PHIL 332 Philosophy of Beauty -- Spring 2008 -- Materials -- Methods - Lecture Outlines (as of May 12, 2008)
Instructor: John H. Brown Office: Skinner 1118B. Tel. 301-405-5702. Email: jhbrown@umd.edu. Office Hours: TTh 2:30-3:30 and by appointment. Classroom: Skinner 1115. Class meetings: TTH 11-12:15.
Books
1. Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just, 1999. (to be purchased)
2. John H. Brown, Theories of Beauty from Plato to the Present, in reduced
form, referred to simply as Beauty hereafter. Free on the web. Go to
instructor's home page at www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/jhbrown and
click on the items at the bottom: Beauty (PHIL 332) Intro/Part II, Part III,
etc. I recommend that you print out the main materials. You may find using
legal size paper is an advantage in doing this.
3. Eddy Zemach, Real Beauty, 1997. (to be purchased)
Supplementary Materials (some items will have to be posted under restricted-use conditions as they become relevant)
1. In Beauty Add-ons (wherever possible only a web reference to the material is given rather than the text itself).
Items mentioned above as being in the Add-ons folder are not listed here.
b. Reviews or discussions of James Kirwan
Jennifer A. McMahon, web (Google, Kirwan - Beauty/p.1 Jenny's Home Page
Crispin Sartwell, web (Google, Kirwan – Beauty/p.1 by Crispin Sartwellc. Reviews or discussions of Elaine Scarry
David Bowman interviews the author at: http://www.salon.com/books/feature/1999/11/09/scarry
Todd Gitlin review: http://www.prospect.org/print/V11/3/gitlin-t.html
Peter Benson review: http://www.philosophynow.org/issue44/44benson.htm.
2. In Beauty Notes
3. In Class discussion folder. See section on class discussion below
Character of the course
1. Presuppositions
Some basic familiarity with aesthetic criticism in some cultural domain (art, music, literature, etc.) and in life at large.
Interest in discovering a theoretical basis for aesthetic criticism
Interest in historical and contemporary theories of beauty and other aesthetic values..
2. Basic problems of the course in a few nutshells
a. Is beauty (and aesthetic value in general) an objective reality, or is it merely "in the eye of the beholder"?
Common formulations of the negative answer to this question:
- Everyone has his own idea of beauty.
- Beauty is entirely a personal (or individual) matter.
- Beauty is entirely a matter of feeling.
- Judgments of beauty are entirely subjective.b. If beauty is an objective reality, what sort of reality is it, and how can it be known? In particular how is its existence related to the aesthetic pleasure felt by those who appreciate it?
c. If beauty is not an objective reality, is there any rational basis for our aesthetic preferences?
3. Ways of addressing the problems
a. Collecting the bits of knowledge we have of the concept of beauty and of its most compelling instances, positive
and negative. Fashioning a coherent account of the basic "logic" of beauty.
b. Studying the attempts by philosophers past and present to produce a credible theory of beauty.
c. Working out what conditions beauty would have to satisfy in order to be a genuine reality.
d. Reviewing what is known about the world to see whether those conditions are in fact satisfied.
e. Exploring ways in which even a subjective beauty might be more or less rational.
4. Course requirements
a. Mid-term test on the reading material and lectures. 25 %
b. Final exam primarily on the theoretical material. 35%
c. Paper ca. 5-7 pages on a topic within the scope of the description immediately following. 25%
d. Class participation and perhaps a quiz or two. 15% (See immediately following)Paper Assignment
1. Subject: Find something you regard as really very beautiful and believe that fair judges of beauty would admire too, given conditions like Hume's (see the reading on this subject in the core text, part III). Then set to work detailing what is beautiful about it, saying what beautiful properties it has. To be convincing your description will have to aesthetically sensitive, not just a factual account of color, form, etc. Also it must not be just a rave, but be genuinely informative of the aesthetic merits of the thing. Cover all the aspects relevant to the high rating you give it. Acknowledge any downside, that is, any properties it has that are unbeautiful (less than beautiful, not necessarily ugly) and explain why they don't interfere with your appreciation and shouldn't interfere with that of anyone else who meets Hume's conditions.
The point is for you to show what you can do on the level of practical criticism, which is an important function for any aspiring philosopher of beauty.
I strongly advise you to pick an example for which you can find a good critical appreciation, and that you cite the critic's observations and comment upon them. That gives you a valuable head start without limiting your initiative. Also, review the material on aesthetic properties as a guide to the types of properties that are relevant to aesthetic value.
It's essential that your choice be something that can be displayed so I can see (or hear or read, etc.) what you are experiencing as you write about it. Aesthetic descriptions are far more enlightening when the thing described is present to the reader.
2. Length: Not less than 5 pages, preferably not more than 8.
3. Due date: Thursday, May 8.
Class participation via written comments
Because of the size of the class and the limited class time, it just isn't possible for everyone to participate enough in class or for their participation to be properly evaluated on the basis of that real-time participation. The sensible remedy is written comments, observations, criticisms, interpretations, and questions. Students email such items to me (jhbrown@umd.edu) and I will post them in the web folder 332Discussions.
Items will be grouped by subject. For instance, there will be a section on Scarry subdivided by the questions arising about her essays; another section on Plato, likewise subdivided, etc. Very often, I think, people who raise points in class will want to carry the exchange farther, make their point more sharply or convincingly. Others who don't speak in class will be expected to contribute by this method. The minimum participation over the course of the semester for each student will be five items. This way we will build up a fund of comments shared with the whole class, achieving more personal participation and more recognition of each by all. Naturally I reserve the right to comment on the comments, and you have the right to reciprocate. I think this is bound to improve the course.
There is no statute of limitations on topics to discuss. The truisms, for example, can be discussed as late in the course as you like. All topics are on the table at all times, as they should be, since later stages may prompt thoughts about earlier subjects. Of course many early topics are pretty well used up after a while, but in philosophy there is always apt to be a new angle.
5. Weekly assignments
Jan. 28: Beauty: Introduction
Feb. 4: Scarry, On Beauty, Part One, "On beauty and being wrong".
Feb. 11: Beauty: Part II, through "Plato's theory...selected topics"
Feb. 18: Beauty: Part II, "Applications" and Scarry, On Beauty, Part Two: "On beauty and being fair."
Feb. 25: Beauty: Part II, remainder (from"Plato's theory of beauty in historical context) and excerpt from Kirwan, Beauty, Ch. 2, "Beauty/God." (In Add-ons)
Mar. 3: Continuation of the preceding, plus the various materials in Beauty-Add-ons, Beauty Notes and 332 Discussions.
Mar. 10: Continuation of the preceding, plus the various materials in Beauty-Add-ons, Beauty Notes and 332 Discussions.
