TS 15*, where these ideas are developed more fully, and where I trace their genesis in Wittgenstein's early writings.

24 Property-tokens are spatio-temporal entities: the token of freckledness present in Mary moves around with her, and ceases to exist when she does. They may also have causal powers, it being the token of freckledness present in Mary which causes others to find her attractive.

25 See *TS 15*, where this interpretation of the mature Picture Theory is developed in detail.

26 See *TS 16*, where this is argued in some detail.

27 See *TS 14* for examples and supporting argument.

28 This interpretation of *TLP* is defended in *TS 8*; and in *TS 10* I argue that Wittgenstein's view of the matter is actually correct.

29 See *TS 8*, where the points which follow are substantiated in greater detail.

30 See *TS 9* for supporting arguments.

31 See *TS 8* for a defence of this interpretation.

2 The Context Principle

1 The principle is not intended to rule out all explicit definitions of individual words. For of course if it is only the meaning of a particular numeral – say '4' – which is not known, then there is no special problem: we can say that it refers to the successor of 3.

2 See *TS 3* for further discussion.

3 In what follows I am heavily indebted to Wright. See his (1983), Ch. 1. See also Dummett (1973), pp. 495–8.

4 See Frege (1984), pp. 140 and 147 and (1979), p. 118. Currie argues in his (1984) that Frege's main reason for believing concepts to be incomplete is metaphysical rather than semantic. He bases his interpretation on remarks Frege made near the time of the publication of *Begriffsschrift*, when (prior to drawing the distinction between sense and reference) he seems to have thought of the content of a judgement as being something like a state of affairs. But this is insufficient to establish the resulting argument to be metaphysical, since even here Frege's views are driven by semantic considerations. (Thus whole contents are always contents of possible *assertion*, and the criterion of identity of content is given as sameness of logical consequences – see Frege (1972), pp. 112–13.) It is clear that for Frege throughout his career, the idea of incompleteness is introduced to explain the unity of *judgement*, rather than to underpin a prior metaphysical thesis about the unity of states of affairs.

5 Note that it does not follow from this that there is no independent reality

whose nature we come to discern, although McGuinness in his (1981) takes the Context Principle to undermine the realism of *TLP*. (Ishiguro, too, comes close to such a view in her (1969), suggesting that the names of *TLP* are mere 'dummy names'.) But there is an important distinction to be drawn here between two different versions of the thesis that the name/bearer relation is prior to propositions: a developmental thesis on the one hand (relating to the learning of language) and a semantic thesis on the other (relating to the nature of sentence-content). The Context Principle rules out the first of these, giving a central place to the use of sentences in the teaching of language. But the McGuinness view requires that it should also rule out the semantic thesis, entailing that for a name to refer is just a matter of how it functions in sentences. However, not only does this not follow, but it is of doubtful coherence. For the content of a sentence must surely be a function of the contents of its component words, since otherwise we should be incapable of understanding new sentences. So the content of a sentence must depend upon the objects to which its component names refer. This is the *TLP* view too – see 3.318, 4.026, 4.0311.

I agree with almost all of Pears' critique of McGuinness' interpretation, except that he too fails to draw the above distinction, apparently thinking the *TLP* view to be that one learns language by first having names attached to things 'like labels being attached to luggage'. See his (1987), pp. 102–3. We shall return to the issue of realism in the next chapter.

- 6 Frege comes to this doctrine through being impressed by an analogy between functions (such as *plus*) and concepts (such as *being freckled*). He thinks that both have to be regarded as essentially 'incomplete', and that both are rules of correlation: a functional expression introducing a rule mapping objects on to objects, and a concept-word expressing a rule for mapping objects on to truth-values. (See 'Function and Concept' and 'What is Function?' in his (1984).) But a close analogy provides no ground for an identification: it gives no reason for saying that the truth-values on to which concepts map objects are themselves objects, or for saying, in consequence, that sentences are complex names.
- 7 There is a remarkable similarity between 3.263 and Frege's discussion of indefinable signs in his 1906 essay 'On the Foundations of Geometry II'. There he writes: 'Since definitions are not possible for primitive elements, something else must enter in. I call it explication . . . Explications will generally be propositions that contain the expression in question.' (See Frege (1984), pp. 300–1.) This is surely too close for coincidence.
- 8 A thesis which receives striking empirical confirmation from studies of child language acquisition. See, for example, Ch. 18 in Ned Block (1981).
- 9 See Maslow (1961), pp. 63 and 73, and Baker & Hacker (1980), pp. 177 and 182.
- 10 This is another of those places where (as in the rejection both of pre-linguistic thinking and the idea that all words are names – see *TS* 8 and 15) I regard the early remarks in *PI* as expressing agreement with *TLP*, and not disagreement, as most commentators suggest.

- 11 See Baker and Hacker (1980), pp. 36–8 and 577–8. Pears too, although in general offering a more sensitive treatment of *TLP*, makes this mistake – see his (1987), pp. 10–17. He does so because he confuses the *TLP* commitment to the objectivity of logic and of meaning-to-world relations (on which see Chapter 4 below) with a commitment to Platonism. This in turn leads him to get the thrust of the later Wittgenstein's consideration of rule-following quite wrong (on which see Chapter 15 below).
- 12 This is explained briefly in *TS* 12. Of course on the interpretation of the Picture Theory defended in the final two chapters of *TS*, *no* relational expressions serve to refer to relations. The difference in the case of the identity-sign is that what renders an identity statement true is not a state of affairs, but an object; so not even relation-tokens need be introduced into its semantics.
- 13 For detailed development and defence of the argument sketched here, see Wright (1983).
- 14 *FA* 62. This was an important insight on Frege's part, with implications for many areas of philosophy. For example, if souls (non-physical subjects of consciousness) were to exist as genuine individuals, then there would have to be criteria of identity for them. Yet it proves impossible to provide such criteria. See my (1986), Ch. 3.
- 15 See *FA* 70–2. See also Wright (1983), Ch. 3.
- 16 See Wright (1983), Ch. 4 for a demonstration that the logicist programme can, in essence, be carried through using definitions of this sort.
- 17 An account not entirely unlike this is provided by Mounce in his (1981), Ch. 5. But he tries to elucidate the content of 'There are three eggs in the jar', not in terms of a 1–1 correlation between the eggs in the jar and the operations necessary to reach 'three' in the series of numerals, but rather in terms of the iterable operation of putting an egg into the jar. This is then vulnerable to Frege's crushing objection to Mill's similar account: 'What a mercy, then, that not everything in the world is nailed down!' (*FA* 7).
- 18 Frege appears to employ a maximising principle for objects: if an expression functioning as a name can be introduced and explained then (supposing it to figure in at least one truth) there exists a corresponding object. Reductionists like Wittgenstein, on the other hand, seemingly employ a minimising principle: if we can say what is said in a sentence containing an apparent name without using a referring expression, then there is no object referred to. Both principles are threatened with incoherence if, as Ramsey argued in 'Universals' (Ch. 1 of his (1978)), we can always transform names into predicates and predicates into names, for example using 'Wisdom carruthersises' to say the same as 'Carruthers is wise.' For in that case a minimiser will have to say that the latter sentence really refers to *no* object. Whereas a maximiser will be constrained to say that it in fact states a relation between *two* objects, and a vicious regress threatens ('Participation relates Wisdom and Carruthers'). In which case the only coherent strategy for constructing a semantic ontology would be to make use of the Principle of Semantic Relevance – see the discussion which follows in the text.

