18. Derived from Aileen Kelly, "A Complex Vision: Isaiah Berlin and Russian Thought," *TLS,* 30 December 1977.
19. S. Freud, "Dostoevsky and Parricide" (1928), *Collected Papers,* vol. 5, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1957).
20. The argument is due to C. S. Peirce, as is the term *abduction* itself.
21. John Wisdom's term. See "Gods" in his *Philosophy & Psychoanalysis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).

IX 0082730h

A CASE OF MIXED FEELINGS: AMBIVALENCE AND THE LOGIC OF EMOTION*

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Traditional philosophical treatments of the emotions have usually emphasized questions of their *rationality;* and some philosophers have raised the related question whether they should be identified with *judgments,* or elements of cognition.[1] In contemporary literature, these questions are brought together by Robert C. Solomon, most recently in an article called "The Logic of Emotion," which argues that emotions have a logic of sorts which connects them quite firmly to judgments, and that they therefore are in many ways open to rational control.[2] Other current authors, though they may agree that emotions generally correspond to judgments, would apparently prefer not to *identify* the two; and some stress ways in which emotions are typically *ir*rational.[3] But there is one important fact about the emotions—indeed, a kind of logical fact—which none of them brings to bear on this dispute, although they may often be ready enough to grant it.[4] This is *the possibility of ambivalence:* contrary emotions with the same object in a basically rational person. Briefly: ambivalence seems to be possible in persons not so irrational as to hold genuinely contrary judgments.

I suppose that most people think of ambivalence in connection with some rather complex, and debatable, claims of psychoanalytic theory, like the claim that a child unconsciously hates a parent it consciously loves, where the parent is its rival in the Oedipal triangle. Indeed, if psychoanalytic theory is even roughly correct, the phenomenon of ambivalence is widespread and subtle enough to require an extended treatment. I shall not give it one here, however —our understanding of even the simplest emotions is just too

fuzzy, at this point. Instead, I shall keep my argument close to common sense and focus on one very revealing yet relatively simple and uncontroversial example of ambivalence, an example roughly familiar to us as a case of "mixed feelings." I think I can extract this case from suggestions found in Spinoza, one philosopher who does make much of the possibility of ambivalence (besides anticipating Freud with some of his general views about knowledge and freedom).[5] In what follows, after constructing and defending my example (Section I), I shall show how it bears on the question whether emotions should be identified with judgments (II-III) and then draw out some implications for the tangled question of the rationality of the emotions (IV). (As my argument proceeds, I shall try to *un*tangle the rationality question somewhat by making a few rough distinctions.)

By putting "logic" in scare quotes much of the time, I mean to cancel out any suggestion that the logic of emotion is really analogous to that of judgment. In fact, I shall be arguing *against* that view, by stressing the logical differences between emotion and judgment, expanding on some of them (and raising further questions about them) in a long set of footnotes. At the same time, though, I think it may be useful to examine an artificial "logic" of emotion (a task I merely begin in this paper), just to see where the analogy must break down. For there *are* some significant parallels between emotion and judgment, which I shall point out, here and there, as my argument proceeds. Hence, even if the two should not be identified, I think we may be able to learn something interesting by exploring their interrelations. I shall explore them here, however—except in a few of my (optional) footnotes—just insofar as they bear on my case of mixed feelings.

I shall argue, then, that insofar as emotions have a "logic," it is one that tends to set them apart from judgments, though it also calls for a noncognitive assessment of their rationality. In my last section, on the second point, I shall present some initial thoughts on a subject that I do not think philosophers have dealt with sufficiently: the special motivational force of emotions, the pressure they exert on us to express them somehow in behavior. In a way, my argument will end with some questions about the nature of this special motivational force. We do not yet understand it fully; but I think we do know enough about it to question the familiar ideal of

"philosophic detachment" from the emotions. Because of their motivational force, I shall argue, the emotions may often be useful to us—may play an essential role, for instance, in social communication—as long as we can control their behavioral consequences. In effect, then, my argument will bear out some of Solomon's more restrained comments on rational control of the emotions, while rejecting his central argument for them, which involves identifying emotions with judgments. But before I get to my critical points, I need to argue, using Spinoza, that ambivalence is indeed possible, and possible, moreover, without some sort of abnormal breakdown in reasoning.

I

In his treatment of the emotions in Part III of the *Ethics,* Spinoza allows for ambivalence—he calls it *fluctuatio,* or vacillation (p. 142)—as a result of a kind of transfer of emotions which he calls *imitatio,* imitation (p. 148). In his particular system, it seems to rest primarily on the resemblance of various possible objects of emotion. He introduces the subject of ambivalence in Proposition XVII:

> If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it. [P. 142]

Spinoza's claim here relies on his view that love and hate amount to the "primary" emotions pleasure and pain (*laetitia* and *tristitia,* often translated—more accurately, I think—as "joy" and "sorrow"), attributed to some object as cause (p. 140; see p. 138). I shall not attempt a scholarly account of Spinoza's overall system of the emotions; but this point should help us construct, in a moment, an example much more plausible than those Spinoza himself actually gives. In the quote above, the object of emotion is seen as causing both pain and pleasure—pain in its own right, and pleasure because of its resemblance to something else that causes pleasure in its own right. Spinoza does not tell us here what sorts of resembling "things" he has in mind; but his later remarks indicate that they

would standardly be persons (or persons seen as experiencing pain or pleasure), including ourselves.

Proposition XXVII, his central proposition on imitation, runs as follows:

> By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected by any emotion, we are ourselves affected by a like emotion. [P. 148]

The proof of XXVII adds:

> If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion. [P. 148]

Thus, on Spinoza's view, a kind of sympathy based on resemblance leads us to "imitate" others' emotions, or at least the emotions of others we do not hate. Taken by itself, XXVII may not seem to bear on the possibility of ambivalence, since it is apparently limited to objects toward which we have no contrary emotion, like hatred. But in light of Spinoza's further comments, it does suggest at least one way in which ambivalence might result from imitation.[6] If something like ourselves (another person, with whom we identify) causes us pain *by* gaining pleasure for itself—by getting something we would like to have ourselves, for instance—then according to Spinoza, it ought to cause us *both* pain and pleasure, and hence be an object of *both* hatred and love. Insofar as we imitate it, it causes us pleasure by virtue of the very same fact that simultaneously causes us pain: its fulfillment of our own competing desire. Thus, it is unaffected by XVII's exclusion of objects of prior hatred, and points toward situations of *rivalry* as one potentially rich source of cases of ambivalence.