Mar. 17: Spring Break
Mar. 24: Review and Mid-term Test, Thursday, Mar. 27.
Mar. 31: Beauty: Part III, Preface through discussion of color.
Apr. 7: Beauty: Part III, Hutcheson's Theory and Hume's criteria.
Apr. 14: Real Beauty, Ch. 2, "Subjectivist Aesthetics."
Apr. 21: Real Beauty, Ch. 3, "Aesthetic Realism."
Apr. 28: Real Beauty, Ch. 4, "Taste and Time."
May 5: Real Beauty, Ch. 5, "The Ontology of Aesthetic Properties." Term paper due, Thursday, May 8.
May 11: Real Beauty catch-up and review.
Final Examination: Thursday, May 15, 8-10 a.m. in the classroom.
Lecture Outlines (to be revised a week before they apply)
Lecture 1
Prima facie reasons for doubting the reality of beauty
Long history of disagreement about beauty, individual and cultural.
Conspicuous differences of aesthetic taste.
Difficulty of making another agree (or enabling another to see) that something is/is not beautiful.Prima facie reasons for believing in the reality of beauty
Obvious cases of beauty/ugliness exist, even if many cases are disputable.
Aesthetic education seems to improve taste by broadening it and sharpening it.
Panels of expert judges are commonly used where aesthetic decisions are needed.Bad reasons for espousing aesthetic subjectivism
The following are common reasons (sometimes acknowledged, sometimes not) for the popularity of subjectivism. In each case a little thought should convince you that the reason has no logical force. That is, even if the facts alleged are as claimed, they provide no evidence that subjectivism is true.
1. Diplomacy (tact, kindness, gentility; desire for public harmony)
2. Pedagogical benefit (overlaps with diplomacy)
3. Aesthetic inertia
4. Aesthetic loyalty
5. Aesthetic freedom (resistance to aesthetic dictation)
6. The demands of creativity (finding one's own beauty)
7. The irreducibility of beauty to a set of rules
8. The unattainability of absolute certainty regarding beauty
What would be good reasons for aesthetic subjectivism? (subjectivism as a last resort)
Lesson: the enormous complexity of issues about beauty.
Truisms about Beauty
1. Beauty-ascriptions are seriously commendatory.
2. Beauty is an aesthetic value among other aesthetic values.
3. Dependence (supervenience) of beauty-ascriptions
Beauty depends on beautiful properties4. Some beauty-ascriptions are aspect specific.
5. Some beauty-ascriptions are overall or all things considered.
6. All beauty-ascriptions carry an implied relativity to a standard.
7. Some beauty-ascriptions are relative to a limited domain; others are not.
8. Differences of threshold for ascribing beauty are ultimately inessential. (All genuine questions about beauty can be answered without reference to them.)
9. Beauty is an ideal (Note here the ambiguity of "absolute beauty.")
Consequences:
a. beauty judgments are, in a sense, always (at bottom) comparative.
b. Beauty-values (+/-) lie on a continuum (rank-order) of beauty-to-uglinessContested truisms: points of contention
10. (obj.) Things are more or less beautiful without respect to variable human views -- worthy of of admiring contemplation. "Beautiful to me (you, them)" is always reducible to "believed to be beautiful by me (you, them)
10. (subj.) Things are more or less beautiful only relatively to human views -- only beautiful to this or that person. All beauty claims carry an implicit "to me (you, them)" that not reducible to "believed to be..." No basis exists for rational decision applying to all persons.
What is a theory of beauty? What must such a theory do ?
- define beauty and other sorts of aesthetic value.
- set forth normative criteria of beauty.
- set forth epistemic criteria of judgments of beauty.
- thereby facilitate aesthetic recognitions & judgments and the understanding of aesthetic experience & reality.
How does one get started in building a theory?
a) Gather obvious truths about beauty-ascriptions (truisms)
b) Sketch the general conceptual landscape surrounding beauty:
- relate beauty to aesthetic and artistic value
- distinguish beauty from ethical and practical value
- distinguish aesthetic questions from psychological/sociological ones
- relate theoretical aesthetics to normative aesthetics
Consider historical attempts to produce a theory of beauty.
- study key texts
- learn the philosophical system presupposed by these texts.
- investigate ways of perfecting the theories .
Course Material Website:
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/jhbrown
Lecture 2
Introduction to Plato's theory of beauty
Radical realism about beauty
Beauty as a Platonic "Form" or "Idea"
-----Particulars and their properties
-----Abstracts and their properties
Abstractness and existence (real although abstract)
-----Being real = being the subject of affirmative truths
-----Abstracts as timeless & not strictly in space
Result: a two-world conception
----Particulars, with their properties and relations
----Forms with their properties and relations
Abstracts and knowability
----Clearly conceiving as a kind of knowledge
----As in geometry and mathematics
Instantiation or exemplification
---- The key relation between Forms and particulars
----Forms as “participating” in their instances
Hierarchy of generality
----More and less general Forms: e.g., genera and species
----High generality no barrier to full reality
Concrete particulars
----Completely specific properties
----Location and history included
----Concreteness the opposite of abstractness
Hierarchy of beauty
----In general the more general the more beautiful
The beauty of Forms
----Purity, changelessness, knowability (lucidity)
Full vs. perfect instances of Forms
----Plato's tendency to confuse these two
----A clear instance of humanity vs. a perfect human
Many questions remain!
Lecture 3
Scarry on general aspects of beauty
1. Beauty and begetting, replication in diverse modalities
----Cp. examples from Rushdie and Dubuffet, B'ty-Adds #1
----High and low forms of "replication"
----Extraordinary diversity of beauties
2. Truisms about the experience of beauty, extracted from Scarry's Part I
1. The pleasure of beauty produces the desire for more...
2. The pleasure of beauty produces the desire to celebrate... and to share...
3. The pleasure of beauty produces the desire to set off the beauty as effectively as possible...
4. The pleasure of beauty produces the desire to preserve and replicate and....
5. The pleasure of beauty produces the desire to know the beauty more intimately...
6. The pleasure of beauty produces the desire to make oneself beautiful...
7. The pleasure of beauty produces the desire to discover even greater beauties.
These are both psychological tendencies and rational desires.
Questions: are the opposite desires ever rational?3. Scarry on errors about beauty
Interpreting pp. 9-10: where's the error? (see p. 6)
A. Underestimations of beauty – in the extreme, false negatives
The palm tree case (stage one)B. Overestimations of beauty – in the extreme, false positives
"Lilies that fester" caseOdysseus' on Nausicaa's uniqueness
C. Corrections in beauty-perception
The palm tree case (stage two)4. Connection of errors with the previous truisms about the beauty-experience
Beauty-pleasures and desires creating illusions of beauty
a. Exaggerating beautiful aspects
b. Overlooking unbeautiful aspects
c. Imagining unexamined aspects to be beautiful
d. Exaggerating overall beautyUgliness-experiences and aversions creating illusions of unbeauty
(counterparts of a-d)Blandness-experiences and indifference creating illusions of absence of both B and un-B.