19 In *TS 16 I* deploy the principle on Wittgenstein's behalf in the course of arguing against the view that predicates refer to transcendent universals

The argument which follows in the text is a development of the one given by Dummett in his (1973), pp. 499–500 and 509–10.

20 Note that the Principle of Semantic Relevance is not the same thing as Ideal Verificationism. The claim is not that understanding a sentence means knowing how an ideally situated intelligence would be able to verify it. Rather, the claim is that there must be a degree of isomorphism between the truth-condition of a sentence and the main features of what we count as evidence for its truth. For evidence for truth is, after all, evidence that the truth-condition is fulfilled.

3 The primacy of logic

1 Note that the 'great mirror' metaphor raises considerable problems for the sort of non-realist view of *TLP* adopted by McGuinness in his (1981).

2 I here assume the truth of the S4 axiom: $\Box A \rightarrow \Box \Box A$.

3 See *TS 9* for a sketch of how such an account might go.

4 Notice that the 'great mirror' doctrine not only commits Wittgenstein to the view that to every possible or necessary representation in language there corresponds a real possibility or necessity in the world, but also to the reverse – that there can be no possibilities in the world which I am incapable of representing in language or thought. He must therefore hold that all natural languages are, in a certain sense, expressively adequate – maintaining that they are able to represent each one of the possibilities that there really are. This view seems plainly false. The addition of radically new concepts to a language (as often occurs in the course of scientific advance) will make it possible for us to represent things which we could not have represented before. So we have reason to think that there are possibilities which we are currently incapable of representing. This aspect of the 'great mirror' doctrine is imposed upon Wittgenstein by his view that all logical possibility must reduce to truth-functional contingency, where the elementary propositions out of which truth-functions may be constructed must be presupposed in any conceptual system whatever. On this see the discussion in Chapter 13.

5 Many commentators have argued for a connection between the doctrines of *TLP* and Kant's critical philosophy – see, for example, Maslow (1961), Stenius (1960) and Pears (1987). Just as Kant was concerned to draw limits to possible human knowledge, as well as maintaining that the structure of the human mind imposes a necessary structure upon experience, so Wittgenstein was concerned to draw limits to the possibility of thought, as well as maintaining that the structure of language imposes a necessary structure on the world of our apprehension. But one difference is that Kant held that we could still entertain thoughts about things outside of the possibility of experience (*Noumena*), whereas as I show in the text, for Wittgenstein we cannot even raise the ques-

tion what the world might be like, considered apart from its being an object of our thought. Another difference is that Wittgenstein takes no interest in questions of epistemology, his whole concern being focussed on the issue of thought and representation, as Anscombe argues in her (1959).

6 I here help myself to the assumption that dogs are not linguistically competent creatures. There are some who claim that all cognitive processing (including that of dogs) takes place in a language of thought – see, for example, Fodor (1981). I doubt whether this is true, but if it were it would only help my case.

7 Note that the usual sorts of response to scepticism are not available here. In particular, we cannot claim that belief in the accurate operation of our essence-sensitive faculty provides the best over-all explanation of the course of our experience. For the only 'experience' to be explained in this context is the class of our intuitively held beliefs about logical relationships.

In contrast there will, on the *TLP* view, be no special problem in explaining how we can have knowledge of the essence of language, since this need not be supposed to concern any mind-independent reality – rather it will be concerned with concepts (ideas) in our minds.

8 Hence making the counterfactual vacuously true.

9 Of course someone might say 'Numbers have colours' as an expression of a formalist position in the philosophy of arithmetic. But this would be a highly misleading way of putting their view, since for the formalist a number is not a numeral, but rather the abstract set of uses to which numerals are put – and these cannot have colours either.

10 I think such an account is consistent with the views of Kripke (see his (1980), pp. 128–9) and Putnam (see 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', in his (1973)).

To say that Wittgenstein's attitude to metaphysics is consistent with the recognition of metaphysical (as opposed to conceptual) necessity, however, is not to say the same for every aspect of his early thought. On the contrary, accepting that distinction would force him to give up the view that all necessity reduces to truth-functional tautology.

11 It might be suggested that such arguments may take the form: 'If it is possible that language (or such-and-such a feature of language) exists, then the world must be thus and so. But language (or such-and-such a feature of it) is possible. So the world must be thus and so.' Here the conclusion will be necessary because *both* premisses are. (If something is possible, then it is necessary that it should be possible.) But in fact there will generally be a suppressed third premiss of such arguments, since the only way of knowing, in general, that the existence of language, or of a certain feature of it, is *possible*, is by knowing that it is *actual*.

12 I have in mind an argument of the following general sort: I have a language for describing my sensations; if sensations were wholly private and unconnected with events in the physical world, then a language for describing them would be impossible; so sensations are not wholly private. See *PI 243ff*. See also my (1986), Ch. 6.

13 Of course Wittgenstein's view is that this contradiction will emerge, under

analysis, as truth-functional (6.3751). But this does not affect the point being made here.

On the issue of the world-referring nature of tautologies and contradictions McDonough goes seriously wrong. He correctly points out that the status of such propositions must, in Wittgenstein's view, be recognisable from the symbol alone, without consulting the real world. But he wrongly takes this to show that they are therefore not *about* the real world. (See his (1986), Ch. 11.) This makes it difficult to understand how Wittgenstein can think that tautologies nevertheless reveal the essence of the world to us (6.12).

14 In my previous publications I referred to this doctrine as 'logical realism', a title which now strikes me as somewhat unhappy.

15 See TS 9 for discussion of Frege's doctrine, and of the grounds of Wittgenstein's rejection of it.

16 Including, let me stress once again, Platonism about concepts. This is where Pears (1987) goes seriously wrong.

17 This account of logical objectivism needs to be made marginally more complicated to accommodate indexical statements. For the truth-condition of such a statement is not determined *a priori* by its sense, but rather by its sense together with the context of its present use. Nor does the sense of an indexical statement determine a truth-condition independently of literally everything contingent, since contexts of utterance are contingent. The crucial thing about the relationship between sense and truth-condition, for a logical objectivist, is that it should obtain independently of the capacities and dispositions of the judging subject: that it should be mind-independent.

4 Logical objectivism

1 See Russell (1921) and Ogden & Richards (1923).

2 See Frege (1984), p. 353.

3 For a demonstration of the innocuousness of the regress when deployed against theories of truth of other sorts, see my (1981).

4 See Frege (1979), pp. 128–9 and 134.

5 See Dummett (1973), pp. 661–2.

6 This is the argument I once thought decisive – see my (1981), pp. 28–9.

7 Frege's argument (or one of them) had been roughly this: (1) There are truths which are conceptually necessary – reflecting relations between our concepts (senses) and holding good for all times and possible worlds. (2) If senses existed only contingently, then there would be circumstances in which truths dependent upon them would fail to hold good (that is, worlds where those senses would not exist). (C) So senses in general and thoughts in particular (senses of complete sentences) must exist necessarily. The argument fails, since it turns on an equivocation between truth *in* a world (which is the notion involved in premiss (2)) and truth *about* a world (which is all that the truth of premiss (1) requires). See TS 9 for further discussion.

