Miscellaneous articles

[8] Tracking science: an alternative for those excluded by citizen science. (Louis Liebenberg first author; multiple others.) Citizen Science: Theory and Practice (2021).

[7]    The bodily senses. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M. Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press, 2013.

[6]    Inner sense. (With Vincent Picciuto.) In M. Matthen, M. Biggs, and J. Stokes (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press, 2013.

[5]    What is Empiricism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 64 (1990), 258-269.

[4] Conceptual pragmatism. Synthese 73 (1987), 205-224.

[3]    Russellian thoughts. Mind 96 (1987), 18-35.

[2]    Eternal thoughts. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984), 186-204.

[1]    Fragmentary sense. Mind 93 (1984), 351-369.

Book reviews and commentaries

[19] Sub-personal introspection. (With Christopher Masciari.) Journal of Consciousness Studies (2023). Commentary on “What forms could introspection take? A research program” by Francois Kammerer and Keith Frankish.

[18] Perceptual awareness or phenomenal consciousness? A dilemma. (With Christopher Masciari.) Biology and Philosophy (2021). Commentary on “Unlimited associative learning and the origins of consciousness,” by Jonathan Birch, Simona Ginsburg, and Eva Jablonka.

[17] Explaining the empiricist bias: Reply to Berent. Journal of Consciousness Studies (2020). A reply to Iris Berent’s critique of my paper, “How mindreading might mislead cognitive science.”

[16] Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy. (With Aida Roige.) Mind & Language (2019). Commentary on Cecilia Heyes, Cognitive Gadgets, Harvard University Press.

[15] Young children flexibly attribute mental states to others. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018), 115, 11351-11353. Commentary on Kiraly et al., Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018).

[14] Episodic memory isn’t essentially autonoetic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2018). Commentary on Johannes Mahr & Gergely Csibra, “Why do we remember?: The communicative function of episodic memory.”

[13] Review of Inborn Knowledge: The mystery within, by Colin McGinn. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May, 2016).

[12] Two concepts of metacognition. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 128 (2014), 138-139. (Commentary on Smith, Couchman, & Beran, “Animal metacognition: A tale of two comparative psychologies.”)

[11] Review of Plato’s Camera: How the physical brain captures a landscape of abstract universals, by Paul Churchland. (With Brendan Ritchie.) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (July, 2012.)

[10]   Descriptive Experience Sampling: What is it Good For? (With Mark Engelbert.) Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:1 (2011), 130-149.  (Commentary on Describing Inner Experience? by Russell Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel.)

[9] Simulation and the first person. Philosophical Studies 144 (2008), 467-475. (Commentary on Simulating Minds by Alvin Goldman.)

[8] Review of Simulating Minds: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading, by Alvin Goldman. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (November, 2006.)

[7]    Can panpsychism bridge the explanatory gap? (With Elizabeth Schechter.) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 10-11 (2006), 32-39. (Commentary on “Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism” by Galen Strawson.)

[6]    Review of Mindreading: an integrated account of pretence, self-awareness, and understanding other minds, by Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September, 2004).

[5]    Review of Thinking without Words by José Bermúdez. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55 (2004), 807-810.

[4]    Review of Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology by Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft. Â Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (November, 2003).

[3]    Review of Human Nature and the Limits of Science by John Dupré. Economics and Philosophy, 18 (2002), 357-363.

[2] Who is blind to blindsight? Psyche 7 (2001). (Commentary on The Significance of Consciousness by Charles Siewart.)

[1]    Review of What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered by Fiona Cowie. Philosophical Books 40 (1999), 258-260.