Failure to perceive the properties that are b'ful or unb'ful
Lecture 4
Scarry on beauty and particularity (individuality) p. 18
----Tradition of this beginning with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
----Partial validity of the claim:
-------no general rules guarantee beauty
-------beauty-making properties are partly non-conceptual
Proust's particular book vs. a composite idea of a good book
Scarry's particular palm vs. a composite idea of a palm
What is wrong with the composite idea?
----Can't be seen (heard, smelled, tasted, touched)
----Specific properties are lost
----Context is lost
Limitations of the saying about beauty and particularity
----rules and concepts may guarantee good-lookingness
----sensory presence, not just particularity, is a key factor
----beauty of abstract things must not be ruled out
Odysseus and Nausicaa again
----Beauty as sacred
----Beauty as unprecedented
----Beauty as life-saving
----Beauty as inciting deliberation and second thoughts
Scarry on Matisse's palm trees
----Abstracting palm-frond patterns (arcs, radials, stripes)
----Associating P-qualities with them: esp. lighting effects
-------striped light, light-shimmer, light-shimmy
----Searching Matisse's paintings for similar patterns
----Associating these patterns with palms & palmy images
-------Even across big discrepancies
How valid is Scarry's method?
----Why always palms instead of lattices?
----Or decorative designs?
----How solid is the evidence that palms are the source?
----Should works of 1940s be used to interpret works of 1920s?
----Is Scarry forcing more unity on the works than they have?
Further fancies
----Palm-trees as the painter's brush
----Violin bow as painter's brush
----Inner life of the mind gambit
----The metaphysical, other-world gravity of beauty
Plasticity, elasticity, volatility, openness, limitlessness
----Is this universal, or is it Scarry's special fancy?
----Is the pleasure taken in beauty really inexhaustible?
----Is our response to beauty always changing?
How is the pleasure of beauty connected with love of truth?
Lecture 5: A Classical Theory of Beauty
Plato's core ideas about beauty introduced
Ergo, abstracts (Forms) must exist.
Plato's myth (in the Phaedrus) of disembodied souls seeing the Forms, including that of Beauty Itself .
- Fanciful aspects of this myth (compounded impossibilities)
- Can a disembodied being see?
- Can colorless, formless (etc.) things be seen?
- Does changelessness imply superiority?
- Would disembodiment give one better mental powers?
- Getting down to the core meaning
- How does the disembodied soul "see"?
- What sort of "space" do the Forms inhabit?
- Abstract spaces, property-spaces
- How can Forms be substances?
- What sort of "light" shines on the Forms?
- How is recollection an appropriate analogy for Plato to use, regardless of the myth?
- In what ways is sight the "most piercing of the bodily senses"?
- Compare sight with smell, taste
- Can we have an art of smell, taste? (take a look at Beauty Adds, #7, Huysmans' Against the Grain)
Lecture 6
Plato's Symposium and the Ascent of the Soul to Beauty Itself
- Individual beauty
- What makes an individual b'ful?
- Contextual beauty
- Beauty of general properties of persons
- Recall beauty's supervenience
- Beauty of different types applicable to persons (of different aspects of persons)
- bodily
- kinesthetic
- of personality
- moral (of character)
- intellectual
- Beauty of things (objects, scenes, etc.)
- Beauty of intangibles
- of laws, customs, institutions
- of sciences
- of knowledge of Beauty Itself
What categories of beauty has Diotima omitted?
What sort of "love" is it that Plato is advocating?
Lecture 7
I. Old business: the aesthetic potential of sensory modes
a. What distinguishes sight and hearing from the other sensory modes?
b. What relevance has that to beauty?
Kinds of beauty (beautiful properties)
Levels of beauty (very tricky)
C. What relevance has that to art?
Joris Huysmans' "evidence" - how convincing is it?
Actual artworld differences - are they arbitrary?
II. Scarry on beauty and being fair
1. Scarry against beauty's critics - how much truth is there in the two sides of the controversy?
a. Looking at beauty can be injurious. i. distracting, ii. demeaning, 'reifying'
b. Looking at beauty can be benign or even morally constructive.
c. Even pure aesthetic admiration can be injurious to beautiful persons.
d. Emphasis on beauty can injure unbeautiful persons.
e. Emphasis on beauty soon leads to recognition of other beauties, e.g. of personality or character.
f. Admiring b'ful things often cannot affect them at all.
g. Admiring b'ful things often preserves them.
h. Cultivating b'ty often upstages more important values.
i. Cultivating b'ty tends to encourage cultivating other values - moral and intellectual values.j. Emphasis on beauty leads to neglect of health, skill, etc.
k. Emphasis on super-beauty leads to a star-system in which everyone else is a failure.
l. Persons/things deserve no credit for their unearned beauty.
m. B'ful persons are as worthy of being valued for their beauty as intelligent persons are for their intelligence.
n. Persons should be valued only for their accomplishments.
o. Many human beauties are the result of human effort, hence are accomplishments.
p. Rapt beauty-gazers can also be injured by their gazing - as much as the object.Do beauty's critics get caught in contradictions? Or only in half-truths?
Lecture 8
I. Left-overs from Lecture 7
Disinterested vs. "interested" appreciation of beauty (78f.)
Spiritual conceptions of beauty: Dante (81f.)
Beauty and sublimity (82ff.)
The Kantian contrast
Scarry's "softer" conception agrees with the classical view
II. Scarry on beauty and justice (86ff.)
Pursuing truth, goodness, justice... and beauty
How similar, how different?
The beauty "compact": reciprocal vitalization
Enlivened awareness of the object
Imaginative enrichment of the object
Symmetry as a key shared property of beauty and justice
Equality and beauty (Augustine's list extended)
“Higher things” and equality
Geometrical figures
(Astronomical bodies acc. to the ancients)
Rhythm and equality: repetition of a modular pattern
Meter, syncopation, etc.
Symmetry: equality under transformation
Constancy of state
Constancy of change:
Curvature
Graduation of color/tone, texture
Constancy of acceleration (spirals, e.g.)
Etc.
Where does transparency fit? Water, air?
What about variety, difference, inequality? Isn't that also essential to beauty?
Symmetry/equality in the social sphere
Equality of what with what?
Not equal incomes
Not equal status
Not equal importance to others
Not equal standard of living
Yet (roughly)
Equal access to essential requirements of life
Burdens equally proportioned to non-basic benefits
Equal immunity to arbitrary constraints
(Details are tremendously complicated)
Other interpretations, e.g., hierarchical justice
Justice a matter of privileges proportioned to “quality”
(Elite justice distinct from common justice)
Scarry's reflection on how beauty can precede justice:
Sensory beauty always available even before justice is instituted.