8 See the discussion in TS 9. Katz argues for the necessary existence of sentences on grounds very similar to those sketched in n. 7 above. See his (1981), Ch. 5. Including Wittgenstein – see TS 8 and 9.

10 For discussion of this issue see Wright's chapter, 'Anti-Realism and Revisionism' in his (1986b).

5 Determinate Sinn

1 That the Simples of TLP are supposed to have necessary existence will be defended in Chapter 8 below.

2 This would receive some support from the fact that the previous remark is 2.03, which says that the objects in a state of affairs fit into one another like the links of a chain. For the relation of linkage is an all-or-nothing one. See also the discussion of 2.03 in TS 12.

3 It has been suggested to me that one might be able to fix a sharp boundary without discreteness thus: point at a surface of uniform colour and say 'This is green, but anything more yellow than this is yellow.' This might be formally adequate, but would mean importing a sample into the very sense of the word. For only if you can carry the sample around with you (and be confident that it has not changed) will the definition be usable.

4 There is only one other remark in TLP besides 3.23 where 'determinacy' occurs as a noun. This is 3.24, where it occurs as the contradictory noun, in the claim that there will be an indeterminacy in any proposition which contains a sign signifying a complex object. But there are two reasons why the notion involved here must be different. Firstly, because the requirement of determinacy could not be a genuine requirement of logic (as Wittgenstein plainly thinks it is) if any significant propositions failed to comply with it. (Illogical thought is impossible – 5.4731.) And secondly because it is propositions (i.e. symbols, sentences with sense) which are said at 3.24 to contain indeterminacy; whereas it is the truth-conditions (*Sinn*) of propositions which are required by 3.23 to be determinate.

In the light of this it is plain that Anscombe goes wrong in equating the requirement of determinacy with the demand that propositions admit of only one way of being true and one way of being false, which she bases on a reading of 3.24. (See her (1959), pp. 34–5.) For if this demand were placed upon propositions in general, then clearly it is one that none of the propositions of ordinary language in fact satisfy. Yet if it were only placed upon elementary propositions, then we would still await some account of why there have to be elementary propositions, and why they have to possess such a property. In which case the requirement of determinacy could not have the sort of foundational position which Wittgenstein plainly conceives it to have. We should have to consider separately what arguments might motivate a programme of analysis which would terminate with elementary propositions possessing such a property. On this see Chapters 7, 9, 10 and 12 below.

5 Translated by Anscombe as 'completely clear', thus missing the fact that

Wittgenstein is here running together the requirement of sharpness with the requirement that I shall shortly call 'the requirement of determinacy-in-advance'.

6 Note how the idea that the significant relation in a sentence must refer to a relation-token (and not a universal) is still dogging him at this stage in the development of his thought. (See the discussion of the Picture Theory in Chapter 1.)

7 There would also be a problem about the significance of false sentences, as we saw briefly in Chapter 1.

8 I say 'the Wittgenstein of NB' because we must remember that the passages under consideration were written in the Summer of 1915, three full years before the final drafting of *TLP*. We have as yet been given no reason for thinking that the concern with vagueness survives into the mature work.

9 See Wright (1975), from whom the examples which follow are derived. Note that the argument here is a conceptual pragmatist one – on which see my (1987b).

10 Most commentators simply assume without argument that the requirement of determinacy of *Sinn* may be equated with the principle of sharpness – see, for example, Fogelin (1976), p. 14, and Malcolm (1986), pp. 38–42. The one notable exception is Anscombe – see n. 4 above.

11 It may be this sloppiness of expression which explains why the passage in question never made it beyond *PTLP* into the text of *TLP* itself. For once cut loose from its context in *NB* it stands out as singularly ill expressed.

12 It is important not to confuse the requirement of determinacy-in-advance with the argument from describing in advance, discussed in Section A of Chapter 4. The former is none other than logical objectivism itself, applied to the particular case of the internal relationship between a proposition and its truth-condition. Whereas the latter is an (unsound) argument in support of logical objectivism, premised upon our ordinary notion of what it is to describe something in advance of knowing the fact described.

6 Vagueness

1 If every proposition must determinately possess one or other of the truth-values *true* or *false* (Bivalence), then plainly there can be no possibility of a proposition possessing *neither* of those truth-values (Excluded Third). However, the converse entailment does not necessarily hold. Those anti-realists who think that truth-values have to be epistemologically accessible to us will refuse to assert Bivalence, since some propositions may be neither verifiable nor falsifiable. Yet they may continue to endorse Excluded Third, maintaining that we cannot be in a position to assert *both* that a proposition is not true *and* that it is not false – claiming that to be in a position to assert that it is not true is to be able to assert that it is false. See Chapter 11 for further discussion.

2 See for example Frege (1984), p. 148.

3 I owe this point to Michael Dummett.

4 See *TS 2* for further discussion of the criterion for sense-identity. The validity of the Same Sense Principle is not often noted, though it is in fact what Blackburn calls 'The Transparency Thesis' in his (1984), pp. 226f. Dummett defends what he calls 'The Equivalence Thesis', which is the claim that 'P' and 'It is true that P' are logically equivalent. (See his (1973), pp. 445–9 and 458–9.) He also notes the connections between truth and such notions as assertion and belief (*ibid.*, p. 463), but without apparently realising that they warrant the stronger claim that 'P' and 'It is true that P' always share the same cognitive content (i.e. that they warrant the Same Sense Principle).

Note that the Same Sense Principle need not entail any form of Redundancy Theory of Truth. Someone endorsing it could consistently maintain, for example, that truth consists in some appropriate *correspondence* with reality. For while it is surely the case that 'P' and 'It is true that P' cannot have the same sense unless they at least have the same logical consequences, the Same Sense Principle can be preserved here, provided we are prepared to maintain that the very notion of a proposition implicitly contains the idea of such a correspondence within it. Indeed I take it that something like this is Wittgenstein's position in *TLP*.

5 The example is of course the one from 'Truth', in which Dummett first raised his anti-realist objection to verification-transcendent truth-values. See his (1978), p. 16.

6 I am in disagreement here with Wright, who asserts that there is no prospect of Bivalence being rendered consistent with the existence of vague statements. (See his (1986b), p. 4.) All we in fact require is a recognition that the Same Sense Principle governs the notion of truth (which renders vagueness consistent with Excluded Third), together with an insistence that 'determinately' in the expression of Bivalence means 'objectively' rather than 'clearly'.

7 Here, as before, the argument is a conceptual pragmatist one. See my (1987b) for a general exposition and defence of such arguments.

7 The programme of analysis

1 The idea of *Begriffsschrift* was explained briefly in *TS 2*. I agree with Griffin about its significance in *TLP*. See his (1964), pp. 135ff.

2 For a brief explanation and assessment of Wittgenstein's views on identity, see *TS 12*.

3 See *TS 11* for a discussion of the *TLP* notion of logical form.

4 It is here that he makes the disastrous suggestion that 'I mean THIS'.

5 This is also what Wittgenstein means at 3.24, when he says that a proposition involving reference to a complex object will contain indeterminacy. The idea is that such a proposition will be both unspecific (containing no explicit mention of the individual parts of the complex) and general (being represented in the first stage of analysis by a proposition containing a definite description). Here again I agree with Griffin, whose work seems to me to have been unjustly neglected by most commentators. See his (1964), pp. 61–5.