Spinoza himself focuses on various other sorts of cases of ambivalence, as arising from the propositions I have quoted; and he does not make explicit any link to situations of rivalry.[7] But I think that the general connection he sets up between ambivalence and imitation would be most effectively illustrated by a case of rivalry. Cases of rivalry are emphasized, of course, in the discussions of ambivalence in psychoanalytic theory; but they should be especially interesting to us because, assuming that one does sometimes identify with others and share in their emotions, ambivalence toward a rival

seems perfectly *rational,* even if by definition it involves a kind of inconsistency. Consider sibling rivalry, for instance: it seems quite *appropriate* to have "mixed feelings" toward a person one both to some extent identifies and competes with. I shall take up the question of "perfect" rationality in my last section; but for the moment, I think we may grant that ambivalence is at least compatible with what I shall call "basic" rationality. It is certainly not unreasonable, that is, even if it falls short of some higher rational ideal, like Spinoza's ideal of complete freedom from external emotional influence; for it need not involve any abnormal breakdown in reasoning.[8]

As they stand, however, Spinoza's comments do not seem to yield an intuitively compelling example of ambivalence, even once we turn to a case of rivalry. He seems to imply, for instance, that any rival would be sufficiently like ourselves to give rise to a sympathetic emotion; and this may certainly be doubted. We might even question his assumption, moreover, that emotions as strong as love and hatred (or for that matter, any conflicting emotions) are directed toward the rival himself, insofar as he causes both pleasure and pain. I think it would be better to concentrate on Spinoza's fundamental emotions of pleasure and pain (joy and sorrow, or positive and negative feeling; perhaps the most natural terms in common speech would be "happiness" and "unhappiness"), taken as directed toward some *facts involving* a rival. We should also restrict our attention to cases where we have some special reason (other than simple resemblance to ourselves) for identifying with a particular rival. For even if Spinoza is wrong about the extent of our identification with others, there clearly are some people (our close friends and relatives, for instance) whose happiness we sometimes participate in, because of love, perhaps, as he suggests in Proposition XXI (p. 145). Using this insight, then, but ignoring the details of Spinoza's system, I think we can construct a case of ambivalence which *is* intuitively compelling.

Instead of treating pleasure and pain as episodes of feeling, let us take the more modern view (not all that foreign to Spinoza himself), and consider those emotions as propositional pro and con attitudes—"being pleased" or (less naturally) "pained" (in common speech, being happy or unhappy) that something is the case; that a rival has won for himself the prize one was competing with

him for.[9] Our initial question then becomes: could two statements ascribing contrary emotions with the same (propositional) object:

I am happy that he won (feel good about his winning).
I am unhappy that he won (feel bad about his winning).

both be true of me? I think they could, in a case where I am the rival of a close friend whose feelings I tend to share. Suppose that a friend and I are in competition for some honorific position; we both want to become chairman of the same department, for instance (to take a somewhat implausible example). What emotions might I feel, not toward my rival himself, but toward the fact that he turns out to win, when I hear it over the telephone, say? I think we might plausibly hold, in some conceivable cases, that I have mixed feelings. I feel both pleased (at least to some extent) and pained—happy "for" him (as we say)—since I know that he deserves the honor and has been hoping for it, but unhappy on my own account, since my own desire has been frustrated.

Perhaps in many such cases my unhappiness would vastly outweigh my happiness; and of course there may be cases where I would not really be happy for my rival, even if I said I was; where I would not really identify with him strongly enough for my negative feelings at losing out to be accompanied by any positive emotion, however weak. On the other hand, in many cases my ambivalence might extend beyond emotions directed toward my rival's victory to those directed toward my rival himself. But these possibilities do not affect my point here. I just want to make the rather weak claim that the two statements above might *sometimes* both be true of me to *some* extent—whatever else may be true as well—on the assumption that I am reacting reasonably. This claim results from what I take to be Spinoza's main insight on the subject of ambivalence—his view that we often "imitate" others' emotions, as applied to my case of friendly rivalry—and I think it provides us with a fairly ordinary and unproblematical example of ambivalence, one defensible without appeal to irrational forces like "the Unconscious," as in psychoanalytic theory.

Some further insights of Spinoza's should help us defend the example against various possible objections: attempts to deny that it represents a genuine case of ambivalence. For instance, someone might maintain that I could not really have contrary feelings toward

my rival's victory at one and the same time; instead, I would waver between them, feeling happy at some times, unhappy at others. Spinoza would grant, I think, that this describes any pleasure and pain I actually experience—my emotions taken as episodes of feeling—since he uses the word *vacillation* for cases of ambivalence. Yet he clearly states that in such cases one has contrary emotions "at the same time" (p. 142). The point of his remarks should be evident: we may be said to have or exhibit a particular emotion (and indeed, I might add, to exhibit it consciously) over a span of time which includes, but is not limited to, the times (supposing there are some) when we are actually experiencing it. Thus, if I waver, over time, between happy and unhappy feelings about my rival's victory (I momentarily feel bad when I first hear the news on the phone, say; but then I immediately consider my friend's good fortune and momentarily feel good), we would reasonably conclude that I have "mixed feelings" throughout the overall time span involved, and not that I am continually changing my mind.[10]

But are my feelings really contrary emotions with precisely the same object? Someone might maintain that what I really feel bad about is not my rival's victory but my own loss. In the case as envisioned, however, my rival's victory entails my loss; so it would be natural enough for me to feel bad about both, even if I might sometimes manage to keep them rigidly distinct. Again, I am not claiming that ambivalence in such situations is inevitable, but only that it *can* occur in a basically rational person—a person whose reasoning comes up to the normal standards, even if it falls short of some ideal of perfect rationality. Someone might maintain, though, that the "contrary" emotions we attribute to that person do not really conflict in themselves, but simply happen to give rise to conflicting tendencies—to act, for example, or to feel. However, I think that, by grounding various pairs of emotions in the fundamental distinction between pleasure and pain, or positive and negative feeling, Spinoza in effect (whatever his intentions) stresses the genuinely contrary basis of many emotions. Emotions, or those amounting to pro and con attitudes, seem to involve taking "positions," of sorts, on their objects, and thus may be said to be capable of logical conflict.

Philosophers may try to dismiss their logical conflict by fiddling with the object of contrary emotions, building into it the reasons

identification of emotions with judgments, or judgments of the sort now under consideration. But even if we ignore them, and grant that I might start out confused enough to accept two contrary judgments, my confusion would have to end rather quickly—or at any rate, more quickly than my ambivalence must—if I am to count as a basically rational person.

How would we normally handle such a conflict between judgments? First, I think, we would *qualify* both judgments, by building into them a description of the reasons for them. The resulting judgments, for instance:

His winning is good in that it satisfies a desire of someone I identify with.
His winning is bad in that it frustrates a desire of my own.

would no longer be genuine contraries, though they still might give rise to contrary emotions. I might continue to waver between happy and unhappy feelings about my rival's victory—though probably at longer intervals (experiencing *no* particular feelings much of the time)—once sufficient time has passed for me to resolve any conflict among judgments. Further, my contrary emotions need not "blend" into a single intermediate emotion, even after enough time has passed for me to *sum* their corresponding judgments: add them together, as a second step in their reconciliation, to form a single "all things considered" judgment, either:

His winning is on the whole good.

or:

His winning is on the whole bad.

Even if my feelings of unhappiness (say) are clearly much stronger than my feelings of happiness at my rival's victory, I still may continue to experience both, instead of opting entirely for those that are "overriding."