Appreciation of sensory beauty stimulates appreciation of justice. (esp. basic justice)
Appreciation of basic justice stimulates desire for refinements.
But is Scarry right that the literary quality of the statement of a principle of justice reinforces its moral merit? What about:
“We hold this truth to be self-evident, that the high-born should govern the low-born.”
Is social justice confirmed by having a beautiful sensory manifestation?
Scarry's idea of the Greek trireme as a sensory image of Athenian democracy
(This works only because of the social arrangement, not because of the ship, the rhythm of the oars, etc.)
Scarry's association is one of opportunity, not of a deep connection.
Unjust social arrangements also have beautiful manifestations, and just ones have unbeautiful ones.
Beauty in elitist, hierarchical societies rarely promotes lateral regard for social justice; rather, the values of social justice remain hidden.
The de-centered character of admiration of beauty
Non-egocentric joy
Aesthetic fellowship
FairmindednessAesthetic endeavor as a model of social fairness
Rawls' veil of ignorance applied to beauty
The rationality of a fair system of beauty enjoyment
Beauties one approves even if one will never see themRawls' rule for just inequalities: inequalities are justified when they redound to the benefit of the least well-off.
Can this be applied to beauty?
Lecture 9. Selected topics in Plato's theory
Plato's normative aesthetics
General constrast between "Apollonian" and "Dionysian" values
Lecture 10
Plato's theory of Forms confronted: How to make it credible?
Questions about Plato's ontology
Questions about the ontology of beauty (assuming it is supervenient and admits of degrees)
Questions about Plato's Epistemology
Questions about knowledge of beauty
Major questions about Plato's normative theory of beauty
Are Forms more beautiful than concrete particulars?
Are Apollonian beauties more beautiful than Dionysian ones?
Is Beauty Itself supremely beautiful?
Master Question for Platonists: Is there a property that meets all of your conditions for Beauty Itself?
Plato fails to show that there is such a property.
But neo-platonists insist that the essential core of Plato's conditions can be salvaged (Kirwan, e.g.)
Lecture 11. The Post-Platonic heritage: Aristotle, the Neo-platonists and St. Thomas
Aristotle's leading ideas
Universals (essences) do not exist apart from instances
Deep acquaintance with particulars more instructive than very abstract thought
The chief forms of beauty: order, symmetry, organic unity, full realization of potentiality of a species or type
Levels of potentiality and actuality
Beauty and the fullest, clearest, and most pleasant sensory or intellectual cognition of the worthiest objects
Lesser precision of ethical and aesthetic values than mathematical or scientific values
More specific value-principles better known than general value-principles
No one Form of the Good: "good" has different senses when applied to different categories
Questions for Aristotelians
Application of aristotelian ideas of the animal kingdom
Beauty within a species = actualization of essential potentiality
Beauty of species determined by level of potentiality
A proposed set of criteria for beauty of species (Beauty-Notes)
Points given on an animal's scorecard
- Points for structural beauty and beauty of action
- Points for adaptation to difficult conditions
- Points for adaptation to a wide range of conditions
- Points for structural features suggestive of higher cognition and feelings
Extreme complexity of the beauty of animals compared with works of art
Aristotle's rebuttal of Plato re. the beauty of representations or "copies": Poetics
- pictures, sculptures, music
- dramatic enactments (plays, oral poetry)
- written literature
Beautiful form, beautiful content
Lecture 12. Plotinus on Beauty Itself
1. The elusiveness of Beauty: the need for a "remoter principle"
2. The beauty of abstract or mental things
The idea in the mind of the artist is more beautiful than the art work itself
3. How to experience the higher beauties
4. What reasons can be found for ranking abstract things above concrete particulars in regard to beauty? (Interpreting neoplatonism)
The appeal of the abstract. The dream of bodiless purity
5. The difficulty of justifying the greater beauty of types, including laws, as opposed to instances (Questioning neoplatonism)
Lecture 13: Neoplatonism (cont.)
Is the whole of reality less inspiring if the great chain of beauty is given up?
Kirwan's idea of a Neoplatonic yearning lying within our experience of beauty
Traditional metaphysical idea of beauty as a divine object, force, emanation, source, inner nature
- Beauty Itself as a mystical reality
- A "beauty beyond beauty"
- Not just kalon but hyperkalon.
- An active agency above personality
- A source of energy
- A reality beyond finite concepts
Associated experiential aspects
1. A sense of earthly beauty being a distant sign of the divine perfection.2. A sense of Beauty Itself being incomparably more beautiful than sensible beauty of any sort, of Beauty Itself and only Beauty Itself being purely beautiful.
3. A sense of Beauty itself being far more beautiful than any invisible beauty that we can conceive of, as in mathematics or other abstract domains of knowledge.
4. An emotional tone of distress or melancholy at the vast distance between the beauties we can conceive of and Beauty itself.
5. A yearning to transcend the limitations of our natures
Kirwan's Claim: even in our ordinary experience of the beauty of a person or flower or theorem, lying at a deep level, is a sense of an unattainable, ungraspable beauty which the beautiful particular only dimly reflects.
Quotes from Kirwan:
Is a non-hierarchical, pluralistic picture of beauty less true to our aesthetic intuitions and our aesthetic aspirations? Are Plotinus and Kirwan right?
Lecture 14: Review session 1
Overview of subjects covered to date
Diagram in Beauty notes #17
General purpose of the test
Things to keep in mind from the truisms about beauty
1. Distinction between b'ful aspects and overall b'ty
2. Distinction between pure b'ty and supreme b'ty
3. Distinction between beauty-causing and beauty-making properties
4. Another distinction needs constantly to be kept in mind when talking about beauty: the distinction between one object and another that is related to the first. E.g.
Likely topics for the second essay (ones discussed in the folders and/or in class)
1. Scarry on lilies, palms, Matisse
2. Scarry on the male gaze
3. Scarry on justice and beauty
4. Animal beauty
5. Human bodily beauty: plan, proportions
6. Gulliver's problem
7. Human facial beauty
- Structure
- Expressiveness
8. The appeal of ugliness, evil, etc.
Dependence on context
9. Natural and artificial (e.g. plastic surgical) beauty
10. The beauty of generally disdained things (Dubuffet, e.g.)
For those not taking Plato's normative aesthetics for the first question:
11. Abstract versus concrete beauty
12. Apollonian versus Dionysian beauty
Examples in Beauty Notes
Note that you are not confined to these topics. Anyone who likes can write about beauty-subjects in any field he or she feels familiar with, for example, architecture, urban planning, athletics, etc.