Note that the 'indeterminacy' of 3.24, which relates to the surface-unspecificity (i.e. of cognitive content) of ordinary propositions, is not at all the same as the 'determinacy' required of us by 3.23, which relates to the manner in which the specific truth-conditions (*Sinn*) of such propositions are determined.

- 6 This is one aspect of the *TLP* requirement that propositions be articulated (4.032). The idea is that it must be possible to analyse a proposition in such a way that the *analysans* is just as complex, and just as detailed, as the truth-condition of the original. (See 4.04.)
- 7 I owe this phrase, and the insight into *TLP* which lies behind it, to Roger White.
- 8 It would appear to be in this final step of the argument that the slide between metaphysical and conceptual necessity occurs, giving rise to the criticism of the *TLP* programme of analysis noted at the outset of this chapter. For we might rather analyse 'That watch is on the table' as implying 'Most of the actual parts of that watch (whatever they are) are combined together in some manner appropriate to constitute a watch, and are lying on the table.' This would be sufficient to explain how the sentence can be true in the variety of circumstances mentioned in the text, but without the term 'that watch' itself disappearing under analysis; and without the actual parts of the watch having to be specified *a priori*.

Notice that on such an account, the truth of 'That watch is on the table' would not follow from a detailed description of an arrangement of the component parts on the table by itself, but only from this together with the statement that these are indeed the parts of that watch. So language would not 'reach right up to the world' by itself, but only in conjunction with a contingent fact; but still, apparently, in a manner which is consistent with the truth of logical objectivism. What therefore commits Wittgenstein to analysing ordinary names into descriptions of arrangements of component parts is not his desire to show how ordinary propositions can be made true by particular states of affairs (itself motivated by his logical objectivism). If there is really any important aspect of *TLP* which commits him to such an analysis, it will have to be the argument to Simples. We shall return to the issue in Chapter 12.

- 9 Malcolm takes just such a view of *TLP*. See his (1986), Ch. 7.
- 10 Note that this remark follows hard on the heels of 4, which tells us that a thought is a proposition with *Sinn*. So when 4.002 says 'Language disguises thought', this means 'Language disguises the forms implicit in sense, implicit in our use of symbols', and not 'Language disguises what goes on in private thinking.'

8 Sense-data and solipsism

- 1 Ayer, for example, always believed *TLP* to be phenomenalist, and more recently Favrholdt (1964) and Hintikka & Hintikka (1986) have defended the same position.
- 2 See, for example, many of the verificationist remarks in *PR*, as well as some of

the comments about *TLP* recorded in Waismann (1979). See also the evidence assembled by Hintikka & Hintikka in their (1966), Ch. 3.

- 3 The 'Lectures' may be found in Russell (1956).
- 4 Anscombe makes the same point, and to a similar end (see her (1959), pp. 14 and 27); as does Griffin (1964), pp. 4 and 149ff.
- 5 See Hintikka & Hintikka (1986), p. 46.
- 6 There is also the evidence of a letter written to Russell late in 1913 where he says: 'Your Theory of Descriptions is quite CERTAINLY correct, even though the individual primitive signs in it are not at all the ones you thought' (capitals in original). See Wittgenstein (1974), pp. 43–4.
- 7 In any case, it might be said in defence of a phenomenalist reading that it is a moot point whether any system of elementary propositions whatever can comply with this requirement. We shall take the matter up in Chapter 14.
- 8 This reading of 2.022–2.023 has recently been challenged in Bradley (1987). He argues that objects can provide the form which is common to all possible worlds (which is what 2.023 literally says) without themselves existing in all worlds. Rather, all possibilities reduce to possible combinations of objects, amongst which are combinations involving objects other than those which exist in the actual world. Now this produces an extremely strange reading of many of the remarks within the 2.0s. For example, the claim that objects subsist independently of what is the case (2.024) has to be interpreted as saying that the status of an object as a possible existent is independent of what is true about the world, which reduces it to the merest truism. Indeed, this interpretation makes nonsense of the argument at 2.021, that objects cannot be composite because they make up the substance of the world. If objects 'constituting the substance of the world' means only that in all worlds they are possible, as Bradley claims, then there is no reason whatever why they should not be composite.
- 9 This is the interpretation offered by Hintikka & Hintikka (1986), Ch. 3.
- 10 This is missed by Hintikka & Hintikka, who place great reliance on the passage (see their (1986), p. 58), as they do on a phenomenalist reading of Wittgenstein's 'solipsism' generally.
- 11 But only part, for this still does not find a role for the metaphysical subject, even as a limit to the world. So the account of Wittgenstein's 'solipsism' presented by Mounce in his (1981), Ch. 9, which thus far agrees with my own, is only partially adequate.
- 12 See Kant (1929), p. 152 (B 131). The connection is also noted by Maslow (1961), pp. 149–50.
- 13 This interpretation agrees substantially with that of Anscombe (1959), pp. 166–7. But she goes wrong in supposing that the idea has anything especially to do with the privacy (and hence uniqueness) of my own sensations, and in drawing a parallel with *PR* 58, where Wittgenstein imagines a notation in which we say 'There is a headache' when L.W. has a headache, but in all other cases we say 'A is behaving as L.W. behaves when there is a headache.' For these ideas only come to the fore with the shift to a verificationist concep-

tion of meaning, which makes it difficult to see how it can even be possible to think of someone else having sensations. But for the Wittgenstein of *TLP* there would be no particular problem about this, nor is there any hint of such an idea in the text. Rather, what is unique is my perspective on the world as a whole, including both physical objects and my own and other people's sensations. See the discussion which follows in the text.

The interpretation also partly agrees with that of Pears (1987) (see especially pp. 166ff.), who is similarly opposed to a phenomenalist reading of *TLP*. But Pears claims that the point of the discussion of solipsism is that it is one attempt to draw limits to the thinkable, the solipsist's idea being that I can only think about things with which I have been acquainted (*ibid.*, pp. 34 and 162). This is to be rebutted by showing that in an important sense there is no self, thus undermining the attempt to use the self as a reference-point of all meaningful discourse. But it is hard to see how this can be right. For the thought that meaningful discourse is limited by the objects of actual acquaintance is available even to a Humean about the self, and so cannot be undermined merely by showing that there is nothing beyond the empirical self or 'bundle'.

14 Hacker, in the course of defending his phenomenalist reading of *TLP*, suggests that by the truth of realism Wittgenstein just means the truth (under an appropriate phenomenalist analysis) of many of our ordinary sentences involving apparent reference to physical objects (see his (1972), p. 80). But this is hardly very plausible, if only because 5.64 speaks of pure (or 'unadulterated') realism. Moreover, Wittgenstein does not go on to gloss his remark by saying that once the self of solipsism has shrunk to a point without extension there remains only the set of truths about experience, as one would expect if Hacker were correct, but rather by saying that there remains reality.