There may be some cases, of course, in which I am unable to make up my mind—to decide which of two contrary judgments is overriding, or even how they might be qualified. But then, supposing that I *am* convinced that they are genuine contraries, and hence that they could not be simultaneously true, I would treat the two judgments as merely *prima facie,* instead of giving my full assent to both—assuming, once again, that I am a basically rational person. Belief in both judgments, even if not impossible, would seem to be unreasonable—to involve some sort of abnormal breakdown in reasoning—in a way that ambivalence does not. Even if it falls short of perfect rationality (the question I shall consider in my last section), ambivalence is at any rate *less* irrational than full assent to judgments one knows to be contrary. We cannot simply decide to treat emotions, like judgments, as merely *prima facie;* so "all-out" emotions may only correspond to *prima facie* judgments, since they resist the sort of qualification and summing that lets us reconcile contrary evaluations.

There are often limits, first of all, to the distinctions we can capture in feeling. A distinction, for instance, between unqualified happiness at my rival's victory and (say) happiness-for-him—an attitude that would not conflict with the unhappiness I feel on my own account—will not help us here; for reasons cannot just be "built into" emotions, in the way that they can be built into judgments. That is, even if I do feel happy for my rival, or happy about his winning *in that* it satisfies a desire of someone I identify with, I would normally still feel happy about his winning—*simpliciter*—so that my emotion cannot be said to be truly qualified. Hence emotions should not be identified with qualified evaluative judgments. (I say "should not," rather than "could not," here and elsewhere, because any such attempt at reduction *could* manage to swallow some counterintuitive consequences, in the interests of simplicity, say. I just mean to argue that this attempt does have counterintuitive consequences, in relation to cases of "basically" rational ambivalence.) Consider how qualification would *change* my initial contrary judgments, for instance: insofar as they both involve taking positions on some object, qualification weakens them, and thereby keeps them from conflicting with each other. But as I illustrated above, in dealing with questions about the object of my contrary emotions, my emotions may very well remain stable as I alter my conception of the reasons for them. It is perfectly conceivable that my unhappiness at my rival's victory should be completely unaffected—in object, quality, strength, and what have you—by the process of discovering the reasons for it and qualifying its corresponding judgment. If so, moreover, it certainly might still conflict with the happiness I feel because I identify with my rival as well as competing with him.

In general, then, it seems that a change in judgment, like the

change it undergoes in being qualified, need not give rise to any change in the corresponding emotion; so intuitively, at least, emotions and judgments seem to be individuated somewhat differently.[14] Further, emotions need not change (except insofar as they naturally fade over time) at the second stage in our reconciliation of contrary judgments, as our qualified evaluations are combined to form a single "all things considered" judgment. Nor does there seem to be anything unreasonable about our failure to change them. For one thing, an emotion seems to be appropriate relative to a particular set of grounds, and not necessarily a unified evaluation of one's total body of "evidence." It is enough that it be justified by *some* (adequate) reasons, even if the overall *weight* of one's reasons favors a contrary emotion instead. Thus, emotions may persist, even when they are accompanied by stronger opposing feelings, in a basically rational person. In my next section, after considering another possible way of identifying emotions with judgments, I shall expand on this brief observation concerning the "logic" of the emotions. I shall conclude that it would be better to stick to our offhand (and much looser) characterization of emotions as *attitudes*—attitudes that generally correspond to judgments, but which seem to exhibit a logic of their own.

III

Instead of identifying emotions with evaluative judgments, someone might argue that they ought to be identified with judgments giving the grounds for a particular evaluation, what we would normally think of as the reasons for exhibiting the emotion in question, the facts that seem to make it appropriate. In the case where I have mixed feelings about my rival's victory, the reasons for my happiness and my unhappiness might seem to be identical with their common propositional object:

He won.

However, the discussion of qualified evaluations in my last section suggests a way of filling out this judgment to distinguish between my two emotions, at least where I am aware of the reasons for them. We can build the reasons into the judgment, and thus replace it with two:

He won, thereby satisfying a desire of someone I identify with.
He won, thereby frustrating a desire of my own.

Still, like the qualified evaluations in my last section, these judgments are not logical contraries—both, in fact, are true—though of course they would be likely to give rise to contrary feelings. They also fail to capture the positive or negative "point" of the emotions —or at any rate, of the emotions I mean to be considering—since belief in judgments like the two just above need not involve any pro or con attitudes. Of course we could manage to interpret such belief as involving *different* attitudes toward a common object. For instance, in holding the second judgment, I might be made out as applying a complex predicate to my rival—as judging that-he-won-thereby-frustrating-a-desire-of-my-own—but this would not itself amount to a con attitude. Rather, it would seem to give the reason for one, for my negative reaction to the news I hear on the phone, and if we want to preserve the force of this claim, we need to preserve some distinction between my emotional and judgmental attitudes.

We can preserve the distinction by returning to the evaluative judgments I discussed in my last section, by considering emotions as analogous to them, but not identical. Thus we can speak of emotions as sometimes conflicting with judgments, in those all-too-familiar cases of "head/heart" conflict, and as conflicting in a logical sense with one another. Since judgments like the two just above do not conflict logically, it seems that any explanation of the possibility of ambivalence must refer beyond them. How is it that my happiness and my unhappiness at my rival's victory can somehow conflict in themselves, apart from any associated behavioral conflicts? So far, I have simply taken for granted our intuitive view that these emotions *are* in some sense logical contraries; but now I want to suggest a way of interpreting it. I suspect that the notion of contrariety must be understood somewhat differently for emotions than for judgments (relative, as I have suggested, to a particular limited set of grounds), so that emotions can be identified with judgments only at the cost of obscuring a logical distinction.

What I have in mind is this: contrary judgments are defined as judgments that cannot both be true; but my case of friendly rivalry makes it clear that we could not accept an analogous definition of contrary emotions. Like judgments, emotions may or may not "fit

the facts," and above I have spoken of those that do as "appropriate." But appropriateness is not quite analogous to truth. For one thing, it depends on the adequacy of certain reasons for an emotion, the facts that make it suited to its object (assumed to exist), as in the two statements given just above.[15] For judgments, on the other hand, questions of truth and justification are often distinct. I shall let myself blur over the distinction, though, in the argument that follows, since I take it that contrary judgments cannot both be fully justified, any more than they can both be true. If we grant, then, that appropriateness is the value for emotions which comes closest to truth for judgments, we might expect contrary emotions to be emotions that cannot both be appropriate. But we have seen above that, in at least one case, contrary emotions might both be appropriate for different reasons. Where I am in competition with a close friend, happiness at his winning might be adequately justified by my identification with him, and unhappiness by my concern for my own interests, even though each of these reasons would seem to count as reason *against* exhibiting the contrary emotion. Ambivalence is possible, then, in a basically rational person. But how can we explain its possibility?

For emotions, I would suggest, support by some (adequate) reasons is enough for appropriateness; so contrary emotions might both be appropriate and, hence, I take it, "basically" rational, even if emotions are not under rational control to the extent that judgments are. (I assume that, except in extreme cases, they are under *some* control: we can usually avoid exhibiting emotions we take to be *in*appropriate.) But even if they are both appropriate, could contrary emotions be appropriate for exactly the same reasons? I think not—in which case contrary emotions might be defined instead as emotions it would be inappropriate to exhibit *for the same reasons.* The reason for an emotion is necessarily a reason *against* its contrary, in short; and thus two contrary emotions may be said to be contrary in a logical sense—to conflict "in themselves," as I have put it above. But however contrariety is defined for emotions, we seem to treat them differently from judgments when we evaluate them against their background of reasons pro and con. The judgments of a person whose reasoning comes up to the normal standards are justified in relation to the total background; but his emotions, even when they are appropriate, may

sometimes rest on particular limited portions of the background, if my treatment of the case of friendly rivalry is correct.