Lecture 15. Review session 2
Plato's Ontology of Beauty
Concepts to explain in the course of your essay
1. Intrinsic vs. percipient-relational properties
2. Abstract things vs. concrete particulars
3. Specific properties vs. highly general properties
4. Comparative vs. all-or-nothing properties
5. Forms vs. instances
6. Universals-cum-particulars
7. Supervenient vs. base properties
8. Value-properties vs. value-neutral properties
9. Self-exemplifying vs. non-self-exemplifying properties
10. Unitary vs. multiplex rank ordersIssues to discuss: definability, identifiability (which Form is Beauty?), which of Plato's stipulations are most essential, which dispensable? How credible is the best version? If no entire version is credible (in your opinion) what parts of platonic beauty-ontology are credible?
C. Plato's epistemology of beautyConcepts to explain in the course of your essay
1. A priori vs. a posteriori knowledge
2. Certain knowledge vs. probability
3. Deductive vs. intuitive knowing
4. Self-evident principles vs. beauty-principles
5. Self-evident truths about the beauty of particulars
6. Direct knowing vs. reliance on authority
7. Knowledge of the beauty of abstract things
8. Knowledge of the beauty of particular things
9. Knowledge of beauty of an aspect vs. knowledge of overall beautyIssues to discuss: similarity/dissimilarity of grasping beauty and grasping mathematical truth in (a) easy cases, (b) in hard cases; reasons for greater disagreement about beauty than about mathematics; beauty and cognitive goodness in general.
D. Plato's Normative AestheticsConcepts to explain
1. Apollonian vs. Dionysian beauty
2. Cognitive vs. sensory beautyExamples given of Platonic beauty
Examples of Dionysian beauty (student-supplied)
Issues to discuss: Are Plato's Apollonian beauties as beautiful as your examples of Dionysian beauties? On what basis? Are abstract beauties more beautiful than concrete beauties? Less beautiful? Why?Note: There are two entries in Beauty Notes concerning the test, #18 and #19.
Lecture 16: The Sense of Beauty Theory
1. The model of the external senses: sight, hearing, etc.
Beware of confusion with sense = impression
An ethical analogue: the conscience2. Elements of the supposed sense:
A faculty of knowledge of beauty, the proximal stimulus of which is internal , not external, the effect of which stimulus is a distinctive "sensation" , which sensation is aesthetically pleasant or unpleasant , all of which functions by regular physiological mechanisms .
3. Relation of the sense of beauty to the beauty of things
Two possibilities:
- merely an avenue of knowing beauty (epistemological theory)
- both a way to know beauty and a key element in the essence of beauty (ontological theory as well)4. Problems of interpreting/reconstructing the theories of beauty suggested by the texts
Textual shortcomings:
- ambiguities and vagueness
- failures to recognize implications
- omissions to supply some parts of the theories
Result: substantial additions/alterations required; scholarly constraints must be relaxed to produce a theory worth serious study.Opportunity offered by the texts -- (elements of) a theory which makes beauty:
- a (real) relational property (versus a subjective impression)
- analogous to familiar natural properties
- which is (in principle) empirically testable
5. The model for the reconstruction: sensory colorsThe commonsense concept of the surface color of an object, as understood by an educated layman,
- involves color-sensation in an essential way
- applies to physical objects
- involves a physical basis
- implies criteria of accuracy of perception
environmental conditions
condition of perceiver
- involves "internal" color properties: hue, saturation and lightness differentia, complementaries, pure/mixed color.
Consequently:
- is not a purely psychological concept
- is not a purely physical concept
(though routinely confused with both of the above)
- is a psychophysical dispositional property occurrent vs. dispositional properties(A similar analysis applies to radiant colors, diffraction colors, interference colors, etc.)
6. Unbreakable illusions involved in empirical color: seeming intrinsicness of colors in objects
seeming identity of object-colors and pyschological colors7. Sensory properties
The psychological (phenomenal) component: the ‘given' or immediately presented,' 'sense-data,' ‘qualia'
- qualities in (or of) consciousness
- basic likeness with 'merely mental' experience
dreams, hallucinations, feelings (e.g., pain)
- capacity to reveal outer realityThe physical components: environmental and
neurophysiologicalThe dispositional connection: causal relationship
Thus: a dispositional property -- a complex 'hypothetical' state of affairs contrasts with occurrent properties/states of affairs
- Normal expression of dispositional states of affairs by counterfactual conditionals
- Truth conditions of 'ordinary' counterfactuals
**the 'reasonable to infer' line
**the basis for such inferences- Special truth conditions of sensory property- counterfactuals
**epistemic conditions
**existence conditionsThe empirical testing of dispositions
Color-blindness tests
**capacity to discriminate
**consensus of best discriminators
**correlation with a physical basisSuppose these tests failed: would color be an objective fact?
Lecture 17
Ontology and epistemology of sensory properties
Points needing special emphasis
1. Structure of the causal interaction
See diagram on the overhead screen
2. Physical basis of the sensory property: e.g. Physical red
3. Phenomenal quality of the sensory property, e.g. phenomenal red
4. Sensory property of red
*applicable to physical objects but not reducible to a physical property
5. Criteria of accuracy of sensory experience of physical objects.
*constitutive part of the concept of a sensory property
*immensely complex set of conditions (the fine print of the concept of sensory red, e.g.)
*covers specific non-standard phenomenal experiences of the sensory property
Outcome: sensory red is an epistemically conditioned, psychophysical dispositional property of a real state of affairs.
6. Presumption of consensus of all maximal discriminators under optimal conditions
*However, this does not mean people do not perceive the sensory property adequately under less than optimal conditions.
7. The "existence" of sensory color when the disposition is not activated:
*in between manifestations
*prior to the existence of color-sighted percipients
Application of this model to the case of beauty
Beauty as an internal sensory property (the sensory property of an inner sense)
Lecture 18: Hutcheson's sense of beauty theory
Hutcheson's (almost) full-scale application of the color model to beauty (ontologically as well as epistemologically)
1. A basic argument-schema to prove we have a sense of beauty:
i. Aesthetic pleasure is distinct from rational pleasure, because not based on belief.
ii. Aesthetic pleasure/displeasure can vary without a difference of outer data.
iii. Aesthetic pleasure/displeasure can vary independently of extraneous influences.
<> iv. Some of the variation can only result from a difference of inner data.
v. Inner data can only come from an inner sense.
<> vi. Some of the variation must result from the operation of an inner sense, which we may call the sense of beauty.
2. Filling in the argument (justifying the premises and the conclusion) -- a sketch of tasks and proposals:
3. The resulting ontological interpretation of beauty:
Beauty = the disposition to elicit a beauty-response from a sense of beauty in such a way that the accuracy of the response can be intersubjectively validated.
4. Applications of Hutcheson's sense of beauty theory: the criterion of uniformity and variety
Uniformity -- sameness/similarity of certain properties or relations holding within an object or scene or event.