15 It is worth noting in passing that Wittgenstein certainly goes wrong in his analysis of reports of belief. For when I say what A is believing or thinking I do not need to specify what arrangement of signs is occurring in A's mind. (I can report the beliefs of a Japanese without mentioning any Japanese sentence.) So the quoted sentence in 'P' says P' is certainly out of place. What he ought to have maintained is that 'A believes that P' may be analysed as follows: there occurs in the bundle of events which is A's mind some structured arrangement of signs representing that P. For this would then have been correct as an analysis of reports of (the contents of) belief from what I called in *TS* 'the belief-acquisitive perspective' (see *TS* 5 and 13). But of course Wittgenstein's primary purpose was not to present a polished analysis of reports of belief, but rather to block any account which would place the metaphysical subject within the world.

16 It is in fact extremely close to the position taken by Nagel. See his (1986), Ch. 4.
17 This is the standard functionalist account of self-knowledge. I do not mean to endorse it, but introduce it here simply to make the point that the 'myness' of an experience need not be an additional fact about it. For my own view, see my (1989a).

18 This is a rough outline of the account presented and defended with great subtlety by Evans in his (1982), Chs. 6 and 7.

9 Simplex: weak arguments

1 I am aware that some philosophers disagree. For example Bennett, in his (1974), pp. 62–5, argues that given a Fregean conception of existence as a second-level attribute, there is no way of expressing the idea of an individual coming to exist out of nothing or going out of existence into nothing (what he calls 'an absolute existence-change'). But there are at least two possibilities which he does not consider, either one of which would be adequate to express such a change. The first is to employ second-order quantification over properties. Let 'Hx' be 'x is a hydrogen atom', and let 'Mxy' be 'x is the matter out of which y is made'. Then we could express the fact that a hydrogen atom goes clean out of existence between times t_1 and t_2 thus:

$$\exists x \exists y ((Hy \ \& \ Mxy) \text{ at } t_1 \ \& \ \forall F (-Fy \ \& \ -Fx) \text{ at } t_2).$$

Alternatively, we could express the same fact by employing the notion of identity thus:

$$\exists x \exists y ((Hy \ \& \ Mxy) \text{ at } t_1 \ \& \ \neg \exists z (z = x \vee z = y) \text{ at } t_2).$$

2 Indeed, I am told that some physicists have proposed that there are places distributed throughout the universe where hydrogen atoms are created out of nothing.

3 See the arguments of *TS* 8 and 9.

4 See the discussion in *TS* 12. Note that if I had adopted Sellars' (1982a) reading, which admits monadic 'configurations', then we should not be forced to see 2.0271 as committing Wittgenstein to the thesis that objects are changeless. For changing 'configurations of objects' could also cover changes in the monadic properties of objects. Objects would only be unalterable in the sense of being incapable of coming to be or ceasing to exist. But this in itself is an argument against Sellars, since it would be strange to describe this as 'unalterability' (see 2.027).

5 This fact is missed by most of those who attribute such an argument to Wittgenstein. See, for example, Malcolm (1986), pp. 37–43.

6 Yet precisely these moves are made by Hintikka & Hintikka in exposition of Wittgenstein, but without acknowledging how weak his position is rendered as a result. See their (1986), pp. 48–9, 61–2 and 68–70.

7 Malcolm, for example, attributes this argument to Wittgenstein (see his (1986), pp. 52 and 53–5); as does Griffin (1964), pp. 66–7.

8 Compare von Wright's essay 'Modal Logic and the *Tractatus*' in his (1982), where he argues on quite other grounds than those given here that the modal logic implicit in *TLP* is S5.

9 Malcolm recognises the argument from the fixed form of the world but seems to suggest, by implication, that the only way to avoid it is to give up the S5 axiom. See his (1986), p. 53.

- 10 Something like this argument seems to be advanced by McDonough (1986), pp. 108–13; but his presentation is far from clear. See also Griffin (1964), pp. 68–9, who also notes its unsoundness.
- 11 We might wonder whether the claimed reduction of all possibilities to the possible truth and falsity of elementary propositions can coherently be introduced into the argument at this stage. For must not this thesis presuppose that the existence of *Simples* has already been established? But in fact we saw in Chapter 7 that Wittgenstein has powerful reasons for thinking that it must be possible for all propositions to be analysed into completely detailed descriptions of their truth-conditions. And as we shall see in Chapter 10, he also has good reason for thinking that the terminal propositions of such an analysis must be genuinely singular (elementary). Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 13, even his reasons for thinking that the elementary propositions must be logically independent of one another in no way presuppose that the existence of *Simples* has already been established.

10 *Simples*: stronger arguments

- 1 The possibility that the circle is not vicious but holistic will be discussed in Chapter 12.
- 2 Although 5.526 says that one can describe the world completely by means of fully generalised propositions without first correlating any name with an object, this should not be counted as contrary evidence. For it is clear that what Wittgenstein has in mind is that every state of affairs can in principle be described without employing any singular propositions, not that one can understand (grasp the concept of) generality prior to understanding singular reference. See Chapter 12 for discussion of some further contra-indications.
- 3 Here I have in mind the arguments of recent quasi-Russellians such as Evans (1982) and McDowell (1984), who believe (like Frege) that singular thoughts involve modes of presentation, but modes of presentation whose very existence is tied to the existence of the objects thought about. These arguments will be considered briefly in Chapter 12. But see also my (1987a).
- 4 Arguments essentially similar to this have been put forward, in exposition of Wittgenstein, by White (1974), pp. 19–21, and Kenny (1973), p. 78. See also Malcolm (1986), p. 52.
- 5 Precisely this conflation is made by White (1974), pp. 23–5, and lies at the heart of his account of the contrast between Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies.
- 6 See *TS* 9.
- 7 Provided, of course, that 'Fb' belongs to factual discourse. I leave to one side the issue of truth in fiction.
- 8 I here assume that 'exists' is not a predicate. I find the arguments for saying that it is (as presented, for example, in Mackie (1976) and Evans (1982), pp. 343ff.) unconvincing. But in fact even if this assumption is not granted the argument may still go through. For it seems plausible that a thesis of semantic hierarchy,

similar to the claim that understanding quantification presupposes a grasp of singular reference, applies to the existence-predicate. Surely no one could understand sentences of the form 'Eb' ('b exists') who did not already understand some sentences of the form 'Fb' ('b has such-and-such an attribute'). For someone only understands 'Eb' who understands its negation. And how is '-Eb' to be explained except in terms of the idea that no sentence of the form 'Fb' is currently true? Thinking of -Eb is certainly not just a matter of imagining b disappearing!

- 9 So it cannot strictly be said or asserted, given the *TLP* account of semantic content. McGuinness, curiously, takes this to be a reason for denying the *TLP* notion of a simple object to be a realist one. See his (1981), pp. 72–3. His reasoning is hard to understand. For from the fact that the existence of a *Simple*, being necessary, cannot be significantly stated, it does not even begin to follow that *Simples* therefore do not constitute a realm of entities independent of our minds.