Thus, instead of identifying emotions with judgments, I think we should take both of them as attitudes of different sorts, and try to distinguish between them initially by describing differences in their logic—in how we "reason" with them, insofar as our reasoning comes up to the normal standards. I have sketched one such difference here, but I am sure there are many others (and a deeper explanation of the one I have sketched). Perhaps by describing them we can best explain the concept of an emotion (answer the philosopher's general question, "What is an emotion?") since the attempt to force emotions into some presumably clearer category (whether cognitive or noncognitive, mental or physical, physiological or behavioral) seems to have failed consistently.[16] The claim that emotions are attitudes is uninformative enough to be widely acceptable as a starting point; so perhaps we can make some progress toward understanding the emotions if we limit ourselves to asking what sorts of attitudes they are, how their logic differs, for instance, from that of judgments.

I have suggested that we treat emotions differently when we evaluate them against their background of reasons. Briefly: an emotion is appropriate as long as there are adequate reasons *for* it, whatever the reasons against it. My suggestion is meant to help explain how ambivalence is possible in what I have loosely termed a "basically" rational person. But does it also indicate that cases of ambivalence —and indeed, the emotions generally—involve a kind of *ir*rationality, in contrast to judgments, even though they do come up to the standards we think of as normal? Presumably, the normal standards are designed to fit beings who are subject to emotions—and subject to whatever irrationality emotions bring with them—so there may be a sense in which emotions are intrinsically irrational. Though we have *some* rational control over them, our control is limited; they are based on reactions to particular facts, as they come into consciousness, rather than consideration of all the relevant reasons. (Here, I think, is where a deeper explanation of basically rational ambivalence would lie.) However, I think we should be wary of applying to emotions the cognitive criteria for rationality in judgments, as we can see by trying to illustrate this argument with my case of friendly rivalry. Certainly—someone might maintain

it would be *more* rational for me to reconcile my conflicting emotions as time passes. A perfectly rational person would come to take a detached view, and suppress any emotions that were not supported by the overall weight of his reasons. This argument may sound plausible; but I think that a closer look at my example will make us reject it. Emotions do involve irrationality in any number of ways, but even a case of conflicting emotions might be defended as perfectly rational in light of the special relationship between emotions and behavior.

IV

My preceding argument was structured as an answer to the question whether emotions should be identified with judgments; and its upshot was a rough account of how contrary emotions might both be appropriate—what notions of contrariety and appropriateness would make sense of that possibility. Starting with an intuitive treatment of my case of friendly rivalry, I tried to explain the possibility in terms of the way emotions are justified by reasons in a basically rational person. A stronger claim, about some higher rational ideal, was not needed to distinguish emotions from judgments, since holding two judgments one knows to be contrary would seem to be downright unreasonable, besides falling short of "perfect" rationality. Now, though, I want to consider whether the stronger claim can be made as well. The conclusions of my preceding argument should not be affected by this one; but this one should let us see just *how* rational my case of mixed feelings really is, assuming that its rationality is not determined by cognitive criteria. I shall argue that it would sometimes be a mistake to treat emotions like judgments, and reconcile them in cases of conflict, even if one could. On a standard of rationality that evaluates emotions according to their behavioral consequences—which takes into account, for instance, the social value of identification with others—ambivalence might sometimes be *more* rational than forming an "all things considered" emotion that resolves the conflict.[17]

I shall illustrate this point in a moment; but let me begin by explaining two qualifications. First of all, even if it is wrong to treat emotions like judgments generally, there may still be enough similarity between the two to allow for their comparison on cognitive criteria, in relation to a total body of evidence. I have admitted as much above, in effect, by characterizing them both as attitudes directed toward an object, with appropriateness taken as the value of emotions which comes closest to truth for judgments. For example, I have assumed that my happiness at my rival's victory is appropriate as long as he has indeed won and I have adequate reason for sharing his happiness at winning; under these conditions, my emotion can be thought of as fitting the facts, like a true judgment. But "adequate reason" for an emotion need not be sufficient to ground a corresponding judgment—it might not count as "evidence" at all. It is clear enough, for example, that my identification with a friend would not give me adequate (cognitive) reason for adopting his beliefs. I shall not deny, then, that the emotions in my case of mixed feelings are in some sense less rational than judgments; but I shall defend them as perfectly rational relative to the *non*cognitive functions of emotion, with emotions considered particularly as *motivating* attitudes, attitudes with special motivational force.

Second, though my defense of this view must rest on some sort of reference to behavior, I shall continue to ignore the conflicts in behavior that conflicting emotions may or may not give rise to. I shall assume that, though emotions may sometimes motivate (exert a kind of pressure toward) irrational behavior, they need not always disrupt deliberation, even if they conflict. Except in extreme cases, we seem to have some control over how we act on them—*more* control than we have over whether we exhibit them or not. For instance, if I waver between positive and negative reactions to my rival's victory, I might be led in extreme cases—where my emotions are especially strong, say—to alternate between friendliness and hostility in his presence. My behavior toward him might very well be inconsistent and self-defeating, and hence irrational. But this is not a necessary consequence of my conflicting feelings; I would ordinarily be able to control their effects on my behavior without actually resolving my emotional conflict. My question is: supposing that I am under pressure to act on my conflicting emotions in *some* way or other (if only to control their effects), *must* my behavior be any less rational than it would be if I resolved the conflict? Let us approach this question by considering a case where I do resolve the

conflict, in the way that we commonly reconcile contrary judgments. I think we shall see that I might lose something important in the process.

Suppose, then, that I do manage to sum my conflicting emotions. We have been assuming that my unhappiness is stronger than my happiness, so perhaps the most likely result would be a somewhat tempered negative reaction to my rival's victory.[18] But then I would no longer participate in his emotion, and share his point of view, though sympathy would have had some effect on what I do feel. From the standpoint of self-interest, then, his feelings might be overridden; and from an impersonal standpoint, on the other hand, they might simply counterbalance my own. A neutral reaction to my rival's victory would also fail to express my identification with his interests—I simply would not care who happened to win—though this solution might well be recommended by some philosophers. The philosopher's ideal of "perfect" rationality is often an ideal of *detachment* from particular points of view. But with emotions taken as motivating attitudes, whose behavioral effects are ordinarily open to control, I think it is clear that conflict between emotional extremes may sometimes serve a purpose that would not be served by moderation. Commitment to different points of view, in short, can motivate behavior unlikely to arise from emotional detachment.