Variety -- number of elements (or complexity?) in an object or scene or event.
A better idea: Variety as number of uniformities
But the variety of kinds of uniformity creates obvious doubts as to how to score overall beauty. Are all of equal importance?
Ptolemaic vs. Keplerian planetary systems
Another of Hutcheson's examples: flora and fauna
Uniformity of structure amid multiplicity of parts having that structure, esp. amid diversity of parts (branches, roots, fruit, flowers)
Thus, (a) uniform and abundant foliage is more beautiful than variegated and sparse foliage. And (b) more parts of the plant (branches, roots, fruit, flowers) having analogous structures makes the plant more beautiful than when fewer parts do.
Approximate overall geometrical regularity in plants (under optimal growth conditions): this is uniformity (symmetry). It is not clear how multiplicity can figure in this.
To say the least, there are MANY problems of application.
Another case: the miniature (short legged) dachshund
- The nature of the breed, related to its purpose.
- The official criteria of excellence
- Testing our intuitions by comparing variations of length of leg
- Tentative conclusions
Lecture 19
The beauty of the dachshund, continued
Hutcheson's criterion, even as amended, must be supplemented to cover functional beauty.
Another refinement of the criterion
A further look at the beauty datum
Descriptive aesthetic properties are powers in things to elicit a paradoxical impression which is nonetheless valid for optimal respondents.
The capacity in viewers to form such impressions conforms to the basic idea of an inner "sense."
Under certain conditions such impressions explain viewers' aesthetic pleasure.
The beauty-pleasure: disinterested satisfaction
Hume's criteria of reliable pleasure-discrimination
Art works are reliably judged by the pleasure received under optimum conditions.
Hume's conditions of accurate sensing of beauty
1. Delicacy of perception
Facility (quickness)
Exactness
Completeness2. Exterior conditions optimal
3. Internal conditions optimal: "sound state of the organism"
4. Liveliness and delicacy of imagination
5. Wide-ranging and instant recollection
6. Serenity of mind
7. Full attention to the object
8. Constant practice in discrimination and judgment of the art under review
9. Freedom from prejudice (disinterestedness)
10. Consensus ("considerable unanimity of sentiment") under the best circumstances
11. Test of time – "durable admiration which attends those works...
that have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy"Lecture 20 Beyond history: A short trip through contemporary theories of beauty via Eddy Zemach, Real Beauty.
Getting started in Zemach
Why we can skip Chapter 1 (noncognitivism)
- Any investigation of aesthetic value must first explore the possibility that beauty judgments have propositional content.
- Only if that fails is it relevant to retreat to a noncognitivist theory.
- Noncognitivism requires us to accept that there is no such thing as a coherent beauty judgment.
Terminology. PAS (defined p. 5) = pure aesthetic sentence = a sentence which simply evaluates its subject without describing it. For instance, "This flower is beautiful"
PAP (defined p. 5) = pure aesthetic predicate = a predicate which evaluates without describing its subject. For instance, "beautiful," "sublime," "gaudy"Zemach on varieties of subjectivism: Ch. 2
[Note that noncognitivism is generally regarded as a form of subjectivism, since it holds that "X is b'ful" expresses a feeling or attitude rather than asserting a proposition. But Zemach reserves "subjectivism" for cognitivist theories.]
Subjectivism: "X is b'ful" asserts a proposition (is true/false) but does not attribute to X an intrinsic property, but rather a relation between the object and a percipient (typically, that X causes the percipient to have an aesthetic experience).
Special versions:
a. X is b'ful --> X causes ideal percipients to have an aesthetic experience.
b. X is b'ful --> what is b'ful is an experience of X, not X itself.c. Where a work of art is said to be b'ful, the work of art is really an experience
d. X is b'ful concerns personal experience vs. typical experience vs. ideal experienceNote that Zemach bundles together:
He does this because he thinks all such theories share refutable common suppositions, esp. that there is a distinctive aesthetic experience. Two versions:
1. Criticism of aesthetic experience of X as experiencing X along with a distinctive feeling of pleasure
Being pleased by (liking, enjoying) X is not a feeling or sensation but an attitude, as are wanting, believing, intending, etc.
2. Criticism of aesthetic experience as experience involving a distinctive type
of attention
Beardsley: aesthetic experience is experience involving:
* object-focused rather than dreamy or drifting attention
* attention strong enough to resist distraction
* attention intent on finding coherent pattern
* attention successful enough for the experience to feel satisfyingly complete
Zemach: none of the above is distinctive to experience of beautiful things, or art works.
Hunting, carpentering, cooking, amorous and other experiences have comparable attention-properties
None of the above is universal to the experience of beautiful things.
Those properties are merely typical of our best experience of b'ful things.
3. Zemach against various theories of aesthetic experience
b. Against aesthetic experience defined via disinterestedness (Kant, Hutcheson et al)
(Covered under #4 below)
c. Against aesthetic experience defined as non-conceptualizing, particularizing (Kant)
* Bullough's "psychical distance" reducible to selective attention (see Beauty-adds, #12)
* aesthetic and nonaesthetic interests not necessarily incompatible
* aesthetic attention not necessarily non-conceptualizing
* aesthetic attention not necessarily totalizing or particularizing
d. Against aesthetic experience defined as producing a non-physical "aesthetic object"
* aesthetic properties though non-physical are possessed by physical objects. Hence no need to postulate non-physical aesthetic objects.
* Physical reality is often essential to the aesthetic character of objects.
Note that Zemach's arguments do not mean the term "aesthetic experience" has no application!
His saying (p. 30) that aesthetic experience is "impossible" is misleading.
4. Zemach against the aesthetic attitude (partly covered above)
a. Against the aesthetic attitude being "disinterested"
* a definitional sleight of hand is involved in the concept of a "disinterested interest"
* "interested" interest is equally involved in both aesthetic and nonaesthetic needs and satisfactions
Attending to things "for their own sake" as opposed for an ulterior purpose: what does that mean? Is it altruistic?
[Disinterestedness can be defined without committing the fallacy Zemach complains of; but it is not exclusive to aesthetic as opposed to moral or scientific pleasure.]
[Also Zemach is right that we have plenty of aesthetic ego-gratifications and there is nothing wrong with this fact.]
b. Against defining the aesthetic attitude as attention to and enjoyment of intrinsic rather than utilitarian properties (pp.39-41)
[Some confusion here, but it's cleared up by distinguishing properties of X from properties of contexts in which X occurs.]
* this line confuses a person's reason for looking with her way of looking and the kind of experience she gets.
* it also leads to an absurd consequence: no way to distinguish doing something for an aesthetic reason from doing it for no reason.