11 The principles of logic

- 1 Notably Strawson. See 'On Referring' in his (1971).
- 2 It is also of course entailed by the Same Sense Principle, discussed briefly in Chapter 6. The weaker of the two principles is employed here because it is less controversial.
- In this paragraph, as in much of the argument of this chapter, I am heavily indebted to Dummett's 'Truth' (see his (1978)).
- 3 On Russell's analysis, for example, it comes out as: One and only one thing is a father of Mary and that thing is not bald.
- 4 See his (1978), pp. 8–10.
- 5 Indeed, the issue is best seen as a conceptual pragmatist one. We can justify Excluded Third on another level if we can show that it reflects the concepts of truth and falsity which we ought to employ if those concepts are to be in accord with the purposes for which we draw a true/false distinction. See my (1987b) for further discussion of this style of argument.
- 6 See Dummett (1978), pp. 8–12 and 20. See also pp. xvii–xviii.
- 7 See Dummett (1973), pp. 354–5.
- 8 As Dummett argues ((1978), pp. 12–14), our interest in constructing a smoothly functioning semantics for the language might also motivate a distinction between different ways in which a proposition can fail to be true. But there are two points to be made about this. Firstly, this may not be the only way of achieving the intended effect (e.g. of explaining how 'The king of France is not bald' is false). We might be able to employ distinctions of scope instead, as Russell does; or we might distinguish between propositional and predicate negation. Secondly, this kind of motivation does not in any case derive from an interest in the truth, as such, of the propositions of our language. It comes rather from a second-order interest in semantic explanation. So even if the proposed distinction were accepted it would not justify rejection of Excluded

Third. Rather, as Dummett suggests, it would merely motivate distinguishing between two different types of falsehood.

- 9 More exactly, it gives rise to scepticism about the necessity of any system of representation whatever employing a concept of truth which would be such as to validate Excluded Third. It may be that Excluded Third is indeed necessary, given the nature of the true/false classification which we actually employ. But who is to say that all possible symbolic systems would have to employ precisely this way of drawing a true/false distinction?

12 Simples and logical objectivism

- 1 If the conceptual pragmatist argument with which we concluded Chapter 11 is correct, then what might be accidental is that we should have selected concepts of truth and falsity such that singular propositions are neither true nor false with respect to circumstances in which their objects of reference fail to exist. This much is consistent with logical objectivism – see my (1987b).
- 2 Note that there is nothing in this argument which entails the description-theory of names as it is usually understood, let alone the specific form of the theory to which Wittgenstein commits himself. For the claim that sentences containing ordinary names are not true with respect to the possible circumstances in which the bearers of those names would fail to exist is consistent with an analysis which takes an atomic sentence 'Fb' to have the form $\exists x(Fx \ \& \ x = b)$. Since this analysis still contains the name 'b', that name has not been analysed away into any sort of description. And since all ordinary names may be analysed in the same manner, we can still maintain that the distinctive contribution made by a particular name to the semantic content of sentences in which it occurs is exhausted by its bearer. Indeed, we could still maintain (as the semantic paradigm defended in *TS* requires) that a sentence containing a name which lacks a referent in the actual world is without semantic content.

Thus the plausible claim that sentences containing names are not true in the face of the possible non-existence of their objects of reference does not entail a description-theory of ordinary names. Moreover, even the claim that there have to be Simples does not entail that ordinary names are to be analysed into arrangements of Simples. For the argument only requires that there be some genuinely singular propositions which can be understood prior to acquiring the concept of generality, not that these propositions then have to be used to analyse the contents of all others.

What emerges from this is that the best way to understand Wittgenstein's commitment to a version of description-theory for ordinary names is in terms of the requirement of determinacy-in-advance, as we sketched in Chapter 7. For although that argument failed too, it had a degree of plausibility which is lacking here.

- 3 Further confirmation of the close connection between the argument to Simples and the requirement of determinacy-in-advance may be obtained from *PtLP*. There the equivalent of *TLP* 3.23 (namely 3.20101) is followed by two passages

expressing what is, in effect, that requirement. Thus *PtLP* 3.20102 tells us that the analysis of signs must come to an end somewhere, because if signs are to express anything at all then *Bedeutung* must belong to them in a way which is 'once and for all complete'. And *PtLP* 3.20103 is none other than the passage which when placed in its original context in *NB* formed our source for the very idea of the requirement of determinacy-in-advance (see Chapter 5).

- 4 It might be objected against this way of reading 2.0211, and in favour of the interpretation given in connection with the argument from Excluded Third in Chapter 10 (where the 'other proposition' is one asserting the existence of the object referred to), that it conflicts with the way in which Wittgenstein expresses the idea in the 'Notes Dictated to Moore' of 1914. There he says: 'The question whether a proposition has sense [*Sinn*] can never depend on the *truth* of another proposition about a constituent of the first.' (*NB* 116. Italics in original.) This certainly looks as if he is objecting to the possible contingency of the objects of reference, rather than the possible contingency of the relationship between a proposition and its truth-condition (as my interpretation would have it).

But there are two things which cast doubt on the connection between this passage and the otherwise similar-sounding 2.0211. The first is that there is some reason to think that he uses '*Sinn*', at this early stage, to mean 'sense', contrasting with its *TLP* usage to mean 'truth-condition'. See in particular *NB* 111. The second is that he is obviously not thinking of a situation in which an object of singular reference might fail to exist, since the passage continues by asserting that the sense of $\forall x(x = x)$ cannot depend upon the truth of $\exists x(x = x)$. Indeed, the context makes clear that what he is attacking is the idea that the status, as such, of a necessary truth (which must be recognisable from the symbol alone) might depend upon some empirical fact. So if anything the passage quoted supports my own reading of 2.0211, since in both cases the 'other proposition' would describe a contingent condition for the obtaining of a conceptual relation – in the one case between symbols and reality, in the other case between the symbols in a tautology – thus conflicting with logical objectivism.

- 5 This view has gained increasing ground in recent years, with demonstratives being accorded the sort of detailed scrutiny which used to be reserved for proper names. See, for example, Perry (1977) and (1979) and Evans (1982). See also my (1987a).

6 See, for example, Evans (1982) and McDowell (1984), as well as many of the papers in Pettit & McDowell (1986).

7 So much, at least, follows from the Context Principle. See Chapter 2 above.

8 The image of the web is of course Quine's in 'Two Dogmas'. See his (1953), pp. 42ff.

9 Notice that a similar concession is forced on us from quite a different direction. For the truth-condition of an indexical statement also depends, not just upon its sense and the state of the world, but upon the context in which it is made; and this, too, is contingent. But to acknowledge that this is so is not in itself to

reject logical objectivism, since the manner in which sense reaches out, *via* a context, to determine a truth-condition can still be considered to be wholly objective. In order to deny logical objectivism one must hold that the manner in which truth-conditions are determined is some function of human dispositions and reactions.

- 10 I disagree. I find Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy – both early and late – excessively narrow. But this should not be allowed to get in the way of our appreciation of his positive contributions, including, in the present instance, the intellectual challenge presented by the argument to Simples.
- 11 Note, moreover, that Wittgenstein himself is only committed to the weaker claim about how it must be possible to acquire a grasp of language, since he speaks at 3.23 of the requirement that simple signs be *possible*, rather than the requirement that they be actual.
- 12 It ought at least to make many contemporary philosophers feel uneasy that they accept something like Wittgenstein's logical objectivism, and his hierarchical picture of language, while thinking that they can deny his conclusion.