In my case of mixed feelings, for example, how might I exercise rational control over my behavior, in light of my emotional conflict? I think I could best handle the conflict by focusing on my happy feelings in my rival's presence. Assuming that I want to preserve our friendship, I should offer him sincere congratulations, take part enthusiastically in any victory celebrations, avoid dwelling on my own disappointment, and so on. Of course, I could conceivably manage to do all this even if I did not really take an interest in his happiness; but then I would merely be going through the motions, probably unconvincingly: we can often *perceive* the difference between detached and emotional behavior. Genuine emotional identification with others, then, motivates spontaneous sympathetic behavior, behavior that expresses our concern for others' interests for their own sake. I think it should be obvious that such behavior facilitates social relations, and thus promotes an important human end, in a way that detached behavior, or behavior

arising from tempered self-interest, would not be likely to. Indeed, even if my conflicting emotions blended to form a positive reaction to my rival's victory, my happiness for him would presumably be weaker than it would be if I failed to resolve the conflict. By allowing the conflict, but controlling its behavioral effects, I can express my strong commitment to someone else's interests without losing sight of my own.[19]

Some philosophers would argue, of course, that judgments, particularly evaluative judgments, also have motivational force. But without taking a position on that issue, I think we can see that the emotions we are discussing motivate behavior in at least one *special* way. Being pleased about something amounts to a pleasurable state, which an agent would naturally act to promote in himself. Positive feeling can itself be positively reinforcing; that is, happiness motivates behavior partly by *rewarding* it, so it is in some ways a more reliable motive than the judgment that something is good, particularly when the judgment is weakened by qualifications.[20] It provides an agent with a further reason for action because it actually increases the desirability (for him) of one of the options he chooses among. Emotions are typically more variable than judgments; but assuming that happiness at others' good fortune is indicative of a long-range tendency, behavior expressing it would tend to be reassuring to others. It would encourage them to think that they could depend on the agent to consider their interests in the future. For even if judgments have *some* motivational force, emotions usually seem to have more; and it usually seems to be easier to change one's mind, and drop a judgment, than it is to alter a pattern of emotional reaction. Thus, emotional identification with others, as opposed to merely including them in one's detached calculations, can lend a special kind of support to social communication. Providing that the agent has control over the behavior it motivates, its behavioral consequences may make it perfectly rational—ideally suited to promoting human ends—even where it involves emotional conflict.

This is just one fairly simple and obvious example of how the emotions can be useful to us, in view of their motivational force. They are "adaptive," let us say for short; for with proper control, they can help us adapt to our social (and material) environment. Since social adaptation serves some chief ends of morality, more-

over, we can begin to appreciate the obvious *moral* significance of the emotions, even supposing that emotions and moral *judgments* are quite distinct. Indeed, the emotions very likely have moral significance beyond what I need to argue for here in defense of their rationality. Without any reference to the informational role I am assigning to them, we might want to say that they function morally just in so far as they actually let us perceive the world from other people's different points of view, by "mirroring" them in our own, as it were, instead of merely viewing them all from some neutral standpoint. Does moral motivation depend, in fact, on our commitment to "points of view," as opposed to detachment? Would I support my friend's chairmanship with equal enthusiasm, for instance, if all I could do were to observe his happy feelings from a distance? A kind of Humean moral stress on the emotions, but without any version of the "emotivist" account of morality, may seem to emerge from questions like these about their special motivational force. But we need not try to settle such questions here. The argument from social communication suffices to establish *one rational* purpose for the emotions, whatever their further rational or moral purposes. Even in promoting our selfish ends in society, that is, we seem to rely on emotional behavior for the information it provides about the future.

Someone might maintain, though, that a perfectly rational *person* would not *need* the emotions to reassure others about his future behavior. He could be relied on to act in strict accordance with detached calculations of the good, since (unlike a "basically" rational person) he would never be subject to weakness of will. But I think that this argument holds only for someone assumed to be living among others who are also unusually rational, so that they can be depended on to take his qualified judgments as strongly motivating. Even so, of course, they might take emotional behavior as a particularly useful sign of someone's tendency to act in their interests, since emotions are typically harder to fake than judgments. As I have suggested, emotions exert a kind of pressure on us to act, at least partly, by affecting the very options we choose among. But at any rate, though judgments may have motivational force as well, I would insist that any *realistic* ideal of perfect rationality must take account of the stronger link, as people are in fact constituted, between emotions and behavior. Instead of detachment, it should stress control over the behavioral consequences of emotion; for with such control, emotions play an important role in motivating rational behavior.[21] On any remotely realistic ideal, then, suppressing an emotion may sometimes be *less* rational than controlling its behavioral consequences.

Since this point seems to apply even to a case of conflicting emotions, like my case of friendly rivalry, I think we may conclude that the "logic" of emotion permits ambivalence. In general, there seem to be two phases of our reasoning with an emotion: to it from its object and from it to behavior. We are far from understanding the logic of the two phases, in particular, the special motivational force of emotions needs further explanation, and I have suggested that we need to understand it if we are to make any progress toward explaining the general concept of an emotion. For the moment, however, I think we may conclude that, where both phases are under proper rational control, even conflicting emotions may be perfectly rational in at least one important sense, given the fact that the agent and the others he interacts with are not perfectly rational. Exhibiting the emotions may be the best way of promoting the agent's ends—that is, the emotions may be "adaptive" as well as appropriate—even if (as philosophers often argue) emotions are in some sense intrinsically *ir*rational and impose some *limitations* on rational control. Indeed, the fact that emotions resist control may be part of the reason why they are useful to us, and hence in our sense rational—part of what gives them their motivational force, and thus lets them serve (in my particular example) as a way of binding ourselves to one another.

Someone might maintain, of course, that we would really all be better off with no emotions whatever, and no need for emotions to bind ourselves to each other. Just above, I have dismissed such cognitive ideals of "perfect" rationality as unrealistic; but in fact I think that the problem goes deeper than that. Some unrealistic ideals (utopian visions of society, for example) seem to provide us with a reasonable standard for action, since the attempt to live up to them presumably is likely to have good consequences, even though it can never quite succeed. But on the whole, I strongly suspect that approaching an ideal of complete detachment, in a world where we depend on the emotions for their special motivational force, would be likely to have rather *bad* consequences. Detach-

ment is surely sometimes in order, in those extreme cases (for instance) where our emotions would otherwise be too strong to allow for control of their behavioral consequences. But where an emotion is both appropriate and adaptive, it may be clearly wrong to urge "philosophic detachment" from it.

NOTES

*I am indebted to my colleague Arthur Flemming for his extremely helpful comments on the earlier versions of this paper, including one I presented at a University of Chicago philosophy colloquium in November 1977.

1. This view is attributed to the Stoics, for instance. For a detailed historical survey of accounts of the emotions, see H. J. Gardiner et al, *Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1970).

2. See Robert C. Solomon, "The Logic of Emotion," *Nous,* XI, 1 (March 1977), 41-49; also, *The Passions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1976). Solomon does not seem to use "logic" in any very precise (or familiar) sense; but I shall not be much concerned here with the fine points of his argument, which I find both illuminating and obscure. A similar view emerges, though, in Donald Davidson, "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," *Journal of Philosophy,* LXXIII, 19 (November 4, 1976), 744-757, see, e.g., p. 751.

