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[17] Language in cognition. In E.Margolis, R.Samuels, and S.Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. OUP, 2008.
[16] Précis of The Architecture of the Mind & On Fodor-fixation, flexibility, and human uniqueness. Mind and Language, 23 (2008).
[15] The creative-action theory of creativity. In Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 3: foundations and the future. OUP, 2007.
[14] Why pretend? In S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination. OUP, 2006.
[13] Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 2: culture and cognition. OUP, 2006.
[12] The case for massively modular models of mind. In R.Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell, 2006.
[11] Distinctively human thinking: modular precursors and components. In P.Carruthers, S.Laurence, and S.Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: structure and content. OUP, 2005.
[10] Practical reasoning in a modular mind. Mind and Language, 19 (2004).
[9] On Fodor's Problem. Mind and Language, 18 (2003).
[8] Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection? In C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell, 2003.
[7] Moderately massive modularity. In A. O’Hear (ed.), Mind and Persons. CUP, 2003.
[6] Modularity, language, and the flexibility of thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25:6 (2002). (Replies to commentators on #[5].)
For the complete BBS exchange, including both [5] and [6], click here: Adobe.
[5] The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25:6 (2002).
[4] Human creativity: its evolution, its cognitive basis, and its connections with childhood pretence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53 (2002).
[3] The roots of scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP, 2002.
[2] Thinking in language?: evolution and a modularist possibility. In P.Carruthers and J.Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. CUP, 1998.
[1] Pretend play: is it meta-representational? (Co-authored with Chris Jarrold, Jill Boucher, and Peter K Smith; second author.) Mind and Language 9 (1994).