13 Independent elementary propositions

- 1 The theory is as follows. Where A entails B it gives it a probability of 1. Where A and B are logically independent they give one another a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$. And where A is inconsistent with B it gives it a probability of 0. Intermediate probabilities are arrived at thus: the probability which A gives to B is a ratio of the number of truth-grounds of B (lines containing a 'T' in its truth-table) which are also truth-grounds of A, against the total number of truth-grounds of A. For example, 'P ∨ Q' gives the proposition 'Q' a probability of $\frac{2}{3}$, since 'Q' is true in two out of the three cases where 'P ∨ Q' would be true. Clearly this truth-tabular account is only workable if the atomic propositions are all logically independent.
- 2 Of course the text here is hard to disentangle, since his thesis is precisely that all logic reduces to logic in the narrow sense – that all logic is truth-functional.
- 3 Griffin, too, stresses this point, in the context of a similar account of the independence requirement to that given here. See his (1964), pp. 84–6.
- 4 The same can also be said of Russell, and indeed of axiomatic approaches to logic generally.
- 5 Note the parallel here with the arguments we used while expounding Wittgenstein's programme of analysis in Chapter 7. The focus there was on the internal relationship between a proposition and its truth-condition; the focus here is on internal relationships between propositions themselves. But the principle is the same: Wittgenstein's demand is that the contents of the propositions in question should be displayed in such a way that the internal relations will manifestly depend upon sense alone.
- 6 See, for example, Hughes & Cresswell (1968). In this and the next two paragraphs I have benefited from discussions with Jack Copeland.
- 7 Moreover, if 'necessary' were allowed to be a predicate of individuals, and if

we supposed predicates to refer, then on the *TLP* account necessity *would* be a genuine aspect of reality, since Simples exist necessarily.

- 8 The moves made here are essentially the same as those which, I argued, enable us to find a place for meaningful philosophical discourse; see Chapter 1 and *TS* 7. This is, of course, no accident, since 'necessary' is one of the crucial distinctively philosophical terms.
- 9 Is it really so very obvious that no one could grasp the concept *red* without as yet having any concept of the other individual colours?
- 10 Of course I am here intending to sketch the sort of account of conceptual necessity which is distinctive of the later Wittgenstein. We shall return to consider the issue in a little more detail in Chapter 15.

14 Modelling elementary propositions

- 1 See, for example, Griffin (1964), pp. 42–50 and 152.
- 2 I myself owe the model which follows to Roger White, though I have since discovered it in Keyt (1963), presented almost as an aside (see Copi & Beard (1966), p. 290). It also has some similarities with the very sophisticated models provided by Goddard & Judge in their (1982); but these are designed to meet a different set of constraints, the most important of which is that Simples should not only be unknown but unknowable. These constraints derive from an interpretation which is largely unargued, and they make no attempt to fit their reading of the metaphysics of *TLP* into the semantic doctrines of the work; though even cursory consideration shows that they have misplaced Wittgenstein's concerns. In particular, they are obviously mistaken in their contention that he belongs within the continental tradition in epistemology exemplified by Kant, Brentano, Meinong and Husserl (*ibid.*, pp. 19–25).
- 3 For example 'There is a point-mass somewhere on plane a_1 at time t_2 ' will come out as: $\exists y \exists z (a_1 y z t_2)$.
- 4 In particular, an elementary proposition which states the existence of a point-mass at a given place and time does not entail the disjunction of the elementary propositions stating the existence of a point-mass at that or the surrounding places at the immediately succeeding time.
- 5 Moreover, even in the case of ordinary material objects, it is implausible that references to them are analytically equivalent to descriptions of the arrangement of their constitutive point-masses. See *TS* 12.
- 6 Not that these assumptions would necessarily have to be made explicitly. For a thinker's understanding of at least some of the names for planes of space might consist in an unarticulated recognitional capacity, acquired directly through immersion in the linguistic practice. But these capacities can only operate effectively if certain things are in fact true about the relative motions of the thinker and the physical items of their acquaintance.
- 7 We are nevertheless left with many interpretative options. For example, we might suppose Wittgenstein to have been working explicitly with our model, but to have failed to realise what would be required to set up and maintain a

system of coordinates, believing this to be of merely psychological interest. I therefore feel justified in continuing to maintain that *TLP* names have senses, despite the evidence of 4.243 – see *TS* 12.

8 In *TS* 11 I argued that Sellars' suggestion, that *TLP* admits of monadic concatenations, produces a reading of the text which, while possible, is far from natural.

9 Since Wittgenstein regards the full implementation of a programme of analysis as belonging to what he calls 'the application of logic', as opposed to logic proper (5.55–5.557), he feels that he can remain agnostic about its ultimate outcome. All the same he may have had firm ideas about the sort of direction in which a programme of analysis should go.

I take it that by the 'application of logic' Wittgenstein means the carrying-through of a programme of analysis for a particular natural language (as it exists in the world as we find it), as opposed to what can be said *a priori* about the form of all conceivable languages (logic proper).

10 Once again I owe the model which follows to Roger White.

11 This point is developed in my (1986), 2iii & 3iii. I believe it derives originally from Strawson's (1959), Ch. 4.

15 Deconstruction: following a rule

1 I have in mind Socrates' oft-repeated inference from someone's concession that they are unable to say what piety or courage or knowledge are, to the conclusion that they therefore do not know what they are.

2 See *TS* 10 for defence of the *TLP* view that thinkings consist in structured arrangements of sign-tokens. But notice that even if thinking could be explained in terms of non-language-involving beliefs there would remain a problem. For we should still want to know what it is about a belief which enables it to reach out to the world in a manner independent of the properties of the believer.

3 The same reasoning leads to the rejection of transcendent universals as candidates for senses. Thus Pears is quite correct that Platonism is a target of attack in Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following (see his (1987), pp. 10–11, 15–16 and 59–60 and his (1988), Ch. 17). But this is true only in so far as Platonism is one form of logical objectivism. So it is wrong to characterise the main difference between *TLP* and *PI* in terms of acceptance or rejection of Platonism, as Pears does. On the contrary, Wittgenstein was opposed to any form of Platonism throughout. See *TS* 9 and 15.

4 I owe the distinction between modified and radical conventionalism to Dummett. See his (1978), pp. 169–80. See also Wright (1980), Chs. 18–20. The modified conventionalist holds that all internal relations are (objective) consequences of a base-class of conventions, whereas the radical conventionalist holds that each and every internal relation is a direct expression of a convention.

5 Nor is time by any means the only dimension along which possible misunder-

standings can occur. For the samples will also, for example, have been of particular shapes and sizes, and will have been viewed within a particular region of space.

6 This point is made by Wright in his (1984a).

7 The idea of a logical objectivist sense is very similar to what McDonough calls 'a meaning terminus' (see his (1986), Ch. 6) – that is, an object of awareness which both represents the world and somehow contains its own standard for interpreting itself. It is a further advantage of my way of reading *TLP* (where senses are functions of conventionally determined uses of signs) as against McDonough's (where meanings are acts of thinking) that it can partially explain how the early Wittgenstein never came to see the absurdity of his view. For he may never have raised the question what it is to know the sense of a sign, perhaps thinking this to be the business of psychology. Whereas if McDonough is right, the lack of candidates for meaning termini ought to have been patently obvious to him.

8 Here I agree with McGinn (1984) about Wittgenstein's positive views on meaning, particularly his denial that the latter takes meaning to be essentially communitarian (as Kripke (1982) and – in some moods – Wright (1980) believe).