3. For an examination of some irrational features of the emotions, see Amélie Rorty, "Explaining Emotions," *Journal of Philosophy,* LXXV, 3 (March 1978), 139-161, also published in this volume. Also, see Frithjof Bergmann, Review of *The Passions* by Robert C. Solomon, *Journal of Philosophy,* LXXV, 4 (April 1978), 200-208, for a refutation of Solomon from another point of view, which I heard at the meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, in April 1977. On some points, my argument will overlap with these, as well as some others (especially Solomon's; and also, of course, the classic treatments of the subject in Descartes and Hume). The differences are also important, however, and numerous and complicated, so for simplicity's sake I shall present my argument without much reference to other authors.

4. See, e.g., Solomon, *The Passions,* pp. 166, 283, 406. But see also Bernard Williams, "Ethical Consistency," in *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: University Press, 1973), for a related treatment of the problem of conflicting desires.

5. I shall give page-references to the *Ethics,* using the translation by R. H. M. Elwes; see Benedict de Spinoza, *On the Improvement of the Understanding: The Ethics; Correspondence* (New York: Dover, 1955). For a classical *rejection* of the possibility of ambivalence, see David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), p. 278. (But cf. Réné Descartes, "The Passions of the Soul," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes,* ed. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), p. 408. Descartes' example—and his account of ambivalence in terms of different reasons—comes close to common sense; but Spinoza's general treatment of the subject contains an important insight, as we shall see.)

6. I shall adopt Spinoza's terminology; but I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the transference of emotions he picks out as "imitation" is meant to rest on any sort of conscious mimicry of others' reactions. I think it must involve *direct* transference, though, in some sense actually coming to *share* another person's happiness, e.g., instead of merely being made happy oneself by reflection on the fact that he is. With this restriction, however, I shall ignore distinctions that other authors might insist upon, and use interchangeably a range of expressions that in ordinary language do seem to fit the rough phenomenon Spinoza seems to have in mind. Thus, I shall speak of "identifying" with others, "participating" in their emotions, acquiring "sympathetic" emotions, and so forth, without taking myself to depart in any significant way from Spinoza's general notion of imitation, though I *will* sson abandon his account of it in terms of resemblance.

7. Spinoza uses ambivalence in his account of jealousy (or our mixed feelings toward a person whose affections we have a rival *for*); cf. Prop. XXXV with its accompanying Note (pp. 153-154). But it does not seem to come into his account of envy (or our feelings toward the rival himself); cf. Prop. XXIV with its accompanying Note (pp. 146-147). For Spinoza's further examples of ambivalence, see Prop. XXXI (p. 151), Corollary I to Prop. XL (p. 157), the Corollary to Prop. XLI (p. 158), and Prop. XLVII with its accompanying Note (pp. 160-161).

8. Spinoza's ideal applies only to those emotions he picks out as "passive"—cf., e.g., Prop. LVIII (p. 171) and the Note to Prop. LIX (pp. 171-173)—but these seem to cover all the emotions we recognize as such in common life. For some further comments on Spinoza's ideal of freedom (particularly in relation to knowledge), see, e.g., the Note to Prop. LXVI in Part IV (p. 232) and the Note to Prop. IV in Part V (pp. 248-249).

9. I am not assuming that *all* emotions are plausibly made out as "propositional pro and con attitudes," but just that these are. Instead, I shall later characterize emotions in general simply as attitudes, of a sort that we can compare with at least some judgments.

First of all, many emotions, e.g., love and hatred, clearly have persons, rather than propositions, as their objects (and it should become obvious, later on, that the same is also true of many judgments, as I am parsing them; see n. 13). It may still be true that emotions are all in some sense *based on* propositional attitudes; perhaps love and hatred, e.g., could be reconstructed out of hypotheticals about what a rational person *would* feel about various possible facts involving the persons they are directed toward. Some such proposal would let us set up a kind of "logic of appropriateness" for the emotions (cf. n. 14); and it may provide us with a way of making some modern sense of the seventeenth-century attempt to build all emotions out of "primaries."

Second, I am not even sure (though I think it not unlikely) that all emotions can be interpreted as pro and con attitudes, as having some positive or negative "point," as I put it below. Spinoza, e.g., accepts desire as a third primary, besides pleasure and pain; see, e.g., the Note to prop. XI (p. 138) and his summary of his views under "Definitions of the Emotions" (pp. 173-174). But it is questionable whether desire really amounts to an emotion; and in any case, perhaps it *could* be made out as a pro attitude, with aversion as the corresponding con attitude. However, I shall leave such questions open here. Many emotions can be taken as pro and con attitudes, surely; and my argument below will make use of this view.

10. This suggests at least one rough point of analogy between emotions and judgments, but with important limitations. Judgments, too, may be held over time spans including, but not limited to, the times when they are actually *asserted* (whether in speech or just mentally). So perhaps assertion, as a cognitive episode, plays a role for judgments, which is something like the role I have assigned to emotional *experience,* or episodes of feeling. Taken as attitudes, as I take them here, emotions and judgments both may be said to be based on (at least the possibility of) certain mental

occurrences; but clearly we can hold a judgment, or exhibit an emotion, without at the same time—or ever—expressing it in conscious thought or feeling.

On the other hand, I shall expand below on some of the crucial differences between judgment and emotion. For instance, not every expression of a judgment in thought—not every "mental utterance" of it—need actually count as an assertion. There are various possible degrees of assent to a judgment: one can merely "entertain" it, to examine its implications, say; or one can assent to it tentatively, pending further evidence, taking the judgment as merely *prima facie*. Perhaps we can sometimes "toy" with an emotion, try it out, as it were, to see how it fits the situation, and perhaps emotions can sometimes be exhibited without full conviction. But in any case, it is clear that we only have limited control over our ability to take such intermediate emotional positions, and, in general, to "change our mind" about an emotion, so the decision to withhold full assent from a judgment often may have no effect at all on the emotion we take to correspond to it.

Moreover, there seems to be an important analogy (again with important limitations) between contrariety in judgments and emotions. Its details will emerge as my main argument proceeds; but in general, I think we must take contrary emotions, like contrary judgments, as expressing conflicting "points" or "positions," and not just as amounting to conflicting properties or states. It is clearly possible for someone to exhibit two contrary emotions, just as he might hold both of two contrary judgments. But—someone might object—is it possible to *experience* conflicting emotions at one and the same time? I am not sure how this question should be answered; but in any case, I do not think it really threatens the limited analogy I wish to set up between emotions and judgments.

Is it possible actually to *assert* two contrary *judgments* at one and the same time? I have my doubts, but perhaps this point is undercut somewhat by the intermediate degrees of assent to a judgment which I sketched just above. Is it possible, instead, to give some sort of simultaneous mental utterance to two *prima facie* judgments? I still have my doubts, in fact, because of some general questions, also applicable to emotions, about the restrictions on occurrent thought. Perhaps it *is* impossible to experience simultaneous conflicting feelings (though we do speak of "mingled" pleasure and pain, say). But this point (supposing it holds) would not seem to apply particularly to *contrary* feelings. I think it may be impossible to experience any two very *different* feelings, whether or not they are contraries, at one and the same time. Can we actually be said to experience hope and hatred simultaneously, for example? My doubts are even stronger about occurrent feelings which are directed (and often appropriately directed) toward the same object, e.g., love and anger.