Lecture 21
5. Zemach against aesthetic relativism
Relativism: the view that since aesthetic disagreement is impossible in principle to remove by valid procedures, PASs do not ascribe aesthetic properties to anything; and hence aesthetic realism is false.
a. Against reduction of (e.g.) "X is gaudy" to "X seems gaudy to Y " (individualistic relativism)
Popular relativists inconsistently believe we use aesthetic terms correctly and yet that they refer to purely private sensations or feelings.
Note the frequent confusion of relativism with "opinionism" and the equally self-contradictory character of that.
Zemach's argument against relativism more fully stated
1. If relativism is true, then X is beautiful = X seems beautiful to Y (and similarly for X is graceful, lovely, animated, etc.). = X seems somehow to Y, and Y calls it beautiful on that basis.
2. Thus a person Y saying X is beautiful is referring to Y's way of experiencing X.
3. Thus all verbal agreements and disagreements about "X is beautiful" result from ways of experiencing X.
4. Individual ways of experiencing are in principle inaccessible to other persons. Hence we cannot tell what it is about Y's experience that leads Y to call X beautiful. No one can tell whether what leads her to call X beautiful is the same as what causes Y to do so.*
5. If 4 is true, then we cannot teach the meaning of "beautiful" by ostension, since we cannot exhibit X's way of experiencing to anyone else.
6. Yet "beautiful" is a phenomenal term (i.e., one that refers to a way of appearing)
7. Phenomenal terms can only be learned by ostension.
8. Hence if relativism is true, aesthetic predicates cannot be taught and no one knows whether his use matches that of anyone else.
9. Hence if relativism is true, neither agreement or disagreement about "X is beautiful" is detectable.
10. Hence, if relativism is true, aesthetic sentences are meaningless.
11. Hence, relativism is incoherent.
* Note that empirically identifiable differences in experiencing X (as in colorblindness) do not support relativism and therefore play no part in the argument.
Lecture 22: Zemach, Ch. 3: Aesthetic Realism
6. Observation conditions for aesthetic properties
a. Phenomenal properties in general have SOCs (standard observation conditions)
E.g. the SOCs for ‘red' (environmental and percipient-related)
If X appears red under the SOCs for surface color, then X is red.*b. Aesthetic properties are phenomenal properties and necessarily have SOCs.
E.g., the SOCs for ‘gaudy' (environmental and percipient-related SOCs)
If X appears gaudy under the SOCs for aesthetic color properties, then X is gaudy.** The if-then connection need only be probabilistic.
Note that the commonsense SOCs for colors on K-pax are likely to be deficient. Only the scientifically sophisticated ones are correct.
I disagree with Zemach about SOCs' relation to maximal discrimination; he claims there is no necessary relation (51-2). I think there is. But I do not accept Smart's version of it.
c. Percipient-related SOCs for aesthetic properties:
- Basic perceptual acuity conditions
- Humean conditions
- Sensitivity to cross-categorial resemblances and differencesd. Re. Consensus of optimal discriminators
Zemach's rejection of maximal discrimination: is his reason adequate?
See argument in Beauty Notes #24.3.
e. Observation and theory
- Reasonable initial assumptions about the reliability of observation
- Discovery of SOCs
- Systematic refinement of observation
- Identification of experts
- Coherence of the whole system of knowledge the final criterion of probability/truthPractical goal: to show that aesthetic predicates are just as valid as other phenomenal predicates.
Special complications of aesthetic predicates because of the ineliminability of perceptual illusions.
Open webfile showing interaction of colors. (Tip of the iceberg. See Beauty-Notes 24.5)
7. The explanatory force of aesthetic properties: what do they explain?
- Linguistic usage: aesthetic predicates applied to objects/events/etc.
- Aesthetic preferences, choices, enterprises
- of artists, designers, decorators
- of critics, curators, conservers
- of viewers, collectors
- Art historical trends, reputations before the fact or after the fact
How do they explain these things?
- By invoking the same basic a priori principle that applies to any phenomenal property: ostensible observation is prima facie credible (clear and distinct perception principle).
- By the fact that linguistic references to aesthetic properties are explicable by the fact of belief in their reality.
- This is of a piece with observation of phenomenal properties providing evidence for scientific properties.
- Observation of aesthetic properties ultimately explains preferences for good ones, aversion to bad ones. (But how?)
However many details remain to be worked out and Zemach's view remains problematic. The subject is continued in Ch. 4.4f. re. The Keats principle.
8. The primacy of aesthetic properties
Hence, the credibility of science depends on the credibility of aesthetic judgments (about science itself).
Hence aesthetic judgments are credible (where the SOCs of the aesthetic properties in question are satisfied). (But see Beauty-Notes 24.9)
Lecture 23
9. Proofs for metaphysical realists
Positions regarding the nature of reality
- Scientific realism: (Zemach's view, e.g.)
- Necessarily, some real properties are knowable.
- Metaphysical realism (Kant's view, e.g.)
- Possibly no real properties are knowable, although reality has real properties.
- Non-realism (Putnam's view , e.g.)
- Justifiable assertibility = "truth" -- no further question arises about "reality."
Zemach's argument vs. metaphysical realism (the view that our aesthetic judgments may be totally wrong in relation to "noumenal" reality)
Two ways of being totally wrong: (1) missing the correct aesthetic properties, (2) reality itself having no aesthetic properties.
Zemach's argument: (68-70)
Is this valid? Reasons for doubting it. (Beauty-Notes, ##24.6 and 24.10)
- Reality must have some character, even if its character is not scientifically knowable.
- Any character must have some aesthetic value or disvalue, even if it is unknowable.
- Hence, real things must have some pure aesthetic properties, whatever their non-aesthetic properties may be.
- Hence, the pure aesthetic properties we assign to things-as-they-appear will also apply to things-in-themselves (noumena), even if not to what we think they do.
- Aesthetic judgments are observation-based and necessarily usually true of the phenomena we can actually observe.
- This applies to theories we contemplate conceptually: we are usually right in judging the aesthetic value of theories.
- Even the metaphysical realist who doubts that the theories of science are true of noumena, must assume that her beliefs about the beauty of those theories are correct.
- Otherwise the metaphysical realist would have no reason to avoid using bad scientific theories; which is absurd.
- Thus we can never have good reason to think that our aesthetic judgments are usually wrong, even those about noumena.
Taste and Time (Ch. 4): How to explain changes of fashion
Are changes of fashion a proof of the instability of aesthetic judgment?
a. The subjectivist line: yes, and this is just what one expects given the subjectivity of those judgments.
b. The contextualist line: no, it merely reflects the difficulty of satisfying the proper SOCs for some aesthetic predicates when the historical context changes.
Types of time-sensitive aesthetic properties which may be actually present even when they seem absent because viewed from an unfriendly cultural context.
- Victorian ensembles viewed from a 20th century perspective may seem tastelessly stodgy, heavy, stiff, repressive, cluttered, pompous
- 18th century clothing for upperclass men viewed from a 20th century perspective may seem absurdly showy, frilly, precious, elaborate, fussy, impractical.
- Works that come back into "active" fashion (retro styles): Greek dress styles for women after the French Revolution.
- Works that come back into "historical" fashion: artistic styles than regain their cultural rank as historical high points. (El Greco, e.g.)
- The special situation of modern art, esp. avant garde art
- Sharp upgrading of radical creativity
- Hence, unprecedented time-sensitivity
- [But also unprecedented re-prioritizing of aesthetic properties]
- Result: shift away from familiar, sure-fire beauties to previously neglected values (recall Dubuffet's statement in Beauty- Additions #1.4))
- Case of Warhol's Brillo Box: its NTPs are subartistic, aesthetically banal; it is raised to art by its TPs: "only an artist who has an acute sense of beauty could have given [these boxes] those TP."
- What kind of TPs? Intelligence, thoughtfulness, wit, provocativeness (regarding the relation of art to industrial design).
- What variations of SOCs can account for the true elegance of Victorian high fashion and the non-foppishness of high courtly 18th century fashion?
- Empathic immersion in cultural history of the time of origin, not just learning facts about it.
- Special importance of this in fashion-driven cases.
- Special importance of this in periods of strong artistic creativity.
- Absent such empathy, one's aesthetic response to TPs is unreliable and almost certainly erroneous.
- Note esp. difference between knowing about the culture and seeing things from its perspective.
- Note also the practical limitations of true empathic understanding.
- Note finally the aesthetic pleasures of erroneous appreciation.
Note: time-sensitivity changes values when the property is embodied at different times.
But time sensitivity cannot change the value of a particular work: if b'ful in its time it is always b'ful, even if it does not seem so when judged from other cultural contexts.
Hence later replicas of a b'ful work will not have the same value as originals; originals will not seem to retain their full original value.
Lecture 24: Time-sensitivity continued
The Keats principles: making aesthetic value an epistemic
criterion of good theories and good judgments.
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty – that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know" (From Ode on a Grecian
Urn)
Two Keats principles for theories in general
- I. True theories must be internally beautiful
- Simplicity, elegance, richness (unity in variety) -- {reasonable}
- II. True theories must be externally beautiful -- {informative}
- Coherence with observations, drama (yielding predictions)
- Coherence with other beautiful theories
- Examples of theories that fail on these grounds:
- Parmenides' theory of the world as completely static
- Radical simplicity
- Radical conflict with entrenched beliefs and intuitions
- Radical informational poverty
- Radical predictive poverty
- Recourse to ad hoc explanations after the fact
- "Phenomenological" theories (not clear what Zemach has in mind; I offer the following replacement)
- Psychological theories of childhood trauma and repressed memories causing emotional dysfunction
- richness but disunity (arbitrariness)
- dramatic predictions but lack of unity with other psychological laws and known facts (total lack of evidence backing up "rediscovered memories" of abuse).
- Fear-driven character of the hypothesis.
A third Keats principle for theories of aesthetic value in particular
- III. True theories of aesthetic value must optimize the value of their objects
- the SOCs for beautiful things are those that make things of that general type collectively seem as beautiful as possible.
- A true theory of aesthetic value must adopt value-maximizing SOCs for the type.
- Yet it must remain in principle possible for an individual X to be uglier than it looks, so more must be said about SOCs.
Ground rules for choosing SOCs:
- 1. All predicates of the same family have the same SOCs for their proper application.
- E.g. color terms, movement terms, configuration terms (otherwise contradictions result)
- 2. All objects of a type must have the same SOCs for a given family of predicates (otherwise learning the terms is impossible).
- 3. The SOCs for objects of a given type must be specifiable independently of the appearance of the objects.
- E.g., color SOCs must make no reference to how colors appear (otherwise circularity results).
- (Yet the SOC for a PAP must be such as makes things with that PAP appear more beautiful than they would do otherwise. Why doesn't that produce circularity?)
Example of SOCs for literary works.
Suppose: the SOCs for novels include: read by a highly intelligent person with great sensitivity to nuances of language, subtle wit, extensive understanding of human nature and social life, robust imagination, emotional depth, moral understanding, familiarity with the literary tradition, etc. (High-brow SOCs)
Then the satisfying aesthetic properties yielded by serious novels will be far more numerous than are yielded by applying those SOCs to pot-boilers, harlequin novels, etc. (which will be judged crude, stereotypical, emotionally immature, although easy to read and well unified).
Suppose: the SOCs for novels include: read by a person of average intelligence with only commonplace sensitivity to language, wit, commonplace understanding of human nature, etc., etc. (Low-brow SOCs)
Then the satisying aesthetic properties yielded by pot-boilers, harlequin novels, etc. when observed under these SOCs will be more numerous than will those yielded by serious novels, which will be judged boring, pedantic, and pretentious.
So how does Zemach justify saying that high-brow SOCs will result in the ratings for novels being higher than will be the case with low-brow SOCs, and that this justifies regarding the high-grade SOCs as more indicative of real beauty?
Brown's suggestion. Why can't we justify choosing high-brow SOCs on the basis of their yielding more discriminations among the linguistic and semantic properties on which aesthetic properties supervene? Thus the high-brow SOCs will bring to light more aesthetic properties and more degrees of given aesthetic properties. Since aesthetic value is determined by aesthetic properties, then the greater discrimination is bound to produce a fairer judgment of aesthetic value. On this basis the best serious novels clearly have a lot more valuable aesthetic properties than the best harlequin novels do. Therefore the high-brow SOCs must result in a higher rating for the novel as a genre than the low-brow SOCs can.
Yet for the reader who can satisfy only the low-brow SOCs, reading the harlequin novel may be a more beautiful experience than reading a serious novel.
Examples of problematic "time-travel" cases: (p. 90f.)
1. Earlier works made to seem fresh under anachronistic critical interpretations. Don Quixote supplied with a contemporary context (Borges ex.).
2. Contemporary works viewed under anachronistic SOCs that make them seem better than they are. E.g. Norman Rockwell viewed under 17th Dutch SOCs; mediocre present day poetry viewed under medieval SOCs.
Zemach: 1 and 2 both violate Ground Rule 2 vs. special exceptions; and broadening the practice probably is impossible without contradictions. Thus the SOCs they use can't be correct.
Applications to "concrete models," i.e., to artistic production that is an "interpretation," therefore a "theory" according to Zemach
Different interpretations give different properties to the work, but retain enough of its properties for it to be the same work; this applies to much music and drama.
JB. It is better to take the cases under d as versions or variations upon the named work, not as the work simpliciter.
JB: How many of the above are genuine cases of interpretation (let alone theory)? Interpretation in w