9 Perhaps Wittgenstein would be more likely to say that my memory of an intention is a *criterion* for its existence. It is not often noticed that most of the benefits of a criterial theory for mental-kind terms can also be provided by functionalism – particularly loose logical connections between mental states and their behavioural manifestations (because the concepts take the form 'state whose normal causes and effects are . . .'). On the notion of a criterion, see Albritton (1959), and Chs. 7 and 8 of Wright (1986b).

10 See Wright (1980), Ch. 11.

11 See McGinn (1984), who thinks that in attacking the view that understanding must consist in something 'coming before the mind', Wittgenstein is focussing on an idea which is without any lasting philosophical appeal (*ibid.*, pp. 95–6).

12 See Kripke (1982). We can distinguish four different constraints on the notion of meaning which are in play within Kripke's Sceptical Argument (the argument to show that there are no facts about meaning): (1) meaning is essentially normative, making room for a distinction between right and wrong use; (2) meaning provides unique justification, the meaning of 'plus', for example, justifying one and only one pattern of application; (3) meaning has infinite significance, justifying infinitely many possible applications; (4) meaning is non-inferentially accessible to consciousness, so that I do not have to form hypotheses about whether I mean *plus* or *quus* by 'plus'. He argues quite correctly that there is nothing which can meet all four constraints. But notice that the second and third are very close, at least, to logical objectivism. Once they have been dropped, there is no reason why a dispositional account of meaning should not be able to comply with the first and the fourth. What has to be given up is a myth about meaning, not the notion of meaning itself.

13 This is how I see Wittgenstein responding to Dummett's manifestation argu-

ment, which is a challenge to the believer in the objectivity of truth to say what a speaker could do to manifest a grasp of a verification-transcendent truth-condition (see, for example, Dummett (1976) and Wright (1986b), Introduction and Ch. 1). The answer is: by manifesting a capacity to employ the component terms in the sentence correctly. What the manifestation argument takes for granted is that a grasp of an objective truth-condition must, if it exists, be a separate capacity, not already accounted for by the thinker's capacity to use the component terms, as evidenced by their use of them in decidable sentences. But it is rather those capacities which *generate* the objectivity of truth, if the argument I give in the text is correct.

You could put the point like this: what a speaker grasps in understanding a sentence is not the objectivity of its truth-condition, but simply its truth-condition. Objectivity of truth is implied by the character of that understanding, rather than being a component idea within its scope. We can respond similarly to Wright's normativity argument (see his (1986b), pp. 23–6): the objectivity of truth need introduce no additional constraint on our linguistic practice, since it is something delivered by the capacities constitutive of our understanding, not a further normative component within the practice.

It might be replied that I am tacitly assuming that the understanding of words is prior to the understanding of sentences, whereas in fact it is secondary, having to be characterised in terms of the latter. But it is one thing to say that understanding a word is a matter of knowing how it will contribute to the content of sentences in which it occurs (with which I agree) and quite another thing to say that understanding a sentence must involve some capacity in addition to those which constitute the understanding of its component parts and their mode of combination (which seems to be what the manifestation and normativity arguments require).

- 14 I am grateful to Tim Fitzmaurice and A. D. Smith for helping me to appreciate this point.
- 15 Most of these difficulties were raised by Crispin Wright in correspondence.
- 16 Notice that this does not commit me to the sort of communitarian conception of meaning attributed to Wittgenstein by Kripke and others. To say that the norms of my language in fact involve reference to a community is not at all to say that the norms of any possible language must do so.
- 17 It is unclear to what extent Wittgenstein would have wished to endorse this anti-logical-objectivist defence of the objectivity of truth. For he appears to have been unwilling to accept that capacities have categorical bases in the brain (hence his view that there could not be just one occasion on which someone follows a rule, criticised soundly by McGinn in his (1984)). But on the other hand, he seems to have accepted that there are determinate counterfactual and hypothetical truths about my responses in various non-actualised circumstances (PI 187). In any case, it is striking that Wittgenstein does not in fact raise doubts concerning the objectivity of truths about remote regions of space and time (as do contemporary anti-realists like Dummett and Wright), his criticisms being confined to logic and mathematics. I suspect that there is a

deep tension within Wittgenstein's thought at this point. Dummett and Wright may be seen as defending one sort of rational reconstruction (extending the anti-realism), whereas I have been defending another (providing a categorical basis for determinate counterfactuals by dropping the opposition to physicalism).

- 18 Here I follow the account developed by Wright in his (1980), Part III.
- 19 The conventionalism is radical in the sense that necessary 'truths' are not thought to be genuine objects of discovery, but are rather the product of a general convention that we should elevate the results of our inability to imagine alternatives to the status of a rule of description. See Wright (1980), Ch. 23.
- 20 **Wittgenstein: early and late**
- 1 For full discussion, see TS 15.
- 2 For full defence, see TS 8.
- 3 See TS 8 for a defence of this claim.
- 4 For full discussion of Wittgenstein's opposition to Platonism in *TLP*, see TS 8, 9, 15 and 16.
- 5 For a more lengthy defence of the possibility that the later Wittgenstein may have misunderstood his earlier work, see TS 1.
- 6 Rightly, as I argue in TS 13.
- 7 Indeed, in one of the few passages in *TLP* where such matters are discussed (4.442), Wittgenstein assumes (wrongly) that Frege's assertion-sign is intended to contribute to the *content* of sentences to which it is attached.
- 8 Some commentators hold that the propositions of *TLP* are essentially assertoric, in that each *Satz* is an act of judging that such-and-such is the case. I argue against such an interpretation in TS 8.
- 9 What this then suggests is that the argument from determinacy of sense-sense comes apart from the argument from the objectivity of conceptual necessity – see Chapter 4. Rather it, like the objectivity of contingent truth, can be accounted for adequately in terms of the operation of the categorical bases of our conceptual capacities in accordance with natural law.
- 10 See TS 7 for a full defence of this view.
- 11 That *TLP* overlooks the possibility of purpose-relative concepts is all-of-a-piece with the lack of attention it pays to context-dependent aspects of language generally. But so far as I can see there is nothing in *TLP* which necessitates this.
- 12 This is not to say, however, that the only aspects of the system of thought of *TLP* which need to be rejected are those that would be undermined by the attack on logical objectivism. On the contrary, the assumption that the identity-condition for semantic content is the same in all regions of discourse is also false, and could be corrected without surrendering logical objectivism. Moreover (and more surprisingly), the *TLP* idea that the principles of logic – in particular Excluded Third – must govern any system of representation whatever, which we argued in Chapter 11 to be false, is also independent of logical

objectivism. Here all that was necessary was for Wittgenstein to recognise the truth of conceptual pragmatism, seeing that there may be a number of distinct but similar concepts in a given area of discourse from amongst which we are to select the one which best subserves our purposes. For as we saw in Chapter 11, our commitment to Excluded Third can only reflect the fact that within assertoric discourse our interest in truth is primary. Yet we can easily imagine circumstances in which our interests would be different, such that we should select a way of drawing the true/false distinction which would leave room for a third possibility. Yet so far as I can see, conceptual pragmatism would be consistent with all of Wittgenstein's other doctrines, including logical objectivism. On this see my (1987b), where I argue that conceptual pragmatism is not only consistent with both logical objectivism and its denial, but also with Platonism. 13 For discussion of these issues see many of the chapters in Dummett (1978) as well as his (1982), and Wright (1980) as well as the chapters in his (1986b).

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