In general: how many mental occurrences can take place in the same mind at exactly the same time? Doubtless certain combinations are possible; but those that are ruled out would clearly include many that could not be plausibly taken as contraries, at least in the sense of "contrary" that seems to be relevant here. Later on in my main argument (after bringing in some of the points I anticipate here), I shall try to pin down the relevant sense of "contrary," for emotions, by analogy with judgments. For the moment, though, I think we may conclude that the relevant sense is *not* explained by reference to possible real-world combinations of emotion or judgment.

11. I owe this point (and much of my treatment of Spinoza) to Arthur Flemming. Spinoza takes pleasure and pain as "confused ideas" (see, e.g., his "General Definition of the Emotions," pp. 185-186); and on some interpretations his "ideas" come out as judgments. His characterization of the judgments that amount to emotions seems to depend very heavily, though, on the peculiarities of his overall system; so I shall limit my attention to some simple modern candidates below.

12. Solomon seems to suggest both alternatives in different places. For the first view, with judgments taken as evaluations, see, e.g., *The Passions*, pp. 149, 187; but he also at least allows for the possibility of the second view, with judgments taken as giving the grounds for evaluations, e.g., in "The Logic of Emotion," p. 47. I shall eventually conclude that the first view *is* more plausible, even though the second may give better support to the claim that emotions and judgments always *correspond* (see n. 14).

13. As my parenthetical insertions are meant to indicate, I am not parsing these statements as they are standardly parsed by authors who make out judgments as propositional attitudes. The attitude in question is standardly taken as simple *belief* (not a pro or con attitude), directed toward *contrary* propositional objects which give the content of the two evaluative judgments, as follows:

I think (it is good that he won).
I think (it is bad that he won).

But on this interpretation, my contrary judgments would not seem to be analogous to the contrary emotions ascribed to me above, with contrary *attitudes* taken as directed toward a *common* propositional object. Instead, to exhibit the analogy, I suggest that we take the attitude involved in judgment as some sort of attitude of predication (in this case, "judging good" or "judging bad") applied to an object (in this case, a propositional object) which amounts to the subject of predication. Thus, I would parse the two statements above as follows:

I think it is good (that he won).
I think it is bad (that he won).

These statements clearly ascribe to me contrary pro and con attitudes directed toward a common propositional object. (For a similar interpretation of *non*evaluative judgments, however, we would need to make some changes. They can be taken as attitudes of predication toward a common object; but the attitudes need not be contrary pro and con attitudes, and the object need not be propositional.)

14. Some further "logical" differences between emotions and judgments emerge from an interesting variant of my example, which I had intended to use in a side-argument designed to strengthen the case against emotions as qualified evaluations. In fact, this example may turn out to be in some ways more revealing than the one I focus on; but it is not a case of basic rationality (or even, necessarily, of ambivalence), so it might just constitute a distraction from the main argument presented in my text. Consequently, I shall restrict it to footnotes, outlining it here, and exploring some of its implications for the attempt to identify emotions with evaluative judgments; and then, in n. 15, showing how it forces us to distinguish appropriateness from truth.

My variant case rests on the possibility of conflicts between emotions and evaluative judgments themselves, of having an emotion one does not consider appropriate. Where emotions, like evaluative judgments, involve taking positions pro and con on some object, it seems that our emotional and judgmental "positions" can sometimes conflict. I might actually believe, for instance, that my rival's victory is good without qualification, though simply out of competitiveness I feel bad about it. What if I feel extremely guilty about my competitiveness—so guilty, in fact, that I consider my emotional reaction completely inappropriate? (I think my guilt-feelings *are* appropriate, say.) For I do not really want the chairmanship at all. My negative feelings at not attaining it stem from a lifelong aversion to losing *anything* that I recognize as completely irrational. It seems at least possible, in this variant case, that I do not hold even the qualified judgment: "His winning is bad in that it frustrates a

desire of my own." (I think it could only be *good* to frustrate *that* desire, suppose.)

Indeed, this variant case suggests that the argument for identifying emotions with evaluative judgments may be trading on an important confusion. In general, it seems that an emotion will be *appropriate* just as long as some evaluative judgment is *true*. Perhaps this means that the belief that one's emotion is appropriate corresponds to an evaluative judgment; but it does not mean that the emotion itself corresponds to that judgment. Thus I have spoken of emotions and judgments just as corresponding "generally" above, though perhaps a stronger claim can be made for cases of basic rationality, where the agent does take his emotional reactions to be appropriate. This, in fact, may be what really stands behind philosophers' several attempts to identify emotions with judgments—what gives that view its initial appearance of plausibility—for we might say that, insofar as they are *reasonable,* emotions have a kind of cognitive "content" which evaluative judgments express. Where an agent's emotions are "basically rational," that is, they involve an implicit commitment to some claim (perhaps unspecified) that would support them as appropriate (We might think of this implied claim as spelling out the *rational* content of an emotion.) This is a suggestion worth looking into, I think, in exploring the logical interrelations between emotion and judgment. But it rests on the (at least partly) normative notion of "rationality"; so I see no way to get from it to a descriptive thesis identifying emotions with evaluative judgments.

More needs to be said, of course, about the various logical terms I am applying to emotions, here and elsewhere: "appropriate," "rational," "reasonable," and the like. I shall say a bit more about them below, but by no means enough.

15. Reflection on my variant guilt case above (see n. 14) has led me to a stronger argument for distinguishing appropriateness from truth. Holding a judgment involves some kind of commitment to its truth, even apart from the requirements of rationality. To hold it *is* just to think that it is true; and to assert it is to say so. But the guilt case seemed to indicate that we can have or exhibit (or even experience) an emotion without any commitment to its appropriateness. (Perhaps, in fact, it is this disanalogy between emotions and judgments which explains those I outlined, e.g., in n. 10 above; it certainly drives a wedge between assertion of a judgment and emotional experience.) Here it seems that appropriateness comes closer to justification than truth (as I suggest just below); for at least in cases of irrationality, we can hold a judgment without thinking it justified. We can cling to it obstinately, as it were, in the face of strong counterevidence; or just blindly, without even evaluating its evidence at all. (Consider, e.g., some people's belief in God.)

On the other hand, we might not want to equate appropriateness with justification, either. Like truth in judgments, appropriateness does not seem to depend on everything we might want to count as a reason for an emotion, but only on reasons that somehow serve to link it to a real-world object. First of all, there may be extrinsic reasons for an emotion, reasons why it is useful in attaining our ends. (I shall touch on some of these—particularly social reasons—in my last section, under the heading of "adaptiveness.") For instance, in a threatening situation in which others are depending on my calmness, I may have reason to avoid exhibiting fear, to keep myself from having the feeling at all, that is (in accordance with my use of "exhibit" throughout this paper), even though the feeling would be perfectly appropriate. For the situation I face may be so extremely threatening that my fear would be too strong to hide from others, if I felt it. So in this case, we might want to say that an appropriate emotion would not be justified, at least on the grounds that seem to apply to emotions.

But second, if I may complicate this discussion further, there seem to be some important differences between the grounds on which emotions and judgments would

be deemed justified. A reason that would justify a judgment, presumably, is reason for thinking the judgment true, not just some noncognitive reason for holding it, e.g., in order to please others or to make oneself feel secure. Suppose, then, that I model my reaction to some situation on my observations of another person, not because I identify with him but just because he is generally sensitive and rational in such matters, a reliable guide to emotional appropriateness. In this case, he is wrong, however; so my reaction might seem to be justified but not appropriate. I have adequate reason for thinking it appropriate, say; but I do not have adequate reason for the emotion. (In fact, my way of arriving at it would in most cases seem ridiculous, though it is analogous to a common and legitimate path to judgments.) I can only conclude that appropriateness falls somewhere in between justification and truth, and that the relations between these notions (for emotions as well as judgments) are confusing. But I can think of no notion that comes closer to truth than appropriateness; so I shall continue to suppose here that it is the basic rational value of the emotions. If there is a better notion, my argument can simply be rephrased in terms of it.

16. For a concise account of several such attempts, ending in a Wittgensteinian "paradigm case" view (and thus, in effect, in a rejection of the general question), see William P. Alston, "Emotion and Feeling," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Vol. I, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967). It remains a crucial issue, of course—which the "paradigm case" view does not shed much light on—just how emotion is related to phenomena in those other categories (in what sense emotional attitudes, e.g., are "based on reactions to particular facts, as they come into consciousness"—my brief suggestion below). But I think, by now, it is clear enough that we cannot easily make out emotions as identical to any of those phenomena; and if, as attitudes, they must involve various dispositions to exhibit those phenomena, it also seems clear enough, by now, that it is difficult to make them out as simply identical to those dispositions. (It is also clear that the dispositions must be extremely complex, for both emotions and judgments.)

17. My argument for this final point need not be taken, like that in my central sections, as an argument for distinguishing emotions from judgments. Judgments can also be evaluated on noncognitive criteria at times; and in this case, someone might argue that I would be better off stopping at the first stage of their reconciliation, and resisting the urge to decide between the qualified evaluations above. However, where grounds for forming a single judgment are available to me, I think it must always seem odd, at least, to refuse to take them into account. We seem to recognize some rational "push" toward moving on to the second stage of reconciliation for judgments. Though we may sometimes resist it, and refuse to sum them, I think this requires a stronger justification than the one I go on to sketch for emotions. I would suggest, then, that cognitive criteria are somehow more essential to the proper evaluation of judgments; but my further remarks can be made out as independent of this view.

18. There are various different senses in which we may speak of the "strength" of an emotion (e.g., felt intensity vs. force as a motive); and in any case, there may be other factors (e.g., the importance assigned to it as a reason) which determine whether a particular emotion is "overriding." To avoid some difficult issues, then, I shall not limit my argument to any single imagined outcome of the attempt to sum emotional contraries.

19. Losing sight of my own interests—completely repressing my *un*happiness—might in fact be worse than ignoring someone else's feelings. Arthur Flemming has pointed out the dangers of *servility,* for some agents, in this connection. But even supposing that I have no tendencies toward servility, I may have reason to retain my

emotional point of view. Without some counterbalancing reaction, some private disappointment, e.g., identification with a rival might often have damaging consequences, like bottled-up hostility. Even a healthy self, in short, needs occasional reinforcement.

20. This need not hold for every positive feeling, for every emotion "based on" positive feeling (cf. n. 9), in the sense that it involves taking a pro attitude toward some object. Thus, e.g., love need not always be positively reinforcing; in some circumstances, hatred may actually feel better and be preferred. Indeed, perhaps there are even some circumstances in which the "primary" positive feelings I am discussing here would actually be annoying, on the whole (where we really—perversely—were *hoping* to be disappointed about something, say). But I think they must always be to some extent pleasurable, even if the pleasure can sometimes be outweighed by accompanying "pains," and even if it is wrong (as I think) to *equate* positive and negative feeling ("being pleased" and "being pained") with simple pleasure and pain. (In fact, since it is emotional *attitudes* I mean to be discussing here, it would be wrong to equate them with *any* features of experience.)

In general, I mean to suggest, just above, that part of the special motivational force of an emotion has to do with extralogical facts about the nature of positive and negative feeling, granting the "logical" fact with which my main argument began: that like evaluative judgment, it involves some sort of pro or con attitude toward an object. Judgmental pro attitudes may also be to some extent positively reinforcing; and it is hard to say precisely why emotion is generally more so, or more so, at least, than evaluative judgment alone (which is all I really need to grant here). But this point does seem intuitively clear.

21. This claim should hardly be surprising to a post-Freudian era (e.g., in view of the likely effects of repression, which I bring up only briefly in n. 19). For that matter, something not unlike it seems to lie behind Descartes's various comments, and especially his general approach to examples in "Part Third."

Note that control over the behavioral consequences of emotion may also give us some indirect control over their expression in experience. I may be able to restrict myself to happy feelings in my rival's presence, e.g., simply by getting involved in his victory celebrations and refusing to think about the grounds for my own disappointment. We need a more detailed treatment of the relation of attitudes to experience and behavior, to flesh out my many hints in this last section. (I hope to flesh them out somewhat in a forthcoming book, *Emotions and Reasons.* For some initial comments on the question of motivational force, but without much reference to the emotions, see "Behavior Control and Freedom of Action," *Philosophical Review,* LXXXVII, 2 (April 1978), 225-240, esp. 230-233. A fuller discussion of these topics would have to deal with the possibility of identifying emotions with desires; but I have focused here on the attempt to identify them with judgments. Since this paper was completed, I have benefited from comments by Jerome Neu whose recent book on the emotions charts an opposing view; see *Emotion, Thought, and Therapy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977), esp. pp. 148-149. For some later remarks on the subject, emphasizing the distinction between judgments proper and the general category of "thought" which Neu equates with belief (see esp. pp. 36-37), see "Emotions and Evaluations" (unpublished, presented at the December 1979 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division).

X

EMOTIONS AND CHOICE

ROBERT C. SOLOMON

I

Do we choose our emotions? Can we be held responsible for our anger? for feeling jealousy? for falling in love or succumbing to resentment or hatred? The suggestion sounds odd because emotions are typically considered occurrences that happen to (or "in") us: emotions are taken to be the hallmark of the irrational and the disruptive. Controlling one's emotion is supposed to be like the caging and taming of a wild beast, the suppression and sublimation of a Freudian "it."

Traditionally, emotions have been taken to be feelings or sensations. More recently, but also traditionally, emotions have been taken to be physiological disturbances. Accordingly, much of this century's literature on emotions is dedicated to mapping out the relationship between sensations and correlative occurrences. William James, for example, takes consciousness of emotions to be consciousness of physiological occurrences. Other philosophers and psychologists, for one reason or another, have tried to reduce the emotion to a physiological occurrence, or, alternatively, have focused on the feeling of emotion and denied any conceptual role to the physiological occurrence. But these traditional worries should be quite irrelevant to any analysis of the emotions, for an emotion is neither a sensation nor a physiological occurrence, nor an occurrence of any other kind. "Struck by jealousy," "driven by anger," "plagued by remorse," "paralyzed by fear," "felled by shame," like "the prick of Cupid's arrow," are all symptomatic metaphors betraying a faulty philosophical analysis. Emotions are not occurrences and do not happen to us. I would like to suggest that emotions are rational and purposive rather than